πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω.
I take it that “πλῆρές τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι” means: I perceive myself having my breast full. But is “παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω” also part of the indirect statement introduced by αἰσθάνομαι? If so, why is its verb expressed by the infinitive? Yet I’m not sure how to connect this part to the rest of the sentence otherwise.
Try reading it by grouping the clauses in this way:
( πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων ) ( αἰσθάνομαι ( παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω. ) )
Does that clarify what is going on? Since I am heavily opposed in principle to using explicit grammar to read texts, I would rather not discuss the explicit grammatical analysis of the sentence. But if you really want to know:
αἰσθάνομαι only takes as its object the indirect statement ‘παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω’. A literal translation of the sentence would be: Having the breast full, I perceive (myself) perhaps to have to say [i.e., to be able to say] with respect to/against these things other things that are no worse [than what others have said].
Thanks! I have some cognitive dissonance, though, as the text-books (e.g., Dickey) say that in indirect statements introduced by αἰσθάνομαι, the main verb becomes a participle, not infinitive.
There are exceptions noted in the LSJ entry. For instance Th.6.59:
αἰσθανόμενος αὐτοὺς μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ δύνασθαι
https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=ai)sqanomai&la=greek#lexicon
Thanks, I overlooked this.
I don’t see how this can be correct. His argument is that his perception of his breast being full is what allows him to say that he could say something at least as good, as he knows that he was not filled out of himself and his own ignorance.
First notice that he is answering the following question (234e):
ΦΑΙ. …οἴει ἄν τινα ἔχειν ἐπεῖν ἄλλον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕτερα τούτων μείζω καὶ πλείω περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος;
τούτων evidently refers to the long speech from Phaedrus just before (or something in the speech itself) at 231-234 (I’ve never read the dialogue in Greek or English and haven’t gone back over that section, so take all this for what it’s worth).
Now we get to 235c where Socrates sees that he has heard something “βελτίω τούτων” from either Sappho or Anacreon or some collection.
ΣΩ. …πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω.
And since it didn’t come from his own ignorance he must be filled from the outside: ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου.
As far as why Socrates uses the infinitive construction there, seemingly unconnected to the verb, I have no idea. But it seems clear enough from the context that he does.
Finally, while I could buy αἰσθάνεσθαι with an infinitive, I think that it would be more than a little weird to have that right next to a participle that’s going to attract the sense.
Good point, Joel. Especially, as texts were originally perceived by ear, and the listener was not supposed to have any clue about what was to follow αἰσθάνομαι.
I don’t share J0el’s difficulty. Surely Kurama explained this correctly. We could put a comma after εχων. The word order favors this articulation, too, with the participle preceding αισθανομαι. The only possible difficulty is the use of the infinitive (αν εχειν) after αισθανομαι, but many such verbs that are ordinarily found with a participle are sometimes found with an infinitive, with little or no discernible difference in sense. We could read εχων if εχειν were unacceptable, but in the circumstances the infinitive seems unobjectionable, in fact preferable; εχων would be awkward after the previous εχων.
The infinitive is certainly not “unconnected to the verb”!
Hi, I read the participle in the same way as Kurama. It makes better sense of the word order. You have
- a ‘setting’ (πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων) in its usual spot at the start of the sentence (Cambridge grammar sec. 60.32), then
- a verb-initial clause in ‘broad focus’ (Cambridge grammar sec. 60.22), αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω, with ἄν in its natural spot.
αἰσθάνομαι w. inf. is discussed in the grammars, e.g. Cambridge grammar sec. 52.24:
αἰσθάνομαι believe that (+ inf.) / perceive that (+ ppl.)
See also Smyth sec. 2144, who records that αἰσθάνομαι can take either a participle or infinitive, without however picking out the difference in sense (he just says there can be a slight difference in meaning).
This is also how the commentators take it, e.g. de Vries (1969 p. 76)
αἰσθάνομαι … ἂν ἔχειν> , Ι ῾feel that I could find" (Hackf.), c.p. KG II 68.
Ryan (2012 pp. 128–29):
αἰσθάνομαι > Socrates’ confidence is based on a sensation in his breast, so—just as we can say ‘I feel that’ in the sense ‘I think that’—Plato lets this verb introduce indirect statement.
Treating the setting clause as nested under αἰσθάνομαι would create less natural word order, and would also mean αἰσθάνομαι flicks from its ‘perceive that’ to its ‘believe that’ usages within the same sentence—I can’t remember seeing that (although haven’t looked up this last point).
Cheers, Chad
EDIT: I see that Michael posted as I was typing, I agree with his post.
But my objection was based on the context, and both of your arguments take the sentence entirely apart from its context. I don’t see what they add to Kurama, who explained the grammar of this sentence perfectly well, taken as its own microcosm. Kühner explains it exactly the same.
However, my objection was on the context. The πλῆρες στῆθος isn’t there to be support for the argument of this section. Rather, it is the argument. None of it flows right if ἔχων is taken as a circumstantial participle. It makes it feel like a strange veer after πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω; On the next page, precisely what his στῆθος is full of becomes the question.
What would work well in this context and completely satisfy me would be an infinitive of result (with an absent ὥστε). ‘He perceives that he has a full heart so as to be able to say something’ But that sounds a bit too much like Homer/Herodotus, I suppose.
Hi Joel, thanks for engaging on this. I agree with the contextual setting that you set out in your first post. Here’s how I see the context working in the relevant quote, in a way that fits with the grammatical reading described above by Kurama, Michael and I. 235c with labels added by me in bold:
Φαῖδρος
τίνες οὗτοι; καὶ ποῦ σὺ βελτίω τούτων ἀκήκοας;
Σωκράτης
νῦν μὲν οὕτως οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν·
- [claim level 1] δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τινῶν ἀκήκοα, ἤ που Σαπφοῦς τῆς καλῆς ἢ Ἀνακρέοντος τοῦ σοφοῦ ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν.
- [question: what is my support for claim level 1?] πόθεν δὴ τεκμαιρόμενος λέγω;
- [claim level 3, supporting claim level 2] πλῆρές πως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, τὸ στῆθος ἔχων
- [claim level 2, supporting claim level 1 and responding to the πόθεν…; question] αἰσθάνομαι παρὰ ταῦτα ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἕτερα μὴ χείρω.
(The argument actually continues after this, bringing in Socrates’ ignorance etc.)
The circumstantial participle construction works perfectly well here. Re-ordering it:
- (level 3) my chest is full of content to say,
supporting
- (level 2) I believe that I can say παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα μὴ χείρω,
supporting in turn
- (level 1) τινῶν ἀκήκοα,
even if, as Hackforth says, claim level 1 is a blatant fiction ‘not meant to be taken seriously’, which even Phaedrus sees through (1993 p. 36).
Socrates doesn’t need to nest the ἔχων clause (i.e. taking it as a supplementary participle) within the αἰσθάνομαι construction for it to serve as support for claim level 2: the circumstantial participle does that job just fine.
Hope this clarifies my reading at least. Cheers, Chad
Hi Chad – My apologies for intrusion; am wondering how “I believe…” statement can, logically, support anything, given that one can hold a belief that is not true. “I perceive [what I feel]”, on the other hand, seems precisely a piece of unfalsifiable evidence needed.
BTW, thanks a lot for the distinction between the two meanings drawn from Cambridge grammar; it is illuminating indeed.
Hi Tugodum, to answer your question we need to read on (see in my post how I said the argument continues after this), at 235c–d: ὅτι μὲν οὖν παρά γε ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἐννενόηκα, εὖ οἶδα, συνειδὼς ἐμαυτῷ ἀμαθίαν: λείπεται δὴ οἶμαι ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων ποθὲν ναμάτων διὰ τῆς ἀκοῆς πεπληρῶσθαί με δίκην ἀγγείου.
