πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην;
Is πόλιν here an accusative of respect or the subject of εἶναι? And if the latter, can “ἄδικον εἶναι” still be taken as impersonal (Smyth 1985c)? The only third option that I see is to take εἶναι as existential but this does not seem to make much sense in this context.
It looks to me like the accusative subject of εἶναι in indirect statement governed by φαίης. ἄδικον then would simply be predicate, so not an impersonal use.
πολιν is the accusative subject of the infinitives επιχειρειν, κατεδεδουλωσθαι and εχειν. αδικον is predicatve, with the copula ειναι, to the infinitive phrases. Roughly: “Would you say that it’s unjust for a city to try to unjustly enslave other cities, and to have [successfully] enslaved them, and to hold many of them subject to itself after having enslaved them?”
So the question is whether the πολις are αδικον or whether it is αδικον for the πολις to exist? Very topical.
Not sure about that, Highlander.
πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι…
I see the καί’s as joining coordinate clauses in the indirect statement, “You would say (or “would you say” if we read it as a question) that the city is unjust and that it attempts unrighteously to enslave and subjugate other cities…”
Your reading is smooth and makes good sense, but I don’t think it adequately explains the first καί.
Barry, with respect –
και . . . και . . . και – Smyth 2877, 2878. The three infinitives επιχειρειν, καταδεδουλωσθαι and εχειν are conjoined by three και’s. αδικον ειναι isn’t conjoined with them.
No article with πολιν. “A city …”. In context, no city has previously been under discussion.
Joel: The question is not whether it’s unjust for a city to exist, but rather whether it’s unjust for a city to enslave another city.
The sentence is a little confusing, I think, because there’s a natural inclination to take πολιν . . . αδικον ειναι as a unit before reading further, but in fact πολιν is the subject of the three infinitives conjoined by και, and αδικον ειναι is the predicate of the three conjoined infinitives.
Hylander: Your translation renders exactly the meaning I thought this sentence has. But then my question is about the syntax. When you say “αδικον is predicatve, with the copula ειναι,” do you take it as an “impersonal expression” in the sense of Smyth 1985? And if so, I have a question regarding 1985c, namely, whether or not it would be correct to say that the subject of an infinitive that goes with such an expression(as do the three infinitives here), when this subject is explicit, is expressed by accusative or dative of respect, as even your translation seems to suggest (“it’s unjust for a city,”), rather that following the pattern of indirect discourse (in which case it could be accusative only).
Okay, let’s look at the whole thing:
πόλιν φαίης ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφʼ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην
I don’t think the reference in Smyth really applies here. The first καί naturally joins εἶναι and ἐπιχειρεῖν, the second joins δουλοῦσθαι and καταδεδουλῶσθαι (which are complementary to ἐπιχειρεῖν), and the third coordinates ἔχειν with εἶναι and ἐπιχειρεῖν.
“The city” in English can be generalizing, without any previous mention. “A city” of course works just as well, more the sense of one’s English here.
Tugodum’s question, not Plato’s. Try reading my comment again, but this time pronounce “πολις” aloud, and you’ll get the joke. Nice to have you back, by the way.
My translation is an attempt at explaining the meaning of the Greek in idiomatic English. It doesn’t follow strictly the syntax of the Greek.
Greek infinitives are verbaland nouns. As such, they can serve as the subject of a predicate. Here the three conjoined infinitives are the subject of the predicate αδικον ειναι, which is indirect speech because it is the complement of φαιης αν. πολιν is accusative because it is the subject of the three conjoined infinitives. It isn’t accusative of respect. (You could say that the three conjoined infinitives are themselves notionally accusatve because they are the subject of the infinitive ειναι.)
Yes, αδικον ειναι is what Smyth calls “quasi-impersonal” in 1984, 1985. But “impersonal” here is slightly inaccurate because αδικον ειναι has subjects, namely the three conjoined infinitives (even though infinitives aren’t persons). I think that’s why Smyth uses the term quasi-impersonal.
Barry, I have difficulty making sense of your reading. He’s not suggesting a city, any city, is unjust andties to enslave other cities etc. He’ suggesting it is unjust for a city to try to enslave other cities etc.
