Plato, Apology of Socrates, starting in 22d

Greek Learning Greek
1

Context: Socrates explains how he went from one man to another
looking for one wiser than himself. But, as he says, he keeps
finding men less wise than himself in this, they believe they know
what they in fact do not know. The following report covers the
results of his inquiries among the poets and the artisans.

I mark with an asterisk words I had much trouble with.

ἀλλ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν* moi ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα ὅπερ* καὶ οἱ
ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι
ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα* τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη* ἡ
πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν:

But, o men of Athens, to me they seem to make the same mistake, both
poets and artisans the same one–because of finishing good work [in
his particular craft] each thinks [himself] very wise in even greater
things–and this false idea [that they know more important things]
seems [I inferred “seems”, to make parallel construction with ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ] to
put in the shade the wisdom [that they actually possess]:

2

ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί

Socrates is on to the χειροτέχναι now, entirely separate from the ποιηταί and the δημιουργοί. If it makes it easier to see what the ὅπερ is doing, the whole sentence could have been, I think: ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί εἶχον

ταὐτόν must mean τὸ αὐτό? It doesn’t make sense to me otherwise.

“thinks” would be present ἀξιοῖ, I believe, while this is past

τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος is τὰ ἄλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος, so you’ll want to make this definite. (The circumflex on τἆλλα is an unfortunate application of the general rules of accent, and I would guess that it did not mean a higher pitch on the first part of the long vowel, as the circumflex generally signifies, but unusually here on the second half of the long vowel due to the contraction. But who knows? All we’ve got are the manuscripts, copied through eras of stress accent that would not have distinguished.)

καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν:…

ἔδοξε makes sense to me anyway, to explain the ἀποκρύπτειν, as you say.

3

ταὐτός, ή, όν, identical, in nom. pl. masc. ταὐτοί, Syrian.in Metaph.137.22, 25, 26, Sch.Theoc.1.56 codd.; τὸ ταὐτό Arist.Metaph.1054b15; τὸ ταὐτόν Syrian.in Metaph.62.32, al.

Liddell, H. G., Scott, R., Jones, H. S., & McKenzie, R. (1996). A Greek-English lexicon (p. 1761). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

4

ἔδοξαν aorist
“they seemed to me” rather than “to me they seemed,” because μοι is enclitic, unemphatic.

αὐτόν is an alternative spelling of αὐτό (neuter).
ταὐτόν = τὸ αὐτόν (crasis, regular spelling). [Ignore Barry’s ταὐτός]
ταὐτόν … ὅπερ the same which i.e. the same as ….

διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι e.g. “because of their successfully practicing their craft”

ἠξίου imperfect

καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα superlative, “at the other most important things too”

αὕτη fem. of οὑτος. “this false idea” good.

And yes ἔδοξεν is understood from ἔδοξαν in the first clause.

5

Yes, unfortunate that L&S gave it a separate entry… :laughing:

6

Many thanks to jeidsath, Barry, and mwh for the help. Before posting I had read translations, but what I posted still contained a lot of guesswork, because at the time I posted I was most unsure how the Greek text allowed the translations that I found.

Since then, I went through the commentary hints again, and I began to understand them better.

7

Just one small point:

αὐτῶν αὕτη* ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν.

It’s not wisdom that they actually possess that their error obscures – it’s σοφία about τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα, which they don’t actually possess, that’s obscured by their error.

8

Interesting point. If I read you right, to think incorrectly that one knows something makes it harder to see the real truth. Plato’s metaphor, I believe, is that it puts the real truth it “in the dark”, or “cast shadow over it.”

I was thinking of a different meaning, but I don’t have the Greek to discuss it intelligently.

9

I disagree. It’s the σοφία that they do have which is obscured, proving the χρησμός correct, despite their “ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν”. In fact, the very next sentence describes how their ἀμαθία takes away the credit of their σοφία, and that it’s better to have neither, like Socrates.

10

No, Hylander had it right.

Soc found that they were sofoi in their individual specialties all right but not in τα μεγιστα (despite what they thought). That sofia—sofia in τα μεγιστα—was concealed from their view by their πλημμελεια, their mistaken belief. (πλημμελεια effectively restates their ἁμαρτημα above.) Τheir sofia in one area effectively blinded them to their lack of sofia in the most important things, τα μεγιστα.

So this is a repeat of what he’d found with the poets. The poets erroneously supposed they were σοφώτατοι not just in poetry but in all other respects as well (ᾐσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν), and now it’s just the same with the δημιουργοι (he ups the ante by glossing ταλλα with τα μεγιστα). It’s really quite straightforward.

