Context: Socrates has been attacking the notion that death is the worst thing that can happen to anybody. His point is that since we don’t know what it’s like to be dead, it is a form of ignorance to believe, as most of us probably do, that death is a bad thing, that “on the whole, [we’d] rather be in Philadelphia.” (W. C. Fields)
Here is my translation: And yet, how is this not that disgraceful ignorance, that [translation of second eta]of supposing one knows what one does not know?
Because this sentence baffled me, I had to study Steadman’s notes and a translation to make it out. Then I had to review some grammar. Here are my thoughts, for correction.
The word πῶς “how” and the Greek question mark tell us this is a question.
Dictionary work tells us that ἐπονείδιστος is an adjective that agrees with ἀμαθία.
I believe that αὕτη ἡ modify ἀμαθία, and are positioned to put ἐπονείδιστος in the attributive position, with respect to ἀμαθία.
The second eta “ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ” looks like a definite article, but seems to be functioning as a relative pronoun. I wonder if there is some accentuation rule that I don’t know, or something about the use of definite articles that I should re-study.
Yes I think you’ve understood it. Each ἡ is just the definite article. ἡ ἐπονείδιστος is attributive (as the article shows), then ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν is attributive in turn.
The thing builds up in stages, like a layer cake:
“How is it not stupidity, this reprehensible (stupidity), the (reprehensible stupidity) of thinking he knows what he doesn’t?”
It’s straightforward enough if we read it in the order in which it comes.
(In translation we’d simply say “How is this not reprehensible stupidity, to think that …?” or even just “How is it not reprehensible stupidity to think that …?”, but in Greek it’s a gradation.)
That’s very helpful, for I didn’t know that definite articles could tacked on in this way. If I have studied the usage, it didn’t stick in useful memory.
Studying your comments, after attempting the grammatical analysis, was productive work.
How is this not ignorance, the shameful type of ignorance, the ignorance of thinking to know what he does not know?
Looking it up now, I see that Burnet explicitly agrees with this understanding, and explains that it justifies the “καίτοι” rather than καὶ τοῦτο of the manuscripts. I quote:
καίτοι κτλ., ‘but surely this is just the reprehensible kind of folly’ (the pronoun assimilated to the predicate in gender as usual). The reference is to 21 d 5.
The reading καίτοι rests only on the authority of Eusebius, but it commends itself at once. With the reading of the MSS. (καὶ τοῦτο) we must take αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος together, ‘this reprehensible folly’ (of which we have spoken already).
ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι … i.e. ἡ αμαθία ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι …. Don’t think of the definite article as being “tacked on,” Hugh. Better to think of its noun (αμαθία ) as being dispensed with, since it’s so readily “understood” from the predicate. The ἡ is indispensable: it controls the whole phrase. (And it does not function as a relative pronoun.)
The use of the genitive articular infinitive is not well covered by the standard grammars. It’s what I would call a defining genitive: the stupidity of thinking … i.e. the stupidity that consists in thinking ….
[Contrary to what Joel suggests, my understanding of ἡ ἐπονείδιστος is the same as Burnet’s. I deliberately did not address the αὕτη, whose gender may be regarded as “attracted” to that of ἡ αμαθία in accordance with regular idiom.]
Just to add a little to the genitive articular infinitive, this exact example is cited in Smyth to show the “genitive of explanation”:
GENITIVE OF EXPLANATION (APPOSITIVE GENITIVE)
[*] 