Plato Phdr 274b

Greek Learning Greek
1

Hi,

i’m having a bit of trouble with how an imperative works in Phdr 274b. The sentence is:

Socrates: οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω.

My translation:
So we have said enough about the art and the lack of art in speech.

I’ve encountered a difference in the punctuation chosen by Robin and basically all others: Robin adds “…” at the end of this sentence, and also at the beginning of Socrates’ next:

Socrates: τὸ δ’ εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, λοιπόν. ἦ γάρ;

Now, adding “…” to the sentences would change the meaning of both significantly, for Socrates would then intend to say that he hasn’t said enough about the art of speech - the “euprepeia” and “aprepeia” of writing would be something that he left out and now wants to discuss. If, however, the first sentence were to end with a period, the second would mean that a ‘new’ subject is now being broached, unrelated to the first.

The problem, it seems, boils down to the ‘ἐχέτω’ at the end of the first sentence. Is it possible that its use doesn’t mean that the subject has been closed?

I hope I made myself clear…
Best,
Antonio

2

I’m not sure I see how Robin’s punctuation would change the meaning. ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω must mean “let that be enough”, “that’s enough”. The μεν . . . δε signals that the second sentence is something new, namely, τὸ εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς, contrasting with and different from τὸ τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι.

So I think τὸ μὲν . . . ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω definitively closes the preceding discussion, and τὸ δ[ε] . . . λοιπόν begins a new discussion. I think Robin’s ". . . " simply signals that the two elements of the μεν . . . δε pair belong together, despite being interrupted by Phaedrus’ interjection τἰ μἠν; marking agreement with the first element.

From LSJ ἔχω"

  1. freq. with Advbs. of manner, > “εὖ ἔχει” Od.24.245, etc.; καλῶς ἔχει, κακῶς ἔχει, it is, is going on well or ill, v. καλός, κακός (but fut. σχήσειν καλῶς will turn out well, D.1.9, cf. 18.45; “εὖ σχήσει” S.Aj. 684); οὕτως . . σχεῖν to turn out, happen thus, Pl.Ap.39b; οὕτως ἔχει so the case stands, Ar.Pl.110; οὕτως ἐχόντων, Lat. cum res ita se habeant, X.An.3.2.10; “ὡς ὧδ᾽ ἐχόντων” S.Aj.981; “οὕτω χρὴ διὰ στέρνων ἔχειν” Id.Ant.639; “οὕτως ἔ. περί τινος” X.Mem.4.8.7, cf. Hdt.6.16; “πρός τι” D. 9.45; “τῇδ᾽ ἔ.” S.Ph.1336; “κοσμίως ἔ.” Ar.Th.854; “ἥδιον ἔ. πρός τινας” D.9.63; ὡς εἶχε just as he was, Hdt.1.114; “ὥσπερ εἶχε” Th.1.134, X. HG4.1.30; ὡς ἔχω how I am, Ar.Lys.610; “ὥσπερ ἔχομεν” Th.3.30; “τἀναντία εἶχεν” D.9.41; ἀσφαλέως, ἀναγκαίως ἔχει, = ἀσφαλές, ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι, Hdt.1.86,9.27; καλῶς ἔχει no, I thank you, v. καλός.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3De)%2Fxw1

3

If the μέν and δέ are intended to be paired in the initial expression, then the οὐκοῦν would apply to both, rather than only being taken only with ἔχετω. Not a big difference, perhaps. οὐκοῦν always seems to me like it has a mild rhetorical feel, like it’s “surely we’re in agreement” or similar, even when it’s not a full blown interrogative.

Robin’s “…” strikes me as an unfinished expression rather than an interrupted expression “–”. Socrates has left the reply to μέν unexpressed, and is prompted to continue. If it’s ended with a period, it’s simply a pregnant expression. He wants assent to both propositions individually.

4

Maybe I didn’t make myself clear.

τἰ μἠν; is an idiomatic expression of agreement, something like “of course” or “why not?”. Phaedrus has interrupted Socrates’ sentence to express agreement with the μἐν clause, after which Socrates continues with the δ[ἐ] clause. The dots at the end of the μεν clause and at the beginning of the δε clause in Robin’s edition serve to mark the continuity of the μεν . . . δε pair across Phaedrus’ interruption. Robin’s French translation (to which I don’t have access) ought to show this.