Moses supposes his toes to be roses,
but Moses supposes erroneously;
for nobody’s toeses are posies of roses,
as Moses supposes his toeses to be.

11

Thank you for modifying that first line.

I think that the best argument for this position is if you are reading αὐτῶν as a person object of ἀποκρύπτειν. “to hide that σοφία from them.” But you and Hylander refer to “their πλημμελεια, their mistaken belief,” so it is hard to tell what exactly you think the parse for this is.

But taking it either way, the statement as you translate it does not make any sense here. Socrates’ argument is that the highest form of σοφία is hidden from all mankind, full stop, and the best that one can do is, like Socrates, recognize one’s own ignorance. It’s his entire point really. This highest σοφία is not hidden by any particular πλημμέλεια. Rather, it’s impossible for all. Neither people who make the error, nor Socrates who does not, has this σοφία.

Your rephrase though, would be a possible argument for Socrates to make here: “their sofia in one area effectively blinded them to their lack of sofia in the most important things, τα μεγιστα.” But that paraphrase (if I can even call it that) goes well beyond “αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν”. It’s just not signaled or implied by the Greek here, and does some violence to what is expressed.

In opposition to you, I think, Burnet does not read αποκρύπτειν as “to hide X from Y” here, but just “to hide” or “occultare”. “To throw into the shade” is his gloss. For him the τὰ μέγιστα is political knowledge. The χειροτέχναι – like every craftsman I’ve ever talked to – think that their local expertise means that they possess the knowledge to rule Athens. Helm seems to follow Burnet, glossing as “the most important things,” saying that it is particularly ethics and politics.

As far as your claim that the χειροτέχναι episode simply exists as a repeat of the ποιηταί and the δημιουργοί, I think that this is the least supportable claim of all. The three episodes are not mere repetitions, but a progression. The δημιουργοί make the simple error, thinking that they know something when they know nothing. The ποιηταί, in contrast, have access to some sort of more-than-human knowledge, but they are conduits rather than possessors of it. And the χειροτέχναι, for whom Socrates has the most narrative sympathy, have a real sort of knowledge, one which Socrates admires but does not possess, yet this knowledge is obscured, or shadowed, by their error.

Again, it’s hard to see how you and Hylander are taking αὐτῶν, but I believe that it actually needs to be understood as a possessive referring to αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια. It’s fronted for emphasis which signals that this is the specific error of the χειροτέχναι, as separate from the ποιηταί or the δημιουργοί. You two just need to dismiss this added σοφία that is so unnecessarily extracted from σοφώτατος as a referent and the section should be clear.

12

No Joel I am not reading αὐτῶν “as a person object of ἀποκρύπτειν”(?!), I’m reading it as a genitive with αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια. I have little doubt that Hylander took it that way too. I’m sorry you disagree with my understanding of the passage, but I’m not going to be sucked into an argument with you about it.

13

The “concealed from their view” was yours, not mine, and is often how this verb works, as you know. I was just trying to guess what could possibly motivate what I think is a unique interpretation. (As an aside, I came across this common τινος τινα use of αποκρύπτειν today in reading, reminding me of this post. τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην.) But I am happy that none of the three of us reads it that way here.

Whatever this statement means, it needs to justify the objection that Socrates has just raised to his argument that “ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν” and logically lead to the following “μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν”, where the σοφία referred to in both cases is that of handicrafts. Your and Hylander’s interpretation does not satisfy this. If you are reading αὐτῶν as we all are, than I can only assume that the interpretation comes only from reading this passage in the limited context as quoted in the thread rather than reviewing the larger context, which better explains ἐκείνη ἡ σοφία.

In short:

  1. Socrates raises this as a possible objection to the oracle:
    ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν
    They knew what I did not know and were wiser than me in this [σοφία of handicrafts]

  2. But their knowledge doesn’t wind up counting for them
    αὐτῶν ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν
    the error of theirs obscures that knowledge [of handicrafts]

  3. He’d rather be as he is
    ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν
    …as I am, not wise in their wisdom [of handicrafts] and not ignorant in their ignorance

14

On what was overshadowed by false claims to knowledge of greater things. I’m commenting here on my thoughts, and claiming no authority. For ease of reference I copy the translation I made.

But, o men of Athens, to me they seem to make the same mistake, both
poets and artisans the same one–because of finishing good work [in
his particular craft] each thinks [himself] very wise in even greater
things–and this false idea [that they know more important things]
seems [I inferred “seems”, to make parallel construction with ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ] to
put in the shade the wisdom [that they actually possess]:

I took a clue from Socrates’s account of the poets. They made verses with ease, but random listeners commented more intelligently on the verses than the poet who composed them. (This as I understood Socrates’s description of the poets.) I read this as an illustration of Socrates’s principle: pretended knowledge of greater things blocks understanding of the work you do, and the things you make. That’s what inspired me to read the line as I did. The poets may go around saying, in prose, big things about gods, nature, and whatnot, but they explain their own verses less well than any old listener.

Socrates himself doesn’t claim to know how to compose verses, which is so mysterious to him that he suggests something like automatic writing under control of some god. (Is this a joke?) Moving my thoughts into the realm of speculation, I imagine those poets could say a great deal about how they learned to versify, if they focused their attention on this matter, instead of the greater things they may speechify about.

Continuing speculatively, Socrates doesn’t know much, but he has learned how to evaluate statements and cross-examine pompous fatheads. In dialogues I have read, you see him at work, but he doesn’t tell you how to do this, he shows you how. He’s like the stonecutter with his apprentice: “See, here is the seam. I hold the chisel just so, and then tap, tap, not too hard now, and it splits apart.”

So, as I say, my thinking, perhaps wrongheaded, was controlled by Socrates’s account of the poets. Again, I’m not talking about how Plato must be read, but merely describing my thinking as I struggled to make a translation.

My working life was mostly teaching. And I learned that many effective teachers, while they may say impressive, big things about teaching, are not very good at telling you how to do the work of it.

15

I hesitate to add to this thread because with such expertise around I will no doubt simply embarrass myself.

I have been listening to some interesting podcasts (see here https://www.greecepodcast.com) on Plato’s republic and one feature which is highlighted is Plato’s sense of humour. This came as a surprise to me and illustrates my ignorance.

I think, Hugh, that perhaps Socrates has in mind for example Homer and Hesiod who begin their poems with invocations to the muse or goddess to tell [the story], implying that the poet will simply act as a medium for divine dictation. So how can these same poets who look for divine inspiration claim to have expert knowledge? The figure of the poet as vatic also appears in Tragedy but I dont have any examples to hand.

But Socrates’ remarks are intended as a point of departure rather than an end point and it is admirable that you engage with the text in the way you do.

16

Thanks for the comments seneca2008.

I hesitated myself for the same reason. But, because my translation evoked some grammatical discussion, mostly over my head, I wanted to clarify and account for my choice. What, for the Apology, does bloviating about “greater things” obscure? Does it block the path to true wisdom about those greater things? (a strong viewpoint here) Or does it make us less wise about things we do? (my choice) And why did I make that choice? I took my cue from the discussion of the poets.

17

You’re nearly there, Hugh. You made the wrong choice, that’s all.

ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν [ἔδοξεν].
“each one thought he was καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος, and this misapprehension of theirs apparently had the effect of keeping that σοφια hidden from view.”
εκεινην την σοφιαν can only refer to σοφια in the most important things (τα μεγιστα superlative, by the way). This fits the larger context too, despite what Joel thinks.

18

Many thanks for the explanation, mwh. I discard the idea I had pressed before.

19

While it’s fun to make this about me, I’m hardly the originator of this interpretation. I’ve got Grube open in front of me (for the first time in a very long time, though it’s pleasant to crack him), and he has “…thought himself very wise in other more important pursuits, and this error of theirs overshadowed the wisdom they had”.

In fact, as far as I can tell from translations, Michael and Bill’s interpretation is quite new to the world. I would guess that it comes from reading only the extracted paragraph and missing the true antecedent to the ἐκείνη ἡ σοφία and its follow up in 22e – perhaps they have not read the original recently – or that it comes from misreading the purpose of αὐτῶν in the sentence. But who knows?

It’s fine to have a new interpretation, of course. Maybe they are right, though they would surely be better off advancing arguments for it rather than chaff like “despite what Joel thinks”, etc. (This personalization of the argument is the only reason I bring up translations at all.)

Note: Fowler’s Loeb could possibly give someone the wrong impression about the “that” if they were to read only the section that comes up on Perseus for 22d (here italicized) and not look click forward or back. However, I refuse to believe that could be where this idea came from: “…they did know what I did not, and in this way they were wiser than I…each one thought he was very wise in the other most important matters, and this folly of theirs obscured that wisdom, so that I asked myself in behalf of the oracle whether I should prefer to be as I am, neither wise in their wisdom nor foolish in their folly…”. I think Plato would agree that technology only makes us worse.