Isocrates 2.35, difficult passage

ὅ τι ἂν ἀκριβῶσαι βουληθῇς ὧν ἐπίστασθαι προσήκει τοὺς βασιλεῖς, ἐμπειρίᾳ μέτιθι καὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ: τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδούς σοι δείξει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει.

Trial translation: If you want to understand thoroughly matters of which the knowledge befits kings, go to [practical] experience and philosophy: philosophy shows you the way, but exercise in doing work makes you able to deal with practical business.

[I assume τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι means discussing how kings might deal with problems that arise for them. I’m imagining something like dry-runs or drills, in which the king and his counselors imagine problems, and what orders a king might make to deal with the problems.]

I’m having trouble especially with this: τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει.

I’m also unsure about ὅ τι in this passage.

Hi Hugh,
Yes, you understand that τὸ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει refers to ἐμπειρία, practical experience, as opposed to τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; he’s expanding that initial bifurcation. This sort of stuff is expressed at such a high level of abstraction and with such manipulation of language that it’s hardly possible to translate it, or to say just what it amounts to in concrete terms. αὐτῶν is intensive, ἔργα “themselves,” the actual ἔργα.
At the beginning ὅ τι is the object of ἀκριβῶσαι, and ὧν is partitive genitive: “what(ever) you want to accurately master of the things that it behooves kings to know.”

Many thanks mwh for the helpful reply, which gives me some topics for thought.

Hello, mwh, this is a second reply.

I want to check two points. Here’s the relevant clip: τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλοσοφεῖν τὰς ὁδούς σοι δείξει, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων γυμνάζεσθαι δύνασθαί σε χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι ποιήσει.

I am wondering if τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δ᾽, by itself, would = the former . . . the latter, even if philosophy and practical experience had not been specified.

The second question is this: δύνασθαί σε . . . ποιήσει. Is it correct that δύνασθαί is the infintive complement of ποιήσει?

As to the first, yes, τὸ μὲν … τὸ δὲ … by itself would ordinarily mean “the former …, the latter” or “the one …, the other,” but here the two items are both feminine, so ἡ μὲν … ἡ δὲ would be more appropriate. But he’s artistically reversed their order (chiasmus, ABBA), so he has to specify, and takes the opportunity for some elegant variation, switching out φιλοσοφία for τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν and ἐμπειρία for the more extensive paraphrase.

As to the second, yes, δύνασθαι is the infinitive complement (if that’s the term) of ποιήσει· “it will make you to be able” i.e. will enable you, will give you the ability. Your “to deal with” is good for χρῆσθαι, a colorless sort of word.

Thanks mwh for that confirmation. On “δύνασθαι [and] ποιήσει”: I was puzzled for quite a while before that possibility appeared to me.

Yes, acc. & inf. (here δύνασθαί σε) is quite regular with ποιῶ, make or cause someone or something to do something.