In Nicomachean Ethics (1142a26), Aristotle has this:
Ὅτι δ᾿ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν·
τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται·
τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον.
ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ·
ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη
ἀλλ᾿ αἴσθησις,
οὐχ ἡ τ ἰδίωνῶν,
ἀλλ᾿ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα
ὅτι τὸ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον τρίγωνον·
στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ.
which seems to mean, pretty straightforwardly:
That phronēsis [is] not epistēmē is clear;
for [it] is of the end-point,
as was said,
for what is done is of this sort.
It is certainly opposite to nous.
for nous [is] of definitions, of which there is not logos.
and that [phronēsis] [is] of the end-point, of which there is not epistēmē,
but instead aisthēsis—
not that of the special ones,
but the sort [sort of aisthēsis, not sort of nous] by which we perceive
that in mathematics the end-point is triangle
for there will be a stop there.
In Aristotle’s epistemology, that all makes sense enough. But next comes this:
ἀλλ᾿ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις,
ἐκείνης δ᾿ ἄλλο εἶδος.
which translators take to mean
But this is more aisthēsis than phronēsis,
but the other form.
That is, they take hautē to mean "this that we have been discussing.” But hautē is feminine, not neuter, and the only recent feminine nouns are aisthēsis, epistēmē, and phronēsis. None of those make obviously good sense here.
What is the antecedent of hautē?