LSJ τις:

f. τί with Particles: . . . —τί μήν; i.e. yes certainly, much like τί γάρ; Pl.Tht.162e, etc., prob. in S.Aj.668:

Phaedrus’ very slight interjection of agreement serves the function of reinforcing the shift from one topic to the next at this point in the discussion, while the articulation of Socrates’ sentence into a μεν δε pair brings into focus the difference between the topics. I think this is a small illustration of Plato’s deftness in using normal colloquial speech patterns to give shape to a philosophical discussion in the form of a dialogue.

5

And in the article for μην, the LSJ takes this usage with A.Eu.203, and glosses “well, what of of it”, which wouldn’t fit that quite as well. I think it would be better to look at different examples of τι μην to find out its range.

6

Or you could look at Denniston, Greek Particles, p. 333. But what’s the point of going to elaborate lengths to elucidate a very common expression where it’s not only clear but also of very minor significance?

7

Thank you for your replies. Yes, I see what you mean. What also threw me off is that both Hackforth and Waterfield, who wrote two of the best translations of the dialogue , render Socrates’ first line as a question:
Hackforth:
Socrates - then we may feel that we have said enough about the art of speech, both the true and the false?
Phaedrus - certainly.
Socrates - but there remains the question of propriety and impropriety in…

Waterfield:
Socrates - is this enough on the subject of rhetorical
expertise and its lack?
Phaedrus - Of course.
Socrates - but don’t we still have to discuss whether or not writing is desirable…

I see now that Socrates’ second line doesn’t necessarily have to refer to something missing in the discussion of the art of speech, but in the whole discussion in general.

8

The word ουκουν is tricky. It can be either οὐκοῦν or οὔκουν. Plato’s original text of course was not marked with accents or other diacritics.

Here is the relevant part of the LSJ entry for οὐκοῦν:

A.like οὔκουν, of οὐκ and οὖν, but differing in meaning and accent, cf. A.D. Conj.257.18sqq., Hdn.Gr.1.516, Phryn.PSp.98B.

I. in questions, inviting assent to an inference, or to an addition to what has already received assent, οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι . . ; you think then, do you not, that . . ? X.Cyr.2.4.15, Mem.1.4.5, cf. 4.2.20, Pl.Prt.332b, 360b-d, Cra.416c, etc.: with hortatory subj., οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλους σε φῶμεν δυνατὸν εἶναι ποιεῖν (sc. ῥήτορας ἀγαθούς）; Id.Grg.449b: folld. by οὐ when a neg. answer is invited, “οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαί ποτε ταὐτὸν τῷ χαίρειν” ; Id.Phlb.43d, cf. Phd. 105e; “οὐκοῦν οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς ἀντείποι” ; D.16.4.

II. in affirm. sentences, surely then, “οὐκοῦν, εἰ ταῦτα ἀληθῆ, πολλὴ ἐλπὶς ἀφικομένῳ οἷ ἐγὼ πορεύομαι” Pl.Phd.67b: with subj. or imper., οὐκοῦν διδάσκωμεν αὐτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ λοιδορῶμεν let us teach him, then, Id.La.195a; οὐκοῦν . . ἱκανῶς ἐχέτω let this then suffice, Id.Phdr.274b, cf. 278b, Luc.DMort.23.3; “οὐκοῦν ἂν ἤδη . . λέγοι” Ar.Pax43: with a prohibition, “οὐκοῦν μὴ . . αὐτομολήσῃς” Aeschin.1.159; οὐκοῦν ὑπόλοιπον δουλεύειν slavery, then, is the only alternative, D.8.59.

οὔκουν, with the accent on οὔκ-, is negative, but it also can introduce a question expecting an affirmative answer: “Isn’t it true that . . .?” LSJ οὔκουν:

II. in impassioned questions, almost = οὐ alone, οὔκουν, Προμηθεῦ, τοῦτο γιγνώσκεις, ὅτι . . ; A.Pr.379, cf. Eu.725; “οὔκουν ἐγώ σοι ταῦτα προύλεγον πάλαι” ; S.OT973; “οὔκουν τάδ᾽, ὦ παῖ, δεινά” ; Id.Ph.628, cf. E.IT 1190, 1196, Ar.Eq.820, Lys.10.12,13, Is.5.34, 11.13, Aeschin.1.85, 2.87, al. (sts., but prob. wrongly, written οὐκοῦν or οὐκ οὖν): sts. separately, οὐ δεινὸν οὖν δῆτ᾽ . . ; Ar.Eq.875: freq. with 2sg. fut., to express an urgent or impatient imper., “οὔκουν ἐπείξῃ τῷδε δεσμὰ περιβαλεῖν” ; A.Pr.52; “οὔκουν μ᾽ ἐάσεις κἀκτὸς εἶ” ; S.OT676, cf. Ant.244, Ar.Ra.200, Pl.71, Pl.Smp.175a: also with τις and 3sg. fut., οὔκουν τις ὡς τάχιστα . . ἀναγκάσει . . ; S.OC897; or opt. with ἄν, οὔκουν ἂν εἴποις . . ; Id.Aj.1051: with neg. repeated, “οὔκουν ἐάσεις οὐδ᾽ ὑπ᾽ εὐφήμου βοῆς θῦσαί με” ; Id.El.630.

