Specifically, I don’t get what the use of the dative is here. The commentaries say the participle is a conditional form of the circumstantial participle (“if their opinion was faulty”/“if their assessment of him was wrong”). But even with that, I’m not sure which use of the dative is in play here and why it exists in this sentence, apart from authorial preference.
You know, I was thinking that it may simply be that the previous clauses had dative plurals and this was just a way to keep the subjects straight, but it sounded like I was grasping at straws to say that. I guess I should not dismiss my gut so easily.
To put it in a grammatical pigeonhole, σφαλεῖσι γνώμης . . . σφίσι is the "dative of “advantage”. The referent of σφίσι is τοῖς σώφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, but σφαλεῖσι specifically agrees with the indirect reflexive σφίσι, not with τοῖς σώφροσι. σφίσι is a dative of advantage complement of χειρώσεσθαι, not of ἐγίγνετο. (In contrast, τοῖς σώφροσι is a dative complement of ἐγίγνετο.)
As the commentaries note, the participle is conditional or hypothetical. I don’t like to paraphrase, but it could be cast as a condition: ει σφαλειεν γνωμης. The Greek participle allows this, unlike English.
Literally: “or he would defeat the Lacedaemonians to their advantage/for them being wrong in their assessment.”
“or he would defeat the Lacedaemonians for them/to their advantage in the event they were wrong in their assessment.”
"some laughter fell upon the Athenians at his empty braggadocio, but nevertheless [Kleon or his proposal to go to Sphakteria] was welcomed by those persons who were of sound judgment, who calculated that one of two good things would come of it, either they would be rid of Kleon, which is what they hoped for more, or else he would defeat the Lacedaemonians to their benefit in the event they were wrong.
An example of Thucydides’ wry humor. Of course, as it turned out, Kleon did in fact deliver a humiliating defeat to the Lacedaemonians at Sphakteria.
Update: I goofed in my original translation, translating χειρώσεσθαι as passive, with the Lacedaemonians as the subject of the infinitive. But it’s future middle, so Kleon must be understood as the subject and the Lacedaemonians are the direct object. Future passive would be χειρωθησεσθαι. I took the liberty of changing my faulty translation.
I’m not sure I follow you, Joel. σφισι functions as an indirect reflexive, referring back to the subject of the main clause in a subordinate clause. See Smyth 1225, 1228b.
Here the “subject” is actually the noun σωφροσι, modified by the participle λογιζομένοις, which acts as a verb introducing indirect discourse. σφισι refers back to τοῖς σώφροσι, which is the “subject” of λογιζομένοις, but it’s not “attracted” into the dative by the case of σώφροσι – it’s dative because its function is dative of advantage complementing the verb χειρώσεσθαι in the indirect discourse σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι. σώφροσι itself happens to be dative because that’s its function in the main clause in relation to the verb ἐγίγνετο.
If you wanted to transform it into a stand-alone sentence (but why would you?), it might read:
No, that would be a very different sentence, and the dative pronoun wouldn’t be the indirect reflexive σφισι – it would be αυτοις, since (1) the subject of the sentence would be ὁ Κλέων, and (2) χειρώσεται would be the main verb of the sentence, not in a subordinate clause.
Thank you, I wasn’t sure whether the genitive absolute would take a reflexive or just a pronoun. Yes it’s a very different sentence, but you made Κλέων the subject and χειρώσεται a finite verb just a moment before and for exactly the same investigatory purpose:
It just doesn’t quite feel right to me. The shift from masculine dative plural meaning one thing to another, without an introduced referent coming first struck me as too much.
And if so, wouldn’t that indicate some “attraction” to λογιζομένοις, if that’s the right word?
Joel, I still don’t see your point. And I don’t understand what you mean by “attraction.” There’s no attraction in this sentence. Both the dative σωφροσι and the dative σφισι are dative because of their function in their own clauses, not because one is somehow attracted into the case of the other. But the indirect reflexive pronoun σφισι refers back to σωφροσι.
In Thucydides’ original sentence, Κλεωνα must be understood as the accusative subject of the infinitive χειρωσεσθαι. Do you see that?
