I see it translated as “Of course” (e.g., in Plato, Phdr. 270e, 271a – by Alexander Nehamas), but this meaning is not in LSJ (s.v. μήν):
III. after interrogatives, τί μ.; well, what of it? A.Eu.203, Pl.Tht.145e, etc.; τί μ. οὔ well, why not? E. Rh.706 (lyr.); τῶς μ.; well, but how . . ? X.Cyr.1.6.28; τίνος μ. ἕνεκα; ibid.; ποῦ μ.; to express surprise, Pl.Tht.142a; ἀλλὰ πότε μήν; X. Smp.4.23;
However, it is the only meaning given by Wiktionary:
(after interrogatives, τί μήν) of course, naturally
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/μήν
Any ideas?
It points more forward than back, whenever I’ve seen it, at the very least serving the same function as “What does that imply?” in a back and forth.
That’s how I, also, have been used to taking it. I wouldn’t have paid attention to Wiktionary if not for Nehamas, who is a respectable scholar (and almost a native speaker :))
I don’t have any real insight, but Denniston lists this usage and gives the following passages: Aesch. Supp. 999, Ag. 672, Eum. 203, Soph. Aj. 668, Eur. Rh. 705, Ar. Ach. 757, 784, and “common in Plato” Phdr. 229a, 267a, Tht. 145e, Rep. 410a, 438d, 441c, 453c, 455e, 485d, 501a, 505d, etc. He says that it’s elliptical but that it’s hard to account for the slight variations all together, so if he’s not sure the best you can probably do is look at all those passages to satisfy yourself about the meaning. He also says that Dittenberger thinks it’s “a conversational idiom of the Sicilian Dorians, picked up by Plato on his first Sicilian journey, and hence not found in his earliest dialogues,” but I just bring that up because it’s fun, and it seems like the type of claim that most people wouldn’t make anymore. This usage is also listed in the new Cambridge Greek Lexicon, which is terrific. And I think it’s sort of implied in the LSJ in the E. Rh.706 example you list, where τί μήν is used in 705 and τί μὴν οὔ in 706, and might be a good passage to study.
Thank you! What surprises me is that Nehamas translates it as “Of course” where it is a response not to a question but to a statement, which sounds funny and makes me think he was assuming this is the only possible meaning of this idiom, regardless of the context, exactly as Wiktionary has it.
Maybe it’s just because I read a book of the Republic lately where it’s used a lot, but I think the best phrase to look at in conjunction is ἀλλὰ τί μήν. The ἀλλά is adversive to what’s behind, and the τί μήν must there at least point entirely forward. “And therefore…?” or something.
The τί μὴν οὔ in Rhesus and Electra, imo, take up the preceding verb in both instances. Really equivalent to places where you see τί μήν followed by a longer phrase, and where μήν is doing its normal thing, amping emphasis, (unlike bare τί μήν;) LSJ disagrees and glosses it “well”. But instead I’d throw these three together:
— δοκεῖς γάρ; — τί μὴν οὐ [δοκῶ];
Ηλ. ξυναινεῖς; Ορ. τί μὴν οὐ [ξυναινῶ];
Ἀλλὰ τί μὴν βουλόμενοι, ἔφη ὁ Κῦρος, ψεύδονται; in Cyropaedia. (And one or two similar in Xenophon and Plato).
Hi all, just a few points here:
- As others have noted above, ‘of course’ reacting to a statement (rather than a question) is ‘fine’ (see next item though — no translation of a particle is perfect) as a (rough) translation of τί μήν; — this is a translation given by Denniston (p. 333), and is also in the earlier translation of Phaedrus 270e online: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Plat.+Phaedrus+270&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0174 . See e.g. Republic 410a:
— οἱ δὲ δὴ νέοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δῆλον ὅτι εὐλαβήσονταί σοι δικαστικῆς εἰς χρείαν ἰέναι, τῇ ἁπλῇ ἐκείνῃ μουσικῇ χρώμενοι ἣν δὴ ἔφαμεν σωφροσύνην ἐντίκτειν.
— τί μήν; ἔφη.
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There is almost never a perfect translation of Greek particles. They mark non-semantic as well as semantic information. Rather than translating, you could consider their function: (1) τί μήν can mark assent, agreeing with a positive statement (express or implied) (Denniston p. 333). (2) ἀλλὰ τί μήν can be used in a parallel way (Denniston p. 332). The semantic element is: ‘(well) how else?’ (Diggle 2020 s.v. μήν 3 and ἀλλά 8), but this does not capture all the information in the particles, just the rough surface semantic info. ‘Of course’ works here if it comes close to capturing this non-semantic as well as semantic info, although it’s rough and ready as the two languages do not match perfectly in these usages.
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I would not rely on the authority of Nehamas (or any scholar really) as a ‘native speaker’. Nehamas in another article on the Socratic dialogues argues for a reading of the syntax in one passage, based on usage in tragedy (which is an extremely weak argument, given that tragedy often differs in syntax from prose) and makes other dubious assertions. The more you read, the more you realise that existing scholarship is riddled with errors, and so is an area where constant new work from academics is required and valuable.
Cheers, Chad
Thanks, Chad! This is helpful, but I’m still wondering why, say, in 270e, taking it as assent is preferable to taking it as forward looking (in the sense “What does this imply?” vel sim.), which, per LSJ, is also, generally speaking, possible.
Hi, note that in the preamble to the μήν article it says: ‘a Particle used to strengthen asseverations’, and I read the III wording in that way (i.e. as marking assent).
This is a different construction to, say, τί οὖν; which, among other things, can mark a question about the relevance of the preceding text (whether that was uttered by the questioner or the respondent): ‘so what?’ (Sicking 1997 pp. 169–70), or to ask a question introducing a second question asking for further information: ‘what more can you tell us (τί), this being so (οὖν)?’, or ‘what then?’ (Rijksbaron 2007 p. 110).
See e.g. for ‘so what?’ Gorgias 463d:
— ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ῥητορικὴ κατὰ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον πολιτικῆς μορίου εἴδωλον.
— τί οὖν; καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν λέγεις αὐτὴν εἶναι;
Ion 530a introducing a second question asking for more info:
— μῶν καὶ ῥαψῳδῶν ἀγῶνα τιθέασιν τῷ θεῷ οἱ Ἐπιδαύριοι;
— πάνυ γε, καὶ τῆς ἄλλης γε μουσικῆς.
— τί οὖν; ἠγωνίζου τι ἡμῖν; καὶ πῶς τι ἠγωνίσω;
There is another variant adding δή, marking that the other person should be expecting this query: τί οὖν δή 'and so what?’ (Sicking 1997 pp. 171–72).
The Cambridge grammar (sec. 59.49) does support the other reading of τί μήν; (‘with the sense what of it? yes, but what is your point?’. However, it does not give any examples of this. You could follow that reading, however I rely on the studies of particles in Plato specifically to get a sense of the force of particles in Plato (and you need to focus on author-specific usages, as different authors can use particles in individual ways).
PS purely for fun (it carries no weight in the argument, I mention it just in passing), I used this ‘forward-looking’ construction with τί οὖν; ‘what’s your point?’ in my dialogue between Socrates and Hawking:
https://antigonejournal.com/2023/02/socrates-redux-competition-winners/
I give the particle source information for this usage on p. 28 of my notes:
https://antigonejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Socrates-vs-Hawking-Bochan.pdf
Cheers, Chad
Dover/Denniston does list τί μήν; after questions, and calls that “Elliptical τί μήν; practically equivalent to an emphatic affirmative, ‘of course’”, listing not only instances of τί μήν;, but also ἀλλὰ τί μήν. He gives Phdr. 229A 267A. in Plato, along with a number of others.
Some items from list of examples hardly seem to support his description. A.Supp.999 and Eu.203 and S.Aj.668? Those are “equivalent to an emphatic affirmative”? Really? I wonder what the first edition of Denniston had for this section, before Dover did his in-place revisions.
In his Plato list, there are spots where it’s a little easier to make the case that it just means “of course”. You could translate it that way at 438D and nobody would notice. But it’s rather inconsistent, and unnecessary, when forward-looking “Yes, and therefore…?” works just as well.
After questions affirmative sense seems plausible, but after statements it substantially diminishes dramatic dynamics, making the respondent into a mere placeholder instead of an active participant in the dialogue.
Chad, are not forward looking examples in LSJ sufficient (“well, what of it? A.Eu.203, Pl.Tht.145e, etc.”)?
Hi Tugodum, I’ll leave it there — the sources I quoted above (including the Republic example I pasted in) make clear, in my view, that τί μήν; with affirmative force can follow statements.
As for diminishing dramatic dynamics, I don’t have a position — I wouldn’t have anything to go on, other than intuition (often a false friend).
As a last general point, I’d be wary about relying on usages from tragedy or any other author — the best scholarship for Platonic usage of particles which I’ve found focuses exclusively on Plato.
I think it’s a good thing to think through other potential readings, as you and others have done on this thread. Scholarship on Greek particles is still very young and nowhere near finalised.
Cheers, Chad
that τί μήν; with affirmative force can follow statements
Just to avoid misunderstanding: I never doubted that it can. My only question is whether τί μήν; with forward looking force can also do this. If it can, than we have to choose. And in this case, I dare say, the reading on which an author of Plato’s calibre turns out to be a better writer (rather than a worse one) is always preferable.
My guess is that the compiler of the Denniston references, which is a good list, meant to say something like “includes strong affirmation”, and that “equivalent to ‘of course’” is sheer error. I’m a little interested in the pre-Dover first edition because it might have had better wording here.
Translators mindlessly putting in “of course”, following Denniston, are perpetuating error.
The separate infelicity is in the LSJ, which claims μήν means “well” in the idiomatic translations (which maybe aren’t bad) it gives. That’s some sort of mechanical translation mummery. To the extent “well” even has a meaning in these idiomatic English phrases, it’s not a μήν equivalent.