So the sentence in Phaedrus can be either a question inviting assent or something like “surely then”, depending on the modern translator’s judgment. It’s probably not an “impassioned” question, so οὐκοῦν seems right here, but that doesn’t answer the question of whether the μεν clause is a statement or a question.

Apparently Hackforth and Waterfield take the μεν clause as a question, but Hackforth takes the δε clause as a statement, while Waterford takes it as a question. But with the continuation of the sentence after Phaedrus’ interruption with the δε clause, I think I’d take the μεν clause as a statement. In the Oxford edition, Burnet takes both μεν and δε as statements, and so does Harvey Yunis in the Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics series. What does Robin do?

There’s no way to know whether Plato intended it as a question. This is a persistent issue in Plato, especially, almost every time that ουκουν introduces a sentence. But fortunately, in the context of 274b (and in most other occurrences, too), it really doesn’t make even a slight difference.

I guess it could conceivably be οὔκουν as a negative statement and not as a question, instead of οὐκοῦν. Then Socrates would be saying, as you originally suggested, that the topic of τὸ τέχνης τε καὶ ἀτεχνίας λόγων πέρι is incomplete, implying that τὸ εὐπρεπείας δὴ γραφῆς πέρι καὶ ἀπρεπείας, πῇ γιγνόμενον καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπρεπῶς is part of the first topic and remains to be addressed. But again, μεν . . . δε signals that the second topic is something new, contrasting with the first topic, not a part of it. (And I believe this is consistent with the general thrust of Phaedrus, drawing a distinction between the substance of a discussion and the inadequacy of what can be put into writing.) So I don’t think there’s much question that οὐκοῦν should be read here.

9

Well, actually it does - it either means that Socrates intends to discuss the adequacy of writing in the context of mapping what is the techne of logos, or that the discussion of writing is unrelated to the technê of logos. If it’s within the purview of the technê of logos, writing, if used well, could possibly be used to operate ‘psychagôgia’. If it isn’t, then the interpreter has to do some work to find out what exactly ‘euprepeia’ means.

10

Again, I think that μεν δε makes it likely that he’s moving on from one topic to the next, not completing the first, inadequately addressed, topic. Doesn’t he reject writing precisely because it doesn’t lend itself to psychagogy, rather than suggest it might if properly written?

11

The negative reading, "we haven’t finished our discussion . . . ", seems possible only by reading οὔκουν, not οὐκοῦν. Does Robin (or anyone else) print οὔκουν? Neither Burnet nor Yunis does.

12

Wouldn’t that need to be μη with an imperative?

13

Another reason for not reading ουκουν as negative here: it’s an emphatic negative, and that doesn’t seem called for in this context, where the discussion is not heated.

14

The οὐκοῦν article in the LSJ is split up into two parts, questions and affirmative sentences. But I don’t feel like the meaning difference is that large though between I and II. As in English, we can pretty much always put a question mark after a “surely then” sentence, and it’s more a matter of emphasis whether we do or not; I think that οὐκοῦν is always mildly (sometimes very mildly) interrogative. That οὐ is still there, even if it’s not emphasized like in οὔκουν. At least that’s how I’ve worked it out in my head.

15

You’re right, Joel. The imperative would reqire μη. ουκουν can’t be paroxytone and negative here. It’s perispomenon.

16

A passage in the Republic, 392c, marking a transition from one topic to the next, has an interesting, though superficial, similarity to Phaedrus 274b:

τὰ μὲν δὴ λόγων πέρι ἐχέτω τέλος: τὸ δὲ λέξεως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅ τε λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον παντελῶς ἐσκέψεται.

The transition here is from λογοι to λεξις. λογοι here means something different from its meaning in the Phaedrus passage, the substance of stories told by poets, and λεξις means the manner in which they are told (no “mimesis” for Plato): roughly substance versus style.