ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικόν

Greek Learning Greek
1

The following is the sentence where Aristotle speaks “of” Plato’s unwritten teaching:

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο.

I would like to ask about the grammatical structure of the first part of the sentence: ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικόν.

The ἄλλον τρόπον is, I guess, the accusative of respect. I cannot figure out the participle λέγων and the (direct object?) μεταληπτικόν. I would have expected something like περί + genitive (of the term for “participant”), so that Aristotle would be saying that it is in another respect that Plato talks “about” the participant there (ἐκεῖ) (than in his in his unwritten teaching), but I’m not sure what is going on here.

Edit: Rereading the passage, I guess the Greeks don’t say “of” something but just say it, which is why I shouldn’t be surprised that “the participant” is in the accusative.

2

I don’t think I could come close to understanding this sentence without more context, some understanding of Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics (for it seems to relate more to metaphysical than to physical doctrine) and more brainpower than I have at my disposal. However, τὸ μεταληπτικὸν is neuter. Your translation as “participant” makes me wonder whether you noticed that it’s neuter. Or is your term “participant” meant as an abstract concept rather than as an individual?

LSJ’s gloss (which is totally opaque to me, but might be helpful to you if you’ve not already seen it):

τὸ μ. capability of receiving form, Platonic name for ὕλη, Arist.Ph.209b12, Placit.1.19.1.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dmetalhptiko%2Fs

A. seems to be saying that P., talking about τὸ μεταληπτικὸν in a different way there (in his written works?) that in his spoken, unwritten teachings, revealed that the τόπος and the χώρα are the same thing. But I think you got that much already.

3

I considered it as neuter accusative (is this wrong?). The LSJ explains μεταληπτικός as “concerning or involving μετάληψις (participation),” which is why I renedered it as “participant.”

Speaking of which, I guess μετάληψις dervies from μεταλαμβάνω, which the LSJ explains as “to have or get a share of, to partake of a thing.” Of course, Plato refers to participate/participation more commonly as μετέχω and μέθεξις.

4

Hi hairetikon (that has a nice ring to it).

Hylander is right (in fact ‘Hi haeretikon, hi Hylander’ has a doubly nice ring to it): It is hopeless to try to understand this sentence without more context. For future reference, it would be helpful of you to provide a citation. Anyway, it was easy enough to Google it and find that your sentence is from Aristotle’s Physics, which means almost by definition that it is dealing with difficult definitions.

You can think of ἄλλον τρόπον as an accusative of respect if you want; it’s simply an extremely common adverbial phrase meaning ‘differently’.

I don’t get how you got ‘participant’ out of μεταληπτικόν? Are you reading the Physics, or did you get this sentence from some entirely different context (perhaps one that cites this sentence for its reference to Plato’s ‘so-called unwritten opinions’?)

SPOILER ALERT. Anyway, here is the sentence in its surrounding paragraph, along with its translation in the Loeb. You will see that ἐκεῖ refers to the Timaeus. The translator’s single quotes (‘matter’, ‘room’, ‘the receptive-of-determination’, ‘place’) reveal that you are dealing with highly specialized terminology, including μεταληπτικόν.

Διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταὐτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· τὸ γὰρ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο. λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, τί δ᾿ ἐστίν, οὗτος μόνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν. This is why Plato, in the Timaeus, identifies, ‘matter’ and ‘room,’ because ‘room’ and ‘the receptive-of-determination’ are one and the same thing. His account of the ‘receptive’ differs in the Timaeus and in what are known as his Unwritten Teachings, but he is consistent in asserting the identity of ‘place’ and ‘room.’ Thus, whereas everyone asserts the reality of ‘place,’ only Plato has so much as attempted to tell us what it is.

5

It’s clear enough in the broader context:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἄλλο λέγεται,
καὶ τόπος ὁ μὲν κοινός, ἐν ᾧ ἅπαντα τὰ σώματά ἐστιν,
ὁ δ’ ἴδιος, ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ (λέγω δὲ οἷον σὺ νῦν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ
ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οὗτος δ’ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι δὲ ὅτι
ἐν τῇ γῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ὅτι ἐν τῷδε τῷ τόπῳ, (35)
(209b) ὃς περιέχει οὐδὲν πλέον ἢ σέ), εἰ δή ἐστιν ὁ τόπος τὸ πρῶτον
περιέχον ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων, πέρας τι ἂν εἴη, ὥστε δό-
ξειεν ἂν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἑκάστου ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ᾧ
ὁρίζεται τὸ μέγεθος καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἡ τοῦ μεγέθους· τοῦτο γὰρ
ἑκάστου πέρας. οὕτω μὲν οὖν σκοποῦσιν ὁ τόπος τὸ ἑκάστου εἶ- (5)
δός ἐστιν· ᾗ δὲ δοκεῖ ὁ τόπος εἶναι τὸ διάστημα τοῦ μεγέ-
θους, ἡ ὕλη· τοῦτο γὰρ ἕτερον τοῦ μεγέθους, τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ
περιεχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ ὡρισμένον, οἷον ὑπὸ ἐπιπέδου
καὶ πέρατος, ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἀόριστον· ὅταν
γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ πέρας καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς σφαίρας, λεί- (10)
πεται οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ὕλην. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ
τὴν χώραν ταὐτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ· τὸ γὰρ με-
ταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. ἄλλον δὲ τρό-
πον ἐκεῖ τε λέγων τὸ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις
ἀγράφοις δόγμασιν, ὅμως τὸν τόπον καὶ τὴν χώραν τὸ (15)
αὐτὸ ἀπεφήνατο. λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τό-
πον, τί δ’ ἐστίν, οὗτος μόνος ἐπεχείρησεν εἰπεῖν.

