Aristotle's "essential" X

ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι ταὐτόν, ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐ ταὐτόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος λεχθήσεται

At the conceptual level, he’s using this bizarre language to make the distinction is between X and essential or ideal X. See here for some examples of the range of the use.

But why dative? And why no dative in question form? He even drops the εἶναι for certain concepts.

I can’t even think of any particular dative property that would cause him to have come up with this usage. The best I can guess is that it’s like a deictic iota of some sort, up against an indeclinable label, rather than a dative. Breadth is one thing and another is being BREADTH. But the forms are generally wrong for that. It would have been ἀνθρωποσί in the above, for example.

it is instrumental dative

I understand it as follows: soul and soul qua soul are the same, but qua man and man are not the same unless soul is also said to be man.
soul and soul qua soul are the same, because soul is already an abstraction so to say sould qua soul is redundant;
but qua man and man are not the same because the firs is an abstraction and the second a real tangible man;
unless soul is also said to be man. unless soul is also said to be a real tangible man.

if you need more context, you can find it in Met., Z6 where Ar develops this argument with plenty of D’s

That’s one of several references in the link. Having reviewed them, my impression was that the problem isn’t so much what he’s saying, which seems to come through by context (more or perhaps less). But it’s why he would ever think of indicating this idea of qua X, or ideal X, or essential X, with a dative.

On the instrumental dative, I would absent context understand instrumental τὸ δικέλλᾳ εἶναι to apply to the existential state of ἄλοξ, a furrow, which exists by means of a hoe. And even if the dative is really pulling that sort of weight in his mind, why not a participle instead of τὸ εἶναι? I don’t really get it.

This is Aquinas’ commentary on this passage:

Manifestum est enim quod si aliqua res est, quae sit forma tantum et actus, quod quid erat esse existit ei, idest quod quid erat esse eius, idem erit cum ea: sicut idem est anima et animae esse, idest anima est quidditas animae. Si vero aliquid est compositum ex materia et forma, non erit idem in ipso quod quid erat esse et res ipsa; sicut non idem est homini esse, et homo. Nisi forte dicatur anima tantum, secundum illos, qui dicunt, quod nomina specierum significant formam tantum. Et sic patet, quod aliqua res est, cui idem est quod quid erat esse suum; scilicet quae non est composita ex materia et forma, sed forma tantum.

Hope this helps.

Hi, the dative is possessive in my view (not instrumental). It’s definitely not a deictic iota (which isn’t used with substantives in this way, and you can clearly see from the spelling that it’s not a substantive with an iota added).

This distinction makes sense in Aristotle’s broader system but unfortunately it means getting your head around all the organon, especially the Categories and Posterior Analytics for this topic (we can’t separate Aristotle’s ontology from the other areas of his philosophy, it’s all tangled together).

τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι is the being of the soul (‘being’ expressed by the infinitive, ψυχῇ being a dative of possession). Aristotle equates this with its essence (i.e. what a definition expresses: see the Posterior Analytics, there are different types of definitions for subject-kinds and demonstrable attributes, each of which expresses an essence).

So far so clear I hope: the soul is the same as its definition (because the soul is the substance and actuality of a body: αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία καὶ ἐνέργεια σώματός τινος, Met. 1030a, not a combination of form and matter. It’s not an identical definition to that in De anima, but that doesn’t change the point here).

This is unlike ἄνθρωπος, as Aristotle notes in the next section.

Hopefully you can see how it all makes sense in Aristotle’s system where substance is tied to essence (Aristotle knocked out other candidates for substance) and where the essence is expressed through definition.

For anyone just entering Aristotle, I highly recommend starting with Guthrie’s volume VI (the whole thing, but especially the chapter on substance):

https://archive.org/details/historyofgreekph0006guth/

Incidentally, a much lighter intro is a lecture I was able to attend as a member of the Royal Society down here in Aus recently (you can hear me asking the final audience question at the end):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5g8KfDcaiT0

Cheers, Chad

It’s definitely not a deictic iota (which isn’t used with substantives in this way, and you can clearly see from the spelling that it’s not a substantive with an iota added).

The first statement simply begs the question. I’m not actually defending the idea, which is a spitball, but you can’t answer the question “Does Aristotle use deictic iota in a special way?” with “No, because deictic iota isn’t used like that.” In fact, Aristophanes shows that the popular Attic usage in his time had a more separable deictic iota than our literary texts do, with unique (to himself) uses like νυνγαρί νυνδί and νυνμενί. Further, what would a deictic iota added to a noun stem look like exactly? Pretty close to a dative – too close for a scribe to tell, at least – especially with any vowel quantity transfer. But I’m not arguing for this. It seems plenty unlikely for other reasons.

τὸ ψυχῇ εἶναι is the being of the soul

This only works in English, where “being” has a much wider range than τὸ εἶναι in Greek. We can say things like “vital being”, “spiritual being”, or “being there”. Only the last could sometimes be translated with τὸ εἶναι.


One way to solve the problem – and this is a bit more than a spitball – is to take Aristotle’s statement as conceptual, not substantive. He’s speaking, as Chad says, definitionally, and not about inner substance. “Essence” or “essential being” are precisely the wrong words to use in English. He’s talking about the abstract concept of a soul, or a man, or whatever, versus a particular soul, or a man, or whatever, that actually exists.

This definitional use comes out, quite clearly, smack dab at the beginning of this most autistic of philosophers:

Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον· τούτων γὰρ ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, > ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος· ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ > τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι> , ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀποδώσει> . συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς· τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόματι προσαγορεύεται ζῷον, καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός· > ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποδιδῷ τις τὸν ἑκατέρου λόγον τί ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ > τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι> , τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἀποδώσει> . παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔνομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

This says that a ζῷον is either “a picture” or “a living thing”. They only have the name in common. Each has a different λόγος τῆς οὐσίας. That is, for human beings thinking about them, a different mental concept of its substance. Someone assigns each one τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, and he says what he means by that: An ἴδιος ἑκατέρου λόγος. Each falls into its own abstract definition.

Easiest to understand this as Smyth 1495, dative of relation. Our mental conception of existence, for a ζῷον, is either the λόγος of being something alive, or the λόγος of being a picture. We are not in the realm of substance, but of mental conception and definition.

And of course ἄλλο μὲν ζῷον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι (in either meaning) now becomes clear. A particular picture is of some particular thing. A particular animal is alive somewhere in some particular body and does some particular thing. Versus the general idea of the thing (in either meaning). The arguments and conclusions that Aristotle takes from this all make perfect sense, as long as you take them on the conceptual level, not some statement about inner substance or what thing thing truly is separate from how we think about it.