Thucydides didn’t see fit to use a genitive absolute construction here.
But I think we should just try to understand what Thucydides wrote and not try to paraphrase him. Many things in Thucydides don’t “feel right,” and even the ancient Greeks found him difficult to understand. He often pushes syntax to the limits of intelligibility. But this sentence seems relatively straightforward.
In Thucydides’ original sentence, Κλεωνα must be understood as the accusative subject of the infinitive χειρωσεσθαι. Do you see that?
I’m not sure what motivates this question. That is why both you and I made Κλέων nominative in the direct speech version.
Many things in Thucydides don’t “feel right,”
Perhaps, but this sentence feels just fine and the translation you’ve given is just fine. But the question wasn’t “what was the translation”, it is “why is σφαλεῖσι dative”? And as I said, if it were simply agreement with σφίσι (which has to be dative), then something like “τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις λογιζόμενοις…ἢ βοηθηθεῖσι Λακεδαιμονίους Ἕιλωσι χειρώσεσθαι” with the alternation of subject, should be possible, but it feels just a little incongruous to me. It’s almost like the English sentence: “I went to the circus with some ladies to see the elephants, and they were almost too big to fit through the entrance.”
If you are suggesting that σφαλεῖσι is dative because it agrees with, or is somehow attracted into agreement with, τοῖς σώφροσι, that’s wrong.
σφαλεῖσι is part of and subordinate to the “indirect discourse/reported speech” segment σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι – it’s embedded in and part of the calculations going through the minds of the σώφρονες, and doesn’t belong in the authorial statement of fact that introduces the indirect discourse, in which τοῖς σώφροσι belongs.
σφαλεῖσι is equivalent to a protasis of a conditional ει σφαλειεν γνωμης, of which the apodosis is Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι. Instead of being framed as a subordinate clause, the underlying idea of the protasis is cast as a participle depending on a pronoun within the clause, namely σφίσι. This is one of the possible ways participles can be used in Greek, but it can only be done in English in very limited circumstances. Here the use of the participle instead of a subordinate clause is characteristic of Thucydides’ pithy style.
If the sentence you constructed doesn’t feel right to you, I can’t help you with that. The syntax and structure of Thucycides’ sentence are clear, and the meaning of the sentence itself is clear.
To me, your made-up clause, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις λογιζόμενοις…ἢ βοηθηθεῖσι Λακεδαιμονίους Ἕιλωσι χειρώσεσθαι seems strange mainly because there’s no alternative ἢ clause, which leaves it devoid of context. Try this:
(This assumes Thucydides would use the passive of βοηθεω, a verb that takes a dative complement in the active. Later Greek apparently does this, but I’m not sure about Thucydides.)
In both cases – Thucydides and the above – the participle can be used as a “protasis” because there’s something in the sentence that precedes it to give it context as a conditional. In the constructed sentence, there would presumably be something in the narrative explaining why the people of sound judgment didn’t want Kleon to help the helots . . . but they would nevertheless be happy to see the assistance rendered, to the helots’ advantage, if it meant a Lacedaemonian defeat. But it would still be a little strange – not syntactically but because the entire context would be odd.
The sentence would seem odd in part because the dative of advantage (or perhaps “dative of disadvantage”? call it “dative of interest”) would seem unmotivated without much more context. In Thucydides’ sentence, the dative of advantage σφισι flows from the context of the σωφρονες’ calculation of their own interest. And the elegantly concise and pithy participle σφαλεῖσι γνώμης is readily understood as conditional in context, following as it does ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον.
But let’s stick to what Thucydides actually wrote and try to understand how that fits together. And that has to be the end of my comments on this. I just hope that if the OP takes another look at this thread, my explanation will set him or her straight.
σφαλεῖσι is part of and subordinate to the “indirect discourse/reported speech” segment σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι – it’s embedded in and part of the calculations going through the minds of the σώφρονες, and doesn’t belong in the authorial statement of fact that introduces the indirect discourse, in which τοῖς σώφροσι belongs.