“πολιν is accusative because it is the subject of the three conjoined infinitives” – So the subject of an infinitive is always is expressed by the accusative? Am I mistaken that it is expressed sometimes by the dative?
Smyth 1985b says ἀνάγκη (“it is necessary”) takes the accusative or dative with the infinitive. I’m just trying to see it in general terms.
“αδικον ειναι has subjects, namely the three conjoined infinitives”–
I thought the subject should be a substantive, which would be the case here if those three infinitives were articular. But perhaps I’m mistaken about this.
With αναγκη, the dative is not strictly speaking the subject of the subsequent infinitive, but rather a dative complement of ανάγκη. Call it indirect object or dative of interest or something like that.
Smyth doesn’t use the term “subject” in 185b: he says only that αναγκη can “take” the dative or accusative.
Smyth 1984 and 1985 address the use of the infinitive without the article as subject with "quasi-impersonal verbs and expressions, which is exactly what we have here. See the headings.
If no one likes my joke about the πόλις, I’ll just say that Thrasymachus’ answer to this question doesn’t seem to take it as a question about what would be ἄδικος to do, but about whether a city doing those things would be ἄδικος.
He answers: “καὶ τοῦτό γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα οὖσα ἄδικος”. And further, of course, a question about what is ἄδικος on Socrates’ part here would make no sense in the argument.
Why aren’t ἐπιχειρεῖν and καταδεδουλῶσθαι and ἔχειν participles? Maybe the σκέψασθαι coming right before? Maybe some deep grammar juju I don’t know about Plato’s habit of switching infinitives and participles? But the question, in context, clearly isn’t about what is ἄδικος to do or not. ἄδικος doesn’t govern any infinitives here.
In Thrasymachus’ response, τουτο refers back to the infinitive phrases πόλιν . . . καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλῶσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; He says that the most perfect city will do, ποιήσει, just that, indeed, being the most thoroughly unjust. (The second και is adverbial, strengthening τελεώτατα, Smyth 2882c.)
His response focuses on whether the activity of enslavement is unjust, not on whether or not the city is unjust. He says that the city engages in that activity precisely because such a city is perfectly unjust.
“Smyth 1984 and 1985 address the use of the infinitive without the article as subject… See the headings.”
“Smyth doesn’t use the term “subject” in 1985b”
– Ok. So the headings are a bit confusing, which was what misled me.
Thanks, Hylander. I’m still wondering, though, what semantic difference an articulation of infinitive can possibly make if infinitive is substantive even by itself (without the article). (I mean the articulation with τὸ, of course; the answer is clear in the case of an article in the genitive or dative.)
Hylander, I thought and do think that you have the most grammatically reasonable reading of the Greek. Other explanations of the infinitives don’t seem to work.
For example, it would clearly be wrong it imagine that εἶναι and ἐπιχειρεῖν (etc.) all depended on φαίης. Tt would mean something like “you might say that a city is unjust and that it is trying to enslave other cities…” Obviously that’s wrong.
But here are the contextual problems I have with your reasonable understanding of the the grammar:
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ἀδίκως seems to petitio principii if he is asking whether it is ἄδικον to ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως
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switching from actions ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι to states καταδεδουλῶσθαι, is slightly surprising to me (though not impossible)
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and then ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην is a pleonasm (But see Heller pg. 172 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.30000006513703&view=1up&seq=188 for an argument why it’s fine.)
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the πολλὰς δὲ…δουλωσαμένην is also slightly surprising to me for a πόλις that has not been concretized.
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Thrasymachus then answers regarding a definite city. Your understanding of his meaning seems possible, but it implies a very slight (but not impossible) logical leap (the “because”).
So I suppose I’d like to read all this as something like “ἄδικον εἶναι οἵην ἄλλας πόλεις…”.
You make a good case, and you could well be right. I’m still having difficulty seeing your reading because of the placement of the first καί, but I’ll probably get over it.
I’m posting the translation of Paul Shorey from Perseus:
A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection.