Possible function of ἢ μὴ

In Posterior Analytics (99b36–37), Aristotle has this:

ὅσοις μὲν . . . ἐν οἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἕν τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

Translating that very tightly:

In some, . . . in others, perceiving, it is possible to have a single something in the soul.

Philosophers argue over what to do with that present participle, αἰσθανομένοις, “perceiving” — maybe “in the others, who are perceiving” or maybe “in the others, by their perceiving,” or maybe “in the others, those who are perceiving.”

(Reading ἔνεστιν + infinitive as “it is possible to” does not seem in dispute. I assume the separation of οἷς and αἰσθανομένοις puts some stress on the participle: the possibility exists because of the perceiving.)

My question is grammatical. One manuscript has an “or not” in there:

ὅσοις μὲν . . . ἐν οἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν ἢ μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἕν τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

No editors accept that as is. But some use it to justify

ὅσοις μὲν . . . ἐν οἷς δ’ ἔνεστιν μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ἔχειν ἕν τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ

and read this as

In some, . . . in others, no longer perceiving, it is possible to have a single something in the soul.

My grammatical question is: Could the clause make any good grammatical sense with ἢ μὴ in it?

I am wondering why editors are confident in including μὴ but not ἢ μὴ. Is plainly an error but μὴ is not?

Hi John, I guess it’s unsafe to say in Aristotle’s elliptical style that something is grammatically impossible (add back enough conjectured ellipses and you may be able to make almost any phrase work), but I think ἢ μή is very unlikely, at least on a quick read.

Putting aside for the moment that ἢ μή doesn’t seem to make semantic sense in context (and only looking at the bare grammar), the key questions are:

(1) why μή specifically would have been used, and
(2) which verb μή would be negating (if not the participle).

It’s hard to come up with an answer that makes sense without re-writing the whole sentence, adding back another verb omitted by ellipsis (if μή is not negating the participle), etc.

I can therefore understand why editors have not gone for this reading ἢ μή, and don’t see it referred to in Ross’ apparatus.

If some editors have gone for μὴ αἰσθομένοις, I assume they read this as generic μή and/or used in a construction having conditional force, depending on how they take the participle.

(PS I see from Ross’ apparatus that μὴ αἰσθομένοις is Trendelenburg’s conjecture, and I also note in passing that although the codd. have αἰσθανομένοις as per the quote your post, Ross’ text prints Ueberwerg’s conjecture αἰσθομένοις).

Cheers, Chad

Hi Chad. Thanks!

The background is philosophical. Philosophers (very wrongly in my opinion) think Aristotle should be saying the single something comes to be in soul after the perceiving.

In 1836, Trendelenburg suggested we stick μή in to negate the participle and justified the move by citing the one manuscript that had ἢ μὴ αἰσθανομένοις. His buddy Ueberweg didn’t buy that and so changed the participle from present to aorist, so that the passage says “now that the perceiving has past.” This has absolutely no support in any manuscript.

I imagine Ueberweg saying, “that is just not how Aristotle would negate a participle to say ‘no longer perceiving,’ and even if it were, that manuscript doesn’t help much; either take all of ἢ μὴ or none of it.”

What would be the right or expected way to negate a participle? Would you put μὴ in front of it?

I argue that Aristotle believes the perceiving is what make the single something come to be in the soul and that the present participle should stand. But it would be nice if I could explain what that ἢ μὴ is doing there or how it could have come to be.

Hi John, on your question as to the right way to negate a participle, in Attic either οὐ or μή is used, depending on how the participle itself is used syntactically and semantically: see e.g. Cambridge grammar secs 56.15–17 on whether οὐ or μή is used with (1) supplementary participles, (2) participles in noun phrases or (3) circumstantial participles.

I gave some examples in my previous post above of where μή (rather than οὐ) is used with the participle in Attic (generic μή, or with a participle used in a construction with conditional force, whether or not a conditional particle is used).

Later on, there was a change to generally use μή (rather than οὐ) with the participle, however this was not a universal rule. e.g. in NT Greek, see sec. 430 (Negatives with the participle) in Blass, Friedrich et al., A Greek grammar of the New Testament and other early Christian literature (1961), link here (you need to log in and borrow it):

https://archive.org/details/greekgrammarofne0000blas/page/222/mode/1up?view=theater

See also e.g. sec. 2.3(d) in Whitacre’s A grammar of New Testament Greek (2021):

https://www.eerdmans.com/Products/7927/a-grammar-of-new-testament-greek.aspx

But as I said, that was the later rule (although there is no bright red line between Attic and Koine and Aristotle hovers around the zone where they overlap, he does use participles with οὐ as well as with μή, e.g. ὡς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσθανομένων ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς προσθῇ in Poetics 1461b).

Cheers, Chad

It doesn’t have to hook up with the following. See the και μη in Theaitetos 149c6. I wouldn’t think there’s a grammatical rule against understanding “it is possible or not”. But contextually possible (or not) is another thing.