I do not understand why αν is omitted in an apodosis of a less vivid future condition as in: εἰ γάρ τις καὶ πλέον ἔτι τῷ λέγοντι ἢ ἃ σὺ λέγεις συγχωρήσειεν, δοὺς αὐτῷ μὴ μόνον ἐν τῷ πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς χρόνῳ εἶναι ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν κωλύειν καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνωμεν ἐνίων ἔτι εἶναι καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ πολλάκις γενήσεσθαι καὶ ἀποθανεῖσθαι αὖθις–οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὸ φύσει ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι, ὥστε πολλάκις γιγνομένην ψυχὴν ἀντέχειν --δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς πολλαῖς γενέσεσιν καὶ τελευτῶσάν γε ἔν τινι τῶν θανάτων παντάπασιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τοῦτον δὲ τὸν [88b] θάνατον καὶ ταύτην τὴν διάλυσιν τοῦ σώματος ἣ τῇ ψυχῇ φέρει ὄλεθρον μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι–ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι ὁτῳοῦν αἰσθέσθαι ἡμῶν… Shouldn’t it be δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ αν?
A possible explanation is that δοὺς δὲ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, as well as μηδένα φαίη εἰδέναι are still in the protasis despite what the comment says, the real apodosis being οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν.
Addendum: I’ve changed my mind; this is wrong! Disregard this and see my subsequent post below.
I think συγχωροῖ and φαίη can be explained as potential optatives without αν. In English translation, I think this would be “he might not agree” rather than “he would not agree”. The optative without αν here seems more tentative and perhaps also more polite in raising an objection to Socrates to his face, consistent with Cebes’ putting the counterargument in the mouth of a hypothetical interlocutor instead of articulating it as his own. See Smyth 1821.
I don’t think that αν somehow dropped out of the text. αν would have had to have disappeared twice, with both verbs. Editors don’t seem to have been troubled by the absence of αν.
But συγχωροῖ and φαίη are both “apodoses” of the conditional: "Even if he were to concede that, he might not agree . . . and might say . . . ".
οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον is a continuation of the argument of the imaginary person making the counterargument, loosely dependent on φαίη.
Thanks I think your explanation is more convincing than the comments of Steadman and Burnet who think the verbs are still in the protasis.
I would go with what Burnet says (but not necessarily Stedman). He knew Plato better than anyone, certainly much better than I. And reading the passage over again, I see that his explanation makes sense.
The εἰ + optative verbs συγχωρήσειεν . . . συγχωροῖ . . . φαίη outline the counterargument to Socrates in the mouth of a hypothetical interlocutor; then Plato/Cebes switches to a present condition with a present indicative protasis (in Cebes’ own mouth) that summarizes the arguments of the hypothetical person: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, “if that’s the case . . .”, and the main clause (the apodosis) follows, also in the present indicative: οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρεῖν, ὃς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον.
There’s really no apodosis to the optatives with εἰ – the optative conditional breaks off and a new present condition begins with εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει . . . . The structure (not a translation) is:
If someone were to concede all your points but were to raise the counterargument that even so the soul might undergo damage in the course of multiple births and rebirths and might ultimately be extinguished completely – and no one knows whether this is true – if that is the case, then no one should rationally approach death with confidence unless he can show that the soul is really immortal and indestructible.
So you were right all along and I was wrong, but I won’t spare myself the humiliation and embarrassment by deleting my previous post.