Plato, R. 339 d1-3

Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον.
Am I right that one can possibly construe this in either of the two following ways?
(1) Impersonal “δίκαιόν ἐστιν” + infinitive (“ποιεῖν”), with “τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον” as the object, in the accusative, of “ποιεῖν”.
(2) Articular infinitive “τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν” as the subject in the nominative, with the “δίκαιόν” as its predicate adjective .

I am not really seeing how the two are supposed to be different. On your second interpretation, what do you think is the case of τὸ συμφέρον? Isn’t it accusative?

On the second reading, the case of the συμφέρον is accusative yet τὸ goes with ποιεῖν to form an articular infinitive (which on the first reading it does not). Cf. 340 e1-2: Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι·

(1) is clearly the correct reading because the noun phrase τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον is a natural unit. (2) would leave συμφέρον without an article of its own, which would be strange. It might be possible to construe συμφέρον as adverbial if it didn’t have a genitive dependent on it.

The follow-up confirms this: ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. If (2) were correct, this would be ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ συμφέρον ποιεῖν.

There’s no real ambiguity here for the reader, who will naturally take τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον as a unit. It would be confusing and disorienting if after τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, τὸ turned out to go not with συμφέρον but with ποιεῖν.

And in context, it’s even clearer: the contrast is between acting to the advantage of the stronger party and acting to the disadvantage of the stronger party, not between acting to the advantage of the stronger party and failing to act to the advantage of the stronger party.

Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι· – singular τὸ obviously cannot go with plural ἀσύμφορα, and ἀσύμφορα doesn’t need an article because it’s plural and concrete, “advantageous things”. (In the first sentence, in contrast, συμφέρον needs an article because it’s abstract: “that which is the advantage of”.) So in the second sentence, when reading τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν, the reader will naturally take the article as belonging to ποιεῖν in an articular infinitive construction.

This illustrates the importance of mentally grouping words together in natural units when reading. To find even a hint of an ambiguity here, one has to pick words apart one by one.

Thanks, Hylander. I thought, actually, that “τὸ” could play a double role, i.e., simultaneously both with “ποιεῖν” and “κρείττονος συμφέρον,” and that “τὸ μὴ συμφέρον” could imply “ποιεῖν” (just as “τοὐναντίον” does imply it on the first reading).
Also, the immediate context seems to suggest the use of “δίκαιον” as adjective:
" τὸ συμφέρον μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, καὶ σὺ ἀπεκρίνω δίκαιον εἶναι," (339 a6-7)
“Οἴου τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ ἀσύμφορα ποιεῖν τοῖς ἄρχουσί τε καὶ κρείττοσι δίκαιον εἶναι ὡμολογῆσθαί σοι·” (340 e1-2)
In other words, the question under discussion is not whether it would be just to act in this or that way but, rather, whether this or that thing is a just one.
Given this, I’m wondering whether my second reading is plainly impossible or just less likely syntactically.

Tugodum, I added some material while you were posting, so I would invite you to read what I wrote again,

I thought, actually, that “τὸ” could play a double role, i.e., simultaneously both with “ποιεῖν” and “κρείττονος συμφέρον,”

No, that would be syntactically impossible.

the immediate context seems to suggest the use of “δίκαιον” as adjective

It is an adjective, modifying infinitive ποιεῖν. ποιεῖν is not an articular infinitive because the focus is not on ποιεῖν – the focus is on the opposition τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον vs. τὸ μὴ [τοῦ κρείττονος] συμφέρον.

In other words, the question under discussion is not whether it would be just to act in this or that way but, rather, whether this or that thing is a just one.

No, in your second reading, the question would be whether it’s just to act in this way or to fail to act in this way, which doesn’t fit the context at all.

I’m wondering whether my second reading is plainly impossible or just less likely syntactically.

I think your second reading is syntactically impossible because it would deprive συμφέρον of its needed article.

Got it. Thanks!

Again, I would urge you to get in the habit of grouping words together in natural units as you read. This will help you avoid problems which, like your original question, arise when you pick words apart and try to fit them together by syntax alone. It will improve your fluency in reading, so that you’ll be reading Greek with comprehension and won’t have to stop and translate each sentence word for word. I don’t mean to be hypercritical, but I think this advice will be useful to you.

Thanks. In this case I was misled, as I said, by the form of the question under discussion, namely: “what [thing] is just” (the answer being “τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον”, i.e., a substantive). But in the passage under discussion it switched to: “what would be just to do.”

A second thought.
“the focus is on the opposition τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον vs. τὸ μὴ [τοῦ κρείττονος] συμφέρον” -
Is this was the sense meant, why was not it phrased, rather, thus:
“Οὐ μόνον ἄρα δίκαιόν ἐστιν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, τὸ μὴ τοῦ κρείττονος”?
The way the text stand, taking “μὴ” with the (implied) “τοῦ κρείττονος”, rather than with the (explicit) “συμφέρον”, seems counter-intuitive to me.

Actually, as I’m rereading the immediately preceding passage, the alternative (τοὐναντίον) under question is definitely not the advantage of those who are “not the strongest” but the disadvantage of the strongest, i.e., the rulers, when they mistakenly command what is disadvantageous to themselves.

Actually, as I’m rereading the immediately preceding passage, the alternative (τοὐναντίον) under question is definitely not the advantage of those who are “not the strongest” but the disadvantage of the strongest, i.e., the rulers, when they mistakenly command what is disadvantageous to themselves.

Yes, that’s right. That’s why τοῦ κρείττονος can be omitted after τοὐναντίον. But it is understood as the complement of τὸ μὴ συμφέρον. I put it in brackets to make it clear, but that seems to have confused you. Sorry.

Thanks for the clarification. Now I’d like to make sure that I got your other (and major) point right. Do you mean that “τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον” (in the sense “[something] to the advantage of the stronger”) would be syntactically impossible as such (i.e., without “τὸ”) in any context? Or do you mean only that it is impossible in this particular context, because “τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον” is previously introduced and, therefore, expected?

I probably shouldn’t state this categorically because someone will find a counterexample somewhere, but τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, as a single unit, is syntactically impossible. Without the article τὸ, συμφέρον is simply the neuter participle of the verb συμφέρω, meaning something like “benefiting.” The article turns συμφέρον into a noun meaning “that which benefits” or “that which is advantageous.”

The verb συμφέρω, including its neuter participle συμφέρον, takes a dative, not a genitive, complement. Used as a noun here, however, τὸ συμφέρον has a genitive complement, τοῦ κρείττονος, which would not be possible with the participle used as an adjective. Thus, τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον, as a unit, with a genitive complement and without the article τὸ nominalizing the participle, would not be syntactically possible.

Thanks, this is convincing. And would you say that it is also in any context impossible for “τὸ” to go with both “συμφέρον” and “ποιεῖν”, thus playing a double role?

And would you say that it is also in any context impossible for “τὸ” to go with both “συμφέρον” and “ποιεῖν”, thus playing a double role?

Yes.

One other point: if ποιεῖν were an articular infinitive, the phrase would read τὸ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ποιεῖν, But Greek avoids two identical (in case, gender and number) articles together. (It might be rephrased as τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον. But in this sentence, using an articular infinitive instead of an infinitive without the article wouldn’t make much difference.

Thanks a lot!

This would seem to be the only counterexample in book I of the Republic. I think that he means ἀγαθὸν and συμφέρον as substantives, like βλάβη, not an adjective. So an exception to the article being required to make the substantive, rather than to your rule about the participle of this verb with the dative.

ὥστε ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι ἡ μὲν δικαιοσύνη καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ὄντι, τοῦ κρείττονός τε καὶ ἄρχοντος συμφέρον, οἰκεία δὲ τοῦ πειθομένου τε καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος βλάβη

Thanks, Joel. I’m wondering whether any grammar book covers this case.

Smyth 1150:

  1. A predicate noun has no article, and is thus distinguished from the subject: καλεῖται ἡ ἀκρόπολις ἔτι ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων πόλις the acropolis is still called ‘city’ by the Athenians T. 2.15.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Smyth+grammar+1150&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0007