Dover: πάντας τἀγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὑτοῖς εἶναι ἀεί, where, although a Greek reader would be bound to say (if asked) that ἀεί goes with βούλεσθαι (as it does with ἐρῶσι in b1), the collocation εἶναι ἀεί is meant to lodge in our minds and reduce the likelihood of our objecting to 206a9-12.
At first glance I read the ἀεί with the εἶναι thinking that it was more or less equivalent to 200d1: βούλει καὶ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταῦτα κεκτῆσθαι. I think that I understand Dover’s point that ἀεί would most likely go with βούλεσθαι, but is taking it with εἶναι really impossible? It should go without saying that my understanding of Greek Word Order does not compare to Dover’s.
I think the point in 205a is that the desire to have good things is common to all humans, and that is always the case, not that all humans desire to have good things forever. The desire to have good things is universal, applicable to everyone and at all times. It’s only later (206a) that she makes the additional point that humans desire to possess “the Good” forever. In 205a, I think ἀεί can be taken with εἶναι only if you take the sentence out of context.
That’s quite different from 200d, where he says that if you’re wealthy, etc. and you say you want to be wealthy, you must mean that you want to continue to be wealthy forever, because it doesn’t make sense to say that you want to be something now, in the present, that you already are – it only makes sense to say you want to be something in the present that you are not now.
Written before seeing Hylander, so I post merely to echo him. I should reply more promptly or (better) simply leave it to him.
For αει to go with ειναι is certainly consistent with the word order. It’s just that we haven’t yet reached the stage in the argument where permanence of possession comes into play. All this logic-chopping makes my head spin, but here the point is simply that desire for happiness (possessing τα αγαθα) is universal, that everyone wants it, always (βουλεσθαι … αει). Desire for the good (~ ευδαιμονια, the goal of all Greek philosophy) is a constant, it doesn’t come and go, it’s not going to change next week, or with the next generation.
It’s only when we reach 206d that we get the additional point about αει ειναι as distinct from just ειναι. People don’t just want happiness, they want permanent happiness. Dover is suggesting that Plato is sneakily paving the way for that final step by adding αει here at 205a7, where in fact it clearly applies to παντας βουλεσθαι and is perfectly in place as such (as Dover recognizes).
I don’t myself think that we have to take such a malign view of Plato’s arguments as Dover habitually does (logically outdoing Plato), but his treatment is very refreshing and almost as challenging as Plato himself. The larger question is whether Plato was aware of the fallacious reasoning he puts in the mouth of Socrates or Diotima or his other main characters, and whether he means his readers to be. Since Plato never says anything in his own person, that’s a tricky one. Always has been, always will be.