Yes that’s about right. So in a sense it is a word-order question after all.
That’s a worthy thing to do. I look forward to reading it.
ἐλπίζω ὅτι σοφίαν δίδωσι ὁ Θεός σε φράφοντα.
That’s a worthy thing to do. I look forward to reading it.
ἐλπίζω ὅτι σοφίαν δίδωσι ὁ Θεός σε φράφοντα.
Thanks, Markos. φράφοντα;
It seems to me, contra Mounce, that this is different, because here the object is established in the first infinitive phrase, and assumed in the second.
Also, it occurred to me later, ἐκβάλλειν demands an object, whereas διδάσκειν doesn’t.
Where Payne goes wrong is in separating the two components in such a way as to make the second limit (rather than simply elaborate or expand) the first.
Is there some kind of theory of semantic relationships which has a terminology for this kind of thing - or some body of work by people who have thought about it?
For a simple example with καὶ:
οὐ γὰρ ἔκρινά τι εἰδέναι ἐν ὑμῖν εἰ μὴ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν καὶ τοῦτον ἐσταυρωμένον.
One might say that the final phrase focuses the thought to make it more specific - from Jesus Christ to Jesus Christ crucified. But it doesn’t limit - he is still knowing Jesus Christ among them, as well as more specifically Him crucified. So one might perhaps distinguish between focus-specification and limiting specification. But I was wondering if there already exists a language to make these distinctions.
It seems to me that it takes a lot more work to achieve a limiting specification. For example (the οὐδέ is incidental):
Σοφίαν δὲ λαλοῦμεν ἐν τοῖς τελείοις, σοφίαν δὲ οὐ τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων· 7ἀλλὰ λαλοῦμεν θεοῦ σοφίαν ἐν μυστηρίῳ τὴν ἀποκεκρυμμένην
Here he starts by saying that they speak wisdom; then he chops out certain types of wisdom that they are not speaking with the negative noun phrases; then in contrast describes the type of specific wisdom they are speaking.
Andrew
hi guys,
although I havn’t had a chance to really contribute to this discussion, I have been popping by to read them. I would just like to encourage you for the wealth of knowledge in these posts!
regards,
Dwayne
I did a search for verbs joined in coordinate fashion with οὐδέ and having a common object. In the New Testament we have:
Galatians 4.14a
καὶ τὸν πειρασμὸν ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου οὐκ ἐξουθενήσατε οὐδὲ ἐξεπτύσατε,
with the object early and both verbs together (see also Hebrews 10.8a)
Then there’s John 14.17a, with the object after the first verb, and implied after the second:
τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃ ὁ κόσμος οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν, ὅτι οὐ θεωρεῖ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ γινώσκει·
Or the object repeated, as in 1 John 3.6b:
πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων οὐχ ἑώρακεν αὐτὸν οὐδὲ ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν.
In the LXX, there are cases of the object after both verbs, as in:
Psalm 21.24
ὅτι οὐκ ἐξουδένωσεν οὐδὲ προσώχθισεν τῇ δεήσει τοῦ πτωχοῦ
see also Proverbs 30.30 and Isaiah 64.3. This is common in secular writers like Plutarch, and I thought this might be a rule, that the first verb would be immediately before οὐδέ in these cases, until I found, with one term in between:
Plutarch, Roman Questions 278.E.8
‘Διὰ τί, δυεῖν βωμῶν Ἡρακλέους ὄντων, οὐ μεταλαμβάνουσι γυναῖκες οὐδὲ γεύονται τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ
μείζονος θυομένων;
Why, when there are two altars of Hercules, do women receive no share nor taste of the sacrifices offered on the larger altar?
Plutarch, Brotherly Love 487.F.2
οὐκέτι κρατεῖν ἐν τοῖς μείζοσιν οὐδὲ καταπαύειν τὸ φιλόνικον δύνανται καὶ φιλό-
τιμον.
.. until they are no longer able to control or subdue their contentious and ambitious spirit in more important matters.
Finally, one with two terms in between, and with some similarity to 1 Tim 2.12:
Plutarch, Whether the Affections 501.D.9
οὕτως οἱ κατὰ ψυχὴν χειμῶνες βαρύτεροι στείλασθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐκ ἐῶντες οὐδ’ ἐπιστῆσαι τεταραγμένον τὸν λογισμόν·
.. so these storms of the soul are more serious which do not allow a man to compose or to calm his disturbed reason;
I did wonder if στείλασθαι might be absolute here, but Carl Conrad at B-Greek thought otherwise, and I think he is right.
So, as Markos said, it certainly seems to be possible for a verb to reach over quite a few terms including οὐδέ to reach its object.
My remaining question is whether this is the sort of thing which one is more likely to find in an Atticist - as Plutarch is sometimes described - than in the New Testament. What does an Atticist style look like - is it more formal, composed, less like speech, even convoluted sometimes?
Thanks, Andrew
What you’re after, if andros is to have any chance of having a relation to didaskein, is two verbs separated by oude when (i) the verbs take different cases (as here acc. and gen.) and (ii) the second of the verbs is followed by a noun (or noun-equivalent) in the appropriate case for that verb and not for the first yet is clearly to be understood as relating to the first as well as the second. In or out of NT (but in ordinary prose; there may be arguable instances in high verse).
Seek and ye shall not find? Regardless, it’s an impossibly forced reading. If Paul had meant to limit the prohibited teaching to teaching a man he’d have said didaskein andra. It’s women teaching (tout court) he’s against. At the risk of repeating myself, context and grammar both make that quite clear; to read it any other way is to torture the plain meaning of the greek. I don’t really understand why you’re persisting with what seems to me a non-starter.
I don’t really understand why you’re persisting with what seems to me a non-starter.
Well, many leading commentators on the passage are arguing for it. It seems to have been first proposed by Douglas Moo in 1981, was stated as fact by Knight in the New International Greek Testament Commentary (1999), repeated by Bill Mounce in the Word Biblical Commentary (2000), and by Schreiner in ‘Women in the Church’, the leading complementarian study of the passage. They all rely on the same two items of support: Acts 8.21 and Smyth 1634. Markos also said that he thinks it is possible. I am trying to be fair and am conscious that my knowledge of Greek is insufficient to make a judgement. I have looked at many of the earlier commentators, and none of them even consider the possibility that ἀνδρός is the object of διδάσκειν. For example, Origen cites the verse as:
.. καὶ διδάσκειν δὲ γυναικὶ οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω ἁπλῶς ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ αὐθεντεῖν ἀνδρός.
Presumably it’s quite impossible for διδάσκειν to leap over ἀλλά as well to reach its object. Likewise, Chrysostom treats the first prohibtion on its own citing it as:
Γυναικὶ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιτρέπω διδάσκειν. And later he says:
Ἐδίδαξεν ἅπαξ ἡ γυνὴ, καὶ πάντα κατέστρεψε· διὰ τοῦτό φησι, Μὴ διδασκέτω.
Andrew
OK, cancel that last sentence; I now understand why. But all this shows is that (a) NT commentators no longer know how to read Greek and (b) they’re a tralatitious bunch.
The Acts passage provides no support at all, and Smyth would be horrified to find himself misused so. You do well to go to the ancient Greek exegetes.
I do indeed think that Paul has the Genesis story in mind, but Chrysostom (and Paul? and we?) maybe need to be reminded that Mary Magdalene, ἡ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἀπόστολος, in a sense reverses the sin of Eve by teaching the men the right message (Χριστὸς ἀνέστη.)
As Andrew points out, I happen to think that ἀνδρός may in fact modify both verbs, but in general your statement is, regrettably, more true than it ought to be. 
You may happen to think that. I may happen to think that the moon is made of cheese. 
I just found what seems to be an example of hendiadys with οὐδέ. I don’t mean of course that this has anything much to do with 1 Timothy 2.12, but it’s interesting to me that it can do this, in much the same way as καὶ, it seems to me:
τῶν δὲ θηρίων βιασαμένων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸ βάρος οὐδὲ τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ πολέμιοι μεῖναι πάντες ἐξέπεσον ἐκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας. [Polybius Hist. 1.74.5.3]
When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated it. [Loeb]
The weight and the attack = the weight of the attack, apparently.
I haven’t found this in the grammars for οὐδέ, only for καὶ, and with a similar feel.
Andrew
On reflection, I don’t think it’s quite ‘the weight of their attack’, because it must be the weight of the elephants which is in view here. Perhaps ‘unable to stand their weight in the attack’ might be closer to it.
Andrew
It seems to me that there is an all pervading logical fallacy in Payne’s paper, which is apparently called the fallacy of the undistributed middle. In its simplest form, it runs, say ‘1) all cats are animals 2) this beast in front of me is an animal 3) therefore this beast in front of me is a cat’; whereas in fact it may be a dog or a budgerigar. [Technically, in the theory of logic, the middle term is animal. It is undistributed because not all animals are cats. Or so I understand it.]
It seems to me that Payne’s argument goes like this. 1) In almost every case (or so he claims) Paul uses οὐδέ to combine two elements into ‘a single idea’; 2) therefore in 1 Tim 2.12, it is highly probably that the two elements will combine into a single idea; 3) his proposed rendering of 1 Tim 2.12 expresses a single idea; 4) therefore this is the true rendering.
But this is illogical. Even if 2) and 3) were accepted, 4) would not follow, because there might be other renderings that also express a single idea.
The OED defines a sentence as: ‘A series of words in connected speech or writing, forming the grammatically complete expression of a single thought;..’ - which I think shows that it is entirely normal for different elements to combine to express a single idea or conception. But they can do that in all sorts of different ways.
I am thinking that the most important question to ask with regard to Payne’s thesis is: ‘Does the addition of the 2nd element extend or restrict the meaning or referent?’ For example, if we start with ‘I do not permit cats’ and then add dogs; so that we have ‘I do not permit cats and dogs (and the likes)’; then we have extended the restriction. It could perhaps be expressed as a single idea of not permitting household pets. We could not then say ‘but I do permit cats.’
On the other hand, if we add the second idea ‘black’; then we get the single idea ‘I do not permit black cats’; and then we can say ‘but I do permit cats in general’.
Any thoughts? Andrew
Yes, you’ve nailed it. As I said from the outset, Payne’s article combines faulty logic with an impossible understanding of Greek.
In the article you are writing refuting Payne, you should be able to point out the flawed logic even to people who don’t know the Greek. The key will be showing those same people how it appears Payne himself does not know Greek. I don’t like saying that, but I cannot see any other conclusion.
Thanks, Markos, for the encouragement.
Here’s another gross fallacy, I think:
He finds a text which ‘perfectly replicates 1 Tim 2.12’s syntactical structure’:
βουλόμενοι γὰρ μηδένα τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς καὶ δυναστείαις ἀπελπίζειν τὴν ἐξ αὑτῶν ἐπικουρίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν, οὐκ ἐβούλοντο συνδυάζειν οὐδὲ προκαταλαμβάνειν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὅρκοις καὶ συνθήκαις, ἀλλ’ ἀκέραιοι διαμένοντες κερδαίνειν τὰς ἐξ ἑκάστων ἐλπίδας.
As they wished none of the kings and princes to despair of gaining their help and alliance, they did not desire to run in harness with Rome and engage themselves by oaths and treaties, but preferred to remain unembarrassed and able to reap profit from any quarter. [Loeb]
Leaving aside his ‘perfectly’, there are certainly similarities in the syntactical structure.
He says this is epexegetical: 'The content after οὐδέ clarifies that ‘to run in harness’ is to ‘engage themselves by oaths and treaties [to Rome]’.
I don’t actually accept this, as I don’t see any proof that οὐδέ ever has that kind of force; but I am happy to agree that the two ideas are pretty close here. I just saw that Liddell and Scott suggest ‘combine’ for συνδυάζειν in this text. Oaths are maybe taking it further, so it might be a case of ‘and what’s more’, perhaps.
Even leave aside the fact that this is not the same kind of single idea as Payne’s proposal for 1 Tim 2.12, since in this case the referent is neither extended nor limited, if I can put it like that.
The thing I want to get to is that Payne says that because this Polybius text expresses a single idea, and because it has a similar syntactical structure to 1 Tim 2.12 (‘this closest structural parallel’), ‘it favors interpreting [1 Tim 2.12’s] οὐδέ construction as conveying a single idea, too.’ (Payne p. 245)
In other words, the closer the syntactical structures of the two texts, the more similar will be the semantic relationships within each text. But these are completely separate matters, or almost so, so far as I can see. The semantic relationships depend primarily on what the referents are, not on how the sentence is strung together, surely?
‘I like bread and butter and jam’
has the same syntactical structure as:
‘I like cabbages and pears and spring onions’.
The first is probably one idea, the second looks like three. You can spread butter on bread and jam on butter and make it into a single item, but you probably won’t be combining the other three items into one.
Andrew
For what it’s worth (apparently very little), I agree, as should be clear from my post of more than a month ago (June 5): “Formally in such a construction the two vbs denote separate activities, obviously; just how separate is the only question here. The Greek in itself is of no help in judging how distinct these particular two are.”
I have question about the DATE of Payne’s article. Is this just a reprint of something Payne wrote eons ago or is this a new phase of the argument? In other other words, I need to know if this was already addressed by A. Köstenberger in either his 1995 analysis of the syntax or the 2005 2nd ed of “Women in the Church …” . I don’t have either of those books on hand. So I am wondering if Köstenberger already addressed this issue.
POSTSCRIPT
I put in a request for 2005 2nd ed of “Women in the Church …” , I think a critique of Köstenberger’s analysis of the syntax would be far more interesting than Payne’s.
http://evangelicaltextualcriticism.blogspot.com/2008/12/paynes-recent-article-in-nts-freely.html
Which is why I think we should drop the discussion of syntax and take a look at parallelism. What Payne is describing (see his first several examples) is negated parallelism. The fact that it is negated is more or less irrelevant. On biblical parallelism see anything you can find by Andrei Desnitsky.
search: Andrei Desnitsky parallelism
see also Lee Irons: Hebrew Parallelism and the New Perspective on Paul
http://upper-register.typepad.com/blog/2010/03/hebrew-parallelism-and-the-new-perspective-on-paul.html
the following is quote from that article.
n the 18th century, the Anglican bishop, Robert Lowth, in his lectures “On the Sacred Poetry of the Hebrews” (published in 1753) argued that there were three types of Hebrew parallelism: synonymous parallelism, antithetical parallelism, and synthetic or constructive parallelism. The first two types are exemplified in Psalm 2:5-6:
A1 “Therefore the wicked will not stand in the judgment,
A2 Nor sinners in the congregation of the righteous;
B1 For the LORD knows the way of the righteous,
B2 But the way of the wicked will perish” (ESV).A1 and A2 are a good example of synonymous parallelism, while B1 and B2 are clearly antithetical parallelism. Lowth’s third category was a kind of catch-all for the many instances that did not seem to be either synonymous or antithetical.
Although Lowth’s analysis was widely accepted for two centuries, in the 1980s, James Kugel and Robert Alter challenged the received Lowthian orthodoxy. They rejected Lowth’s category of synonymous parallelism, pointing out that even when the two lines seem to be saying something roughly similar, they are never perfectly equivalent, and that the difference, however small, when viewed in light of the similarity of the two lines, produces a new meaning that goes beyond what each line contributes individually.
James Kugel’s label for this was “subjunction,” i.e., line B is subjoined to line A. To explain this, he invented the formula, “A, and what’s more, B.” The first line (A) is the primary statement; the second line (B) adds new information or a new perspective. (James L. Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry: Parallelism and Its History [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981].)
A few years later, Robert Alter took Kugel’s approach and moved the ball down the field a few more yards. He fleshed out the specific ways in which the B line heightens, intensifies, focuses and even dramatizes the A line. Alter speaks of “parallelism of specification” and “parallelism of intensification,” although he does acknowledge that, occasionally, one finds “static synonymity.” Alter’s main point is that “literary expression abhors complete parallelism … usage always introducing small wedges of difference between closely akin terms.” He quotes Viktor Shklovsky who wrote that “the purpose of parallelism … is to transfer the usual perception of an object into the sphere of a new perception – that is, to make a unique semantic modification.” (Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Poetry [New York: Basic Books, 1985], 3-26).
More recently, the Dutch scholar J. P. Fokkelman vividly explained the Kugel-Alter theory of parallelism with the helpful metaphor of binoculars. Just as binoculars provide depth perception by bringing two nearly identical but nevertheless distinct pictures together to form a new unity, so in Hebrew parallelism the similarities and the differences between the two lines complement one another, and the result is that whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Parallelism helps us to see in stereo. (J. P. Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Poetry: An Introductory Guide [transl. Ineke Smit; Louisville: WJK, 2001], 78-79.)
Lee Irons, PdD: Hebrew Parallelism and the New Perspective on Paul
http://upper-register.typepad.com/blog/ > … -paul.html
I have question about the DATE of Payne’s article. Is this just a reprint of something Payne wrote eons ago or is this a new phase of the argument? In other other words, I need to know if this was already addressed by A. Köstenberger in either his 1995 analysis of the syntax or the 2005 2nd ed of “Women in the Church …” . I don’t have either of those books on hand. So I am wondering if Köstenberger already addressed this issue.
It’s a revision of the c.1986 ETS paper. Payne and Kostenberger had a further exchange of views after the 2008 paper. http://www.biblicalfoundations.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/42-The-Syntax-of-1-Timothy-2.pdf ; https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3myvzj5H9WVdi1mZC1zQlFpbWM/edit?usp=sharing
Andrew
What Payne is describing (see his first several examples) is negated parallelism. The fact that it is negated is more or less irrelevant.
οὐ γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραὴλ οὗτοι Ἰσραήλ· 7) οὐδ’ ὅτι εἰσὶν σπέρμα Ἀβραὰμ πάντες τέκνα, ἀλλ’· ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεταί σοι σπέρμα. [Rom 9.6b-7]
Even if οὐδέ were joining equivalent expressions here, as Payne claims, it hardly helps his case. Obviously, if two ideas are the same, then adding one to the other leaves you with just one. This isn’t the same type of ‘single idea’ as he is arguing for in 1 Tim 2.12.
But in this text especially, they are not the same at all. The whole point of the following discussion about the seed of Abraham is that it was only one line that were the inheritors of the promises. Ishmael and Esau were excluded.
Andrew