Seneca, de ira, book 1, section 10
Context: govern yourself by reason, or become the slave of feelings (fear, etc.)
in tyrannide illi vivendum est in alicuius adfectus venienti servitutem
I had to consult a translation; here is my hypothesis on the Latin.
Illi: dative singular, dative of the agent, with respect to vivendum est
vivendum est: “it must be lived”.
venienti: present participle, dative singular, modifies illi, “coming”
in . . . servitutem: “into servitude”; tells where one is coming
alicuius adfectus: genitive singular, “of some passion”; this phrase modifies servitutem
English:The man who is governed by some passion must live in tyranny.
You’ve parsed this correctly, but the antecedent of illi is found in the preceding sentence:
Non potest > hic animus > fidele otium capere, quatiatur necesse est fluctueturque, > qui malis suis tutus est, qui fortis esse nisi irascitur non potest, industrius nisi cupit, quietus nisi timet> : in tyrannide > illi > uiuendum est in alicuius adfectus uenienti seruitutem.
“the soul that is securely set [tutus] in its own evils, that can’t be brave unless it is angry, [that can’t be] active unless/except when it desires [i.e., is consumed by desire], [that can’t be] free from activity [quietus] unless/except when it is afraid cannot enjoy reliable freedom from troubles/equanimity [otium]; it is necessarily [continuously] shaken and restless: it must live [illi uiuendum est] in tyranny whenever it comes into servitude to any state of mind [obsession?] whatsoever.”
As always, it helps to interpret sentences like this in a somewhat broader context.
illi is not any man or soul, but rather one defined by the qui clause in the preceding sentence.
affectus doesn’t seem to mean a “passion” here, but merely something like a state of mind.
A rational person can presumably enter into various states of mind without becoming a slave to them. [But see follow-up post.] It’s the soul/person who is tutus in suis malis, etc., who becomes a slave to his mental states and lives in tyrrany.
I’m having second thoughts about affectus. I think this could mean a pathological state of mind, not merely a neutral one, that takes possession of one’s mind. Perhaps it could be translated by “obsession.” See Lewis & Short, afficio, which often has a pejorative sense when used of mental states, “afflict”:
http://perseus.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/philologic/getobject.pl?c.0:1463.lewisandshort
Hylander, your revised view matches what I understood affectus to mean in de ira.
I’m impressed with de ira. I’ve been thinking about it in relation to politics, where angry expression is so common. People seem often to think display of anger in the expression of an opinion should give the opinion greater force in common deliberations. Seneca would oppose this, I think.