λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν.
All translations I’ve come across take it in the sense:
“such a disposition can be forgotten, whereas prudence cannot be forgotten.”
I’m wondering whether it can be alternatively taken to mean:
“forgetting is a feature of such a disposition, whereas it is not [a feature] of prudence.”
I think the literal translation would be:
The forgetting of such a ἕξις exists, while the forgetting of φρόνησις does not exist.
But there was also an accentation rule about ἐστίν that I cannot quite remember. Did it mean possible when it was accented like ἔστιν? I am sure others will clarify things more.
[187].b. ἐστί is written ἔστι at the beginning of a sentence; when it expresses existence or possibility; when it follows οὐκ, μή, εἰ, ὡς, καί, ἀλλά (or ἀλλʼ), τοῦτο (or τοῦτʼ); and in ἔστιν οἵ some, ἔστιν ὅτε sometimes. Thus, εἰ ἔστιν οὕτως if it is so, τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι that which exists.
Smyth, H. W. (1920). A Greek Grammar for Colleges (p. 43). New York; Cincinnati; Chicago; Boston; Atlanta: American Book Company.
Tugodum - I’m guessing the context of the passage would answer your question. Perhaps you could supply it.
Randy, I’m asking whether it is possible in terms of Greek syntax. Otherwise, we’d have to discuss Aristotle’s concepts, which seems to be off topic here.
Of course it’s syntactically possible (if we isolate it from its context and disregard the accentuation), but that’s not what it means.
Considering Barry’s clarification (ἐστί is written ἔστι…when it follows οὐκ), the accentuation apparently does not necessitate the possibility sense.
Tugodum: I am not sure why you are inclined towards the “forgetting is a feature of such a disposition” interpretation. If the text were simply λόγος ἀνθρώπου ἔστι, would you be inclined to interpret this as λόγος is a feature of the human being?
But consider that the first ἔστι is so accented, and does not follow οὐκ.
You are right. Sorry.
Thanks everybody. I have to admit, I had not factored in the accentuation.
This discussion made me think: are all of the extant Aristotle manuscripts themselves accented? When did accents began to be marked in these manuscripts anyway?
By the way, fool around with some of the digitized manuscripts; it is really fun. https://guides.library.yale.edu/AristotleEthics/ENmanuscripts
hairetikon – Thanks for the link, it is fun indeed. My understanding is that accentuation was introduced by Byzantine scribes, who might be great grammarians but not so great thinkers. I understand how a habit may be lost by not exercising it but it does not seem natural to me to call such loss of a habit “forgetting” it. One may forget this or that opinion one used to hold, or to altogether lose the habit of forming opinions, but not to forget a habit, as it seems. Also, it is far from clear to me why, on Aristotle’s account, prudence, as a habit, cannot be “forgotten” (i.e., lost by not exercising).
I don’t think that habit is a good transltion for ἕξις, but at any rate, Aristotle says in Metaphysics 1047a1 that we can lose the art (which, too, is a ἕξις) either by forgetting or by some suffering or by time (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ). A temporary cessation of the exercise of an art does not entail its loss (so the Megarians are wrong) but decades of inactivity would lead to forgetting.
hairetikon – Thanks for the reference, it is helpful! But there the λήθη in the dative indicates the means, whereas the action is expressed by the participle of ἀποβάλλω.
This makes perfect sense: a “habit” (or, “state”) can be lost in virtue of (or, due to) the forgetting of certain things.
p.s. This is what my initial guess was: it is possible to forget certain relevant things while being in the state under discussion, and this results in the loss of the state.
p.p.s. I think ἕξις here means something like a disposition. A disposition can be lost, no doubt. But losing a disposition does not necessarily imply forgetting it. I perfectly remember some dispositions that I used to have. Likewise, forgetting about a disposition that one has does not seem to imply necessarily losing it.
Otherwise, we’d have to discuss Aristotle’s concepts, which seems to be off topic here.
Oh, I see. But wait! Apparently hairetikon has seduced you into just that discussion (perhaps because his name means “the factious thing”? 
).
Which is perfectly fine by me. But I’m having a hard time distinguishing what you think is syntactically possible from what you think Aristotle meant from what your own psychological opinion is. I don’t know where you grabbed this sentence of Aristotle’s from, but if you’re reading the Nicomachean Ethics, I’d like to know what you think Aristotle meant.
He found it right where it is, NE Book 6, 1140b. Here is a bit more context:
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δʼ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν.
Aristotle. (1894). Nicomachean Ethics (Greek). (J. Bywater, Ed.). Medford, MA: Perseus Digital Library.
Kind of a fun discussion, actually.