He’s talking about the ὕλη. It is μεταληπτικὸν because “ὅταν γὰρ ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ πέρας καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς σφαίρας, λείπεται οὐδὲν παρὰ τὴν ὕλην”. I guess we’d call it the “boundary”?

Or maybe “space”? I can’t tell whether he’s referring to the defining boundary or whole space left over from the object.

6

I wrote, “A. seems to be saying that P., talking about τὸ μεταληπτικὸν in a different way there (in his written works?) that in his spoken, unwritten teachings, revealed that the τόπος and the χώρα are the same thing.”

But I think I was wrong. A.seems to be saying that P.'s account of τὸ μεταληπτικόν in the Timaeus is different from that in his unwritten teachings, but nevertheless (ὅμως) he showed (in both cases?) that the τόπος and the χώρα are the same thing. I missed the force of ὅμως.

7

Hi, for the background context on the passage (from Aristotle, Physics 209b13–16), I’m setting out here the analysis and commentary on this from Ross’ edition of the Physics (1936), in case helpful.

Analysis of Book IV, A (Place), 2 (Is Place matter or form?) (pgs 371–2), my underline:

209a31. A thing’s proper place is that in which it is directly present and which it fills; while the common place is that in which all bodies are because they are either directly in it or in something which is in it.

b1. If place proper is the direct container of a body, it will be a limit, so that the place of each thing would seem to be its form, by which its magnitude and matter are delimited.

  1. On the other hand, in so far as place seems to be the extension of the magnitude of a thing, i.e. what is contained and limited by the form, it seems to be matter or the unlimited; for when the boundary and the properties of a body are taken away, nothing is left but the latter.

  2. Hence Plato in the Timaeus identifies space and matter, making space identical with the ‘participative’ (though he gave a different account of the ‘participative’ in his unwritten lectures). While every one says place exists, he alone says what it is…

Commentary (pgs 565–6):

11–13. διὸ … ταὐτόν. It is correct to say that the Timaeus identifies χώρα and τὸ μεταληπτικόν. The latter phrase does not occur there, but τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν … ἀνόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον of 51a4–b1 is identified with χώρα in 52a8, b4 (where τόπος also is used, apparently without distinction of meaning, ἔν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά), and d3. This, with παραδείγματα or Forms, is what Plato needs for the construction of the sensible world.

Aristotle’s phrase τὸ μεταληπτικόν may be due to a misrepresentation of the phrase μεταλαμβάνον δὲ … τοῦ νοητοῦ. That phrase does not mean ‘receptive of intelligible form’, but ‘sharing in intelligibility’ (as the context shows). But τὸ μεταληπτικόν is not a bad paraphrase of such words as ὑποδοκή and πανδεχές …

13–16. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον … ἀπεφήνατο. Comparing this passage with b33–210a2 we see that the discrepancy between the Timaeus and the ‘unwritten doctrines’ was that in the latter the μεθεκτικόν or μεταληπτικόν was identified not with ὕλη (or rather, as we have seen in the previous note, not with χώρα) but with the great and small. The substitution of this for χώρα as the non-formal element may be explained by the fact that, while in the Timaeus Plato was discussing only the constitution of sensible things, he later carried his analysis further and performed an analysis of the Forms corresponding to that which he had already performed on sensible things. …

8

Thanks for the replies folks, this has been helpful. One thing I don’t get, however, is where the Loeb gets “reality.”

Isn’t Aristotle saying, rather, that λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, meaning that even though everybody says that the place is something (τι), Plato alone tried (ἐπεχείρησεν) to say it (i.e. tried to say what exactly it is).

What is at issue here is the accusative plus infinitive construction, right? In its normal form, it would be: “the place is something,” or so it seems to me.

9

I am trying to delete the replica post (I am sorry guys, I can’t figure out how to delete this post, which I posted by mistake).

10

One thing I don’t get, however, is where the Loeb gets “reality.”

Isn’t Aristotle saying, rather, that λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον, meaning that even though everybody says that the place is something (τι), Plato alone tried (ἐπεχείρησεν) to say it (i.e. tried to say what exactly it is).

I’m not sure, but I think you’re wrestling with the difference between a literal and the Loeb’s non-literal translation. Notice, for example, the difference between your “the place” and the Loeb’s “‘place’” (no translation of the definite article, and ‘place’ in quotes), which is much more accurate English for what Aristotle is and has been saying, i.e., trying to define what τόπος is. Same thing with “reality”. More or less literally, “Sure, everyone says that τόπος is something, but what it is, only [Plato] tried to say.” But trying to capture Aristotle’s clean τι-τί literally just doesn’t work, and in the context “asserts the reality of ‘place’” works.

What is at issue here is the accusative plus infinitive construction, right? In its normal form, it would be: “the place is something,” or so it seems to me.

Maybe I just answered this, maybe I didn’t. I don’t understand what you mean by the accusative + infinitive being “at issue” or by “its normal form”.

11

One thing I don’t get, however, is where the Loeb gets “reality.”

Randy is right. It’s not a literal translation. λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ πάντες εἶναί τι τὸν τόπον: “everyone says that τόπος is something”, “everyone says that τόπος is a thing”, are equivalent, in the translator’s view, to “everyone says that τόπος is real” or “everyone asserts the reality of τόπος”. A literal translation would produce something that would be barely intelligible English. I think this illustrates how Greek tends to use concrete, specific expressions, where English tends to use abstract words.

ἐπεχείρησεν might be translated as “undertook”.

What is at issue here is the accusative plus infinitive construction, right? In its normal form, it would be: “the place is something,” or so it seems to me.

Yes, it’s the accusative + infinitive construction, complementing λέγουσι, equivalent to εστι τι ο τοπος in direct speech.