There would be a major and perhaps relevant counterexample to this line of reasoning regarding an authorial/discourse firewall. Smyth 1973 c. mentions that “when the governing verb is a participle in an oblique case, a predicate noun usually agrees with the participle, and rarely stands in the nominative.” Ex. ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι. And see Kühner 475.6 for more copious examples.
In this case, λογιζομένοις is our governing participle. Perhaps there is some way to understand σφαλεῖσι as attributive and predicate to the subject of λογιζομένοις, but I won’t argue that. What does seem clear, however, is that the governing oblique case participle must be present to the author as a possible referent. And, again, the word choice and order here is striking to me if we don’t know who the σφαλεῖσι are until σφίσι.
EDIT: Posted before I saw your recent comment, so this is not meant as a response to that.
OK, one more stab at this and I’m done. The reader doesn’t have to wait until σφισι to know who is meant by σφαλεισι γνωμης. ο μαλλον ελπιζον makes it perfectly clear who is meant by σφαλεισι γνωμης, which follows immediately and balances it.
I think that this would be a more convincing argument if ἤλπιζον and σφαλεῖσι referred to the same action. But the ἐλπίς of these σώφρονες is to be Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι. And the γνώμη of which they σφαλλοῦσι is that he is talking κουφολογίαν. They are a pair in a general sort of way due to the verb meanings, but it is not αs tight as if it were “σφαλεῖσι ταύτης τῆς ἐλπίδος” or somesuch. There is no more necessary connection in the subjects of the two verbs than in their two objects. (Though clearly the subject is the same for other reasons.)
But I’ll leave you with one thing to think about: Thucydides abhors strict parallelism. It’s the most salient characteristic of his style, and it leaps off every page he wrote.
And you’re wrong about the γνωμη they would be mistaken about. It’s that they would be rid of Kleon, ο μαλλον ελπζον. Don’t forget that ελπιζω covers more ground than “hope”. It includes “expect”. Here it partakes of the meanings of both English words.
Ah, I had misinterpreted that μαλλον as a statement of just how unpopular he was. I appreciate the correction. I imagine that they’d rather have the victory, even if it meant that he’d come back afterwards.
As I mentioned, it’s a bit of wry humor – but perhaps not wrong. To paraphrase, the bien-pensants nevertheless looked on it favorably because they calculated that they would gain one of two possible advantages from it: either they would be rid of Kleon --which is what they really hoped for (and expected) – or else, if they proved to be mistaken in that expectation, he would defeat the Lacedaemonians for them.
If he had written λογιζομένοις δυοῖν ἀγαθοῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου τεύξεσθαι, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, ἢ, ει σφαλεῖεν γνώμης, Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι, I don’t think you would have had a problem recognizing who was meant by σφαλεῖεν. But σφαλεῖσι essentially carries the same information as would σφαλεῖεν – a masculine plural referent – and this could only be the σωφρονες in this sentence. I think it’s the very Greek, very succinct conditional use of the participle that creates the difficulty for English speakers – pithy and elegantly concise. And σφίσι really isn’t too far away, anyway. So this usage is something to take note of.
It’s worth taking a look at this sentence from a stylistic point of view. I think that stylistically it’s very carefully constructed. The two alternatives, ἢ Κλέωνος ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι, ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον, and ἢ σφαλεῖσι γνώμης Λακεδαιμονίους σφίσι χειρώσεσθαι, are balanced chiastically, with ὃ μᾶλλον ἤλπιζον balancing σφαλεῖσι γνώμης, but deliberately (I think) avoiding strict parallelism. The rhyming homoeoteleutons, ἀπαλλαγήσεσθαι and χειρώσεσθαι, reinforce the balanced effect, again without strict parallelism. And the underlying idea is balanced but again without parallelism: either Kleon would be eliminated or the Lacedaemonians would be eliminated.
Thucydides goes to great lengths to avoid parallelism at all costs. He’s reacting to the mindless μεν/δε’s of Gorgias, which were becoming very fashionable at the time.
I appreciate the points on the parallelism between the two, though I don’t see any verb there, “εἰ […]εῖεν γνώμης” would be very likely to trigger a subject shift.
However, if we are rephrasing, I’ll also point out: