Got it. Thanks again.
Again, I would suggest trying to group words together in units as you read. Once the reader reads τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, it should be apparent that these words go together as a unit.
Also, the phrase τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, which is the crux of the issue in this part of the Republic, has already been used at least three times previously in this passage, and it should be clear that this phrase is a unit.
As I was reading it sequentially, word by word, I first came to “δίκαιόν ἐστιν…”, and at that point I had to take it as anticipating either a substantive (of which the adjective δίκαιόν would, then, turn out to be a predicate) or the infinitive of a verb. The context prompted me to follow the first of these two routes. (Cf. τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι … [339 a6-7] Here δίκαιον is clearly the predicate. The discussion is about finding an X that would be a truth-maker for the proposition “X is δίκαιον”.) Once the force of “δίκαιόν ἐστιν…” had been set in my mind, the interpretation of the rest of the sentence followed from it.
Now I’ve come to: “Καί μοι εἰπέ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν ὃ ἐβούλου λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι, ἐάντε συμφέρῃ ἐάντε μή;” (340 c2-5). I tried to read it along the lines that you suggested. I.e., having come to “τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον”, I recognized it as an expression that had occurred before; accordingly, I took “τὸ” with “συμφέρον”. But as I come, next, to “δοκοῦν,” it seems to me that it is it (not “συμφέρον”) that should go with “τὸ”, so that “τὸ…δοκοῦν…τῷ κρείττονι” be construed in apposition to “τοῦτο”. Is this correct?
Yes, in this sentence τὸ nominalizes the neuter participle δοκοῦν. (τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον is also treated as a noun, as the genitive complement τοῦ κρείττονος, instead of dative, shows, but has no article, perhaps because here it’s predicative, with εἶναι.)
Socrates has cleverly reformulated Thrasymachus’ definition, embedding Thrasymachus’ definition in an expanded phrase that makes Socrates’ point: it’s not what is what is really advantageous to the stronger party – it’s what appears to the stronger party to be advantageous to the the stronger party, whether it’s really advantageous or not.
There is perhaps a slight – and deliberate – surprise when the reader, after reading the familiar τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, comes to δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι and realizes that the unit to which τὸ applies is not τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, but rather τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τῷ κρείττονι. The slight syntactic jolt (which would probably not be consciously experienced by a Greek reader but would, I think, be felt) cleverly reinforces Socrates’ point.
The syntactic structure and meaning are completely clear once the reader comes to the end of the phrase.
Thanks!
BTW, a bit further down (341 a3-4), I’ve just come across what seems to be the very articular infinitive (just differently arranged) that I had suspected at 339 d1-3: ὥστε, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, δίκαιον λέγω τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ποιεῖν συμφέρον.
Possibly, but the infinitive doesn’t need an article. δίκαιον (with understood εἶναι) is an impersonal expression in which the infinitive can be used without the article. See Smyth 1984, 19851984.
1984. As Subject.> —The infinitive may be used as subject, especially with quasi-impersonal verbs and expressions (933 a).
““γράμματα μαθεῖν δεῖ” to learn to read is necessary” Men. Sent. 96, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; what must be done? X. A. 2.1.16, κόσμος (ἐστὶ) ““καλῶς τοῦτο δρᾶν” to perform this well is a credit” T. 1.5, πᾶσιν ἁδεῖν χαλεπόν (ἐστι) to please everybody is difficult Solon 7, ““ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς προϊέναι” it seemed best to them to proceed” X. A. 2.1.2, ““συμφέρει αὐτοῖς φίλους εἶναι” it is for their interest to be friends” X. O. 11.23. Cp. 1062, 1978.
1985. > Such quasi-impersonal verbs and expressions are δεῖ it is necessary, χρή (properly a substantive with ἐστί omitted, 793) it is necessary, δοκεῖ it seems good, ἔστι it is possible, ἔξεστι it is in one’s power, οἷόν τέ ἐστι it is possible, πρέπει and προσήκει it is fitting, συμβαίνει it happens; and many expressions formed by ἐστί and a predicate noun, as ἄξιον it is right, > δίκαιον it is just> , ἀναγ- καῖον it is necessary, δυνατόν it is possible, ἀδύνατον (or ἀδύνατα) it is impossible, αἰσχρόν it is disgraceful, καλόν it is honourable, ὥρα_ and καιρός it is time. With the last two expressions the old dative use of the infinitive is clear: ““ὥρα_ βουλεύεσθαι” it is time for considering” P. Soph. 241b. . . .
I think you could take the expression τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος . . . συμφέρον, with a slight hyperbaton, as a unit, especially since it’s a phrase that has been repeatedly uttered by Thrasymakhos, and it would be the same as his original formulation in 338c, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον.
In fact, if you look just a little further at 341b, when Socrates addresses Thrasymakhos’ assertion, he expresses it as οὗ τὸ συμφέρον κρείττονος ὄντος δίκαιον ἔσται τῷ ἥττονι ποιεῖν. Here, τὸ must belong to συμφέρον because he’s asking “whose συμφέρον will it be just to do?” “The συμφέρον of who being stronger – i.e., of which stronger party – will it be just to do?” (It’s an indirect, not a direct, question of course.) I think that shows how Plato was thinking in 341a. I would say that clinches it.
So I think it’s likely that in 341a τὸ nominalizes the participle rather than the infinitive. Maybe there’s a very slight synntactic ambiguity in 341a, but the basic structure is clear, and I wouldn’t worry too much about it. I think you’d be wasting your time dwelling on this, since the meaning is perfectly clear however you take τὸ.
Thanks for these helpful considerations. I don’t think it’s a “waste” of time, though, as I’m not really “dwelling on it” but am just going through the text, trying to be as analytical as possible and take mental notes whenever anything appears as remarkable syntactically or grammatically, even if the meaning is unequivocally clear on any reading (as it, actually, is at 339 d1-3). BTW, Geoffrey Steadman in his note on 341 a3 says: “τὸ … ποιεῖν: to do; the article is part of the articular infinitive, not συμφέρον”
(https://geoffreysteadman.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/platorepublic-july12.pdf). I do not bring him in as an absolute authority, though, as I had been coming across mistakes in his notes occasionally.
Geoffrey Steadman in his note on 341 a3 says: “τὸ … ποιεῖν: to do; the article is part of the articular infinitive, not συμφέρον”
For the reasons I stated, I think the better answer is that τὸ belongs to συμφέρον in 341a. I’d emphasize that the reader has come to expect τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον as a unit from the discussion that precedes 341a, and I think it’s a unit in 341a, too.