Socrates is using a sort of argument like this: I believe I can say παρὰ ταῦτα ἕτερα μὴ χείρω (the ἔχων clause supports this). The content either comes from me or from others; I’m too ignorant to come up with it myself, and so I must have heard it from others.
(It’s obviously not an argument based on tight logical entailment, and you could poke a hole through it by arguing a third possible source of the content.)
This seems to me to be a variation on an argument in other dialogues, where Socrates argues from a premise that content must have been learnt from others or discovered by oneself, e.g. Cratylus and Alcibiades 1. But that would take us down a rabbit-hole and well off topic!
Cheers, Chad
“the ἔχων clause supports this” – But you missed my point, namely: in order for the ἔχων (or any other) clause to be able to support anything, it needs itself to be grounded, i.e., to be shown to be based on something.
Hi Tugodum, ah here we have a different reading. I don’t see why in a conversation Socrates must say “I perceive having my chest full”, rather than simply asserting the fact, as the grammar suggests. Also, worth noting that Socrates uses lots of unsupported premises in his arguments: if you’re looking for tight entailment with inferences traceable back to irrefutable axioms like geometry, Socrates will frequently disappoint!
Cheers, Chad
“Socrates uses lots of unsupported premises in his arguments” – Sure. I’m not saying such reading is implausible. But taking αἰσθάνομαι to flick from its ‘perceive that’ to its ‘believe that’ (as you suggested as an aside) would make for a better argument on Socrates’ part.
I don’t know very well how the genitive infinitive works, but could we take the infinitive to work as the genitive complement of πλῆρες?
I think that the genitive infinitive is just Latin. In Greek, an infinitive without an article can be appositional to a substantive:
Pl. Crito 45c: οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιχειρεῖν πρᾶγμα, σαυτὸν προδοῦναι.
Or with ἐστί, as a predicate:
Pl. Gorg. 476d: τὸ δίκην διδόναι πότερον πάσχειν τί ἐστιν ἢ ποιεῖν
So I’d think (to pick a very motivated example) Chad’s “my chest is full of content to say” would be “πλῆρες τὸ στῆθός μου εἰπεῖν” “my chest is full (in order) to speak”. And from there the rest of the sentence. Anyway, that’s my understanding, for whatever it’s worth.
Hi all, just to follow up on the latest posts:
As a side note only, a dynamic infinitive can qualify certain adjectives, e.g. the common δεινὸς λέγειν. See e.g. Cambridge grammar 51.18, or Smyth secs 2001–2:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Smyth+grammar+2001&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0007
especially those denoting ability, fitness, capacity, etc. (and their opposites), and generally those analogous in meaning to verbs which take the infinitive
However, that’s not what’s at play here. εἰπεῖν is a dynamic infinitive (with ἔχειν), but ἔχειν is a declarative infinitive: the ἄν makes this clear (declarative infinitives can take ἄν, dynamics don’t)—if there are exceptions to this, I can’t recall them just now. The ἄν is waving a flag at us showing that αἰσθάνομαι is, in fact, introducing the infinitive ἔχειν in indirect discourse.
Here, ἂν ἔχειν in indirect discourse (after αἰσθάνομαι) represents the present tense potential construction ἂν ἔχοιμι in direct discourse (see e.g. Cambridge grammar secs 51.25–27). It corresponds to e.g. the following in direct discourse:
Theaetetus 185d:
ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ > ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν> ,
Euthydemus 272d:
ὡς οὐκ > ἂν ἔχοιμί γε εἰπεῖν > ὅτι οὐ προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν αὐτοῖν,
Cheers, Chad
Yes, that seems very reasonable. So I don’t know how to read this then, except perhaps to take ἔχων as circumstantial to the indirect speech rather than to the αἰσθάνομαι.