Why this genitive with “perceive”?

In On Sleep (454a4), Aristotle has this

τὸν γὰρ αἰσθανόμενον ἐγρηγορέναι νομίζομεν καὶ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα ἢ τῶν ἔξωθέν τινος αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων.

which I take to mean

For we hold that the person who is perceiving is awake and that everyone who is awake either perceives something from outside or [perceives] motions within himself.

If that is right, why are the underlined words in the genitive? To perceive (αἰσθάνομαι) would normally take an accusative.

Are objects of the infinitive in accusative-infinitive constructions (here because of νομίζομεν) in the genitive instead of accusative? Or something like that?

To perceive (αἰσθάνομαι) would normally take an accusative.

Cambridge Grammar CG p. 367
Verbs taking the genitive

αἰσθάνομαι …Perceive (by ear , the gen. marks the source of sound; αἰσθάνομαι + acc =“become aware of”, learn;
combinations of gender./acc. occur )

Look at the lexicon entry.

αἰσθ-άνομαι (cf. αἴσθομαι), Ion. 3pl.opt. αἰσθανοίατο Ar. Pax 209: impf. ῃσθανόμην: fut. αἰσθήσομαι S. Ph. 75, etc.; later αἰσθανθήσομαι LXX Is. 49.26; αἰσθηθήσομαι ib.33.11: aor. 2 ᾐσθόμην: pf. ᾔσθημαι: later, aor. 1 ᾐσθησάμην Sch.Arat. 418; ᾐσθήθην LXX Jb. 40.18: (cf. ἀΐω):—
Aperceive, apprehend by the senses, Alcmaeon 1a, Hdt. 3.87, Democr. 11, etc.; τῇ ὄψει, τῇ ἁφῇ, τῇ ἀκοῇ Hp. Off. 1; αἰ. τῇ ἀκοῇ, τῇ ὀσμῇ, Th. 6.17, X. Mem. 3.11.8; see, S. Ph. 75, etc.; hear, βοήν Id. Aj. 1318, cf. Ph. 252; οὐκ εἶδον αὐτόν, ᾐσθόμην δʼ ἔτʼ ὄντανιν ib.445; τινὸς ὑποστενούσης αἰ. Id. El. 79; βοῆς E. Hipp. 603, etc.

2 of mental perception, perceive, understand, τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι Hp. Off. 1; τὸ πραχθέν Lys. 9.4, cf. Th. 3.36, etc.:— hear, learn, v. infr. II: abs., αἰσθάνει you are right, E. Or. 752; ᾔσθημαι, in parenthesis, Id. Hipp. 1403.

II Construct. in both senses, c. gen., take notice of, have perception of, τῶν κακῶν E. Tr. 638 s. v.l.; rarely περί τινος Th. 1.70; αἰ. ὑπό τινος learn from one, Id. 5.2; διά τινος Pl. Tht. 184e, al.: c. acc., S. El. 89, Ph. 252, E. Hel. 653, 764, etc.:—freq. with part. agreeing with subject, αἰσθάνομαι κάμνων Th. 2.51; αἰσθώμεθα γελοῖοι ὄντες Pl. Thg. 122c; agreeing with object, τυράννους ἐκπεσόντας ᾐσθόμην A. Pr. 957, cf. Th. 1.47, etc.; ἤδη τινῶν ᾐσθόμην ἀχθομένων Lys. 16.20, cf. Pl. Ap. 22c; ᾐσθόμην τεχνωμένου Ar. V. 176: less freq. c. acc. et inf., Th. 6.59; αἰ. ὅτι . . Id. 5.2, Pl. Ap. 21e, etc.; ᾔσθετο ὅτι τὸ στράτευμα ἦν . . X. An. 1.2.21; αἰ. ὡς . . ib.3.1.40, etc.; οὕνεκα . . S. El. 1477:—abs., αἰσθανόμενος having full possession of oneʼs faculties, τῇ ἡλικίᾳ Th. 5.26; sensible, of keen perception, καὶ μετρίως αἰσθανομένῳ φανερόν X. Mem. 4.1.1, cf. Th. 1.71, Pl. R. 360d.—The Pass. is supplied by αἴσθησιν παρέχω, cf. αἴσθησις I.
IIIdisplay feeling, Arist. Po. 1454b37.

So it is related to the cases that the verb takes. It’s not an artefact of the grammar.

Which makes the choice here all the more interesting, for normally Aristotle uses the accusative.

I had been wondering if his choice here might tell us something about his philosophy of perception. Maybe it does . . . . Hmm.

Thanks!

The way I read it, only τινος depends on αἰσθάνεσθαι, while both τῶν ἔξωθέν and τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων are partitive genitives with τινος. Also, κινησεων applies to τῶν ἔξωθέν as well as to τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ, so that both external movements and internal ones are covered.
“… and that everyone who’s awake perceives something either of the (movements) from outside (himself) or of the movements within himself.”

τινος is genitive because it’s the source of what’s perceived, not what’s actually perceived. ακουω (for example) works just the same way. “I hear you” gen., “I hear your voice” acc.
(So the genitive could be called “an artefact of the grammar,” but the grammar is an artefact of the conceptualization, which is not specifically Aristotelian.)

Fred Miller read it that way in his Oxford Univ Press translation.

By it, Aristotle says that what we perceive are movements either inside or outside the body.

But that suggests we do not perceive anything in the world unless it is in motion. And that just doesn’t sound like Aristotle.

I can see him saying that about internal perceptions (we don’t feel our stomachs unless something is churning around there; we don’t feel what is inside our heads unless something is moving the wrong way in there and that gives us a headache), but I have not seen him say that about external objects.

Generally, I am finding that he uses the genitive for categories of things preceived (we perceive hard, warm, and cold, σκληροῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ, 492b30) and the accusative for particular items (αἰσθάνεται τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον, 100a17).

The Loeb translator also read it as Miller and @mwh do, but only by reading κινήσεων as “stimuli.”

I do still wonder if he intended “perceives something from outside or [perceives] motions within himself.”

My sense of Greek tells me that τινος αἰσθάνεσθαι(not αἰσθάνεσθαι alone) will apply to the second η as well as first. Then τῶν ἔξωθεν and τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ are in parallel.

Perception (aisthesis) of any external object would be construed as a matter of light or sound or whatever traveling between that object and the perceiver’s sensory organs (eyes, ears, etc.)—that’s to say, κινησις. Stimuli is an apt term. (One-way traffic, from the object to the perceiver, as in Empedocles? hence εξωθεν rather than εξω?) But I know damn all about Aristotle’s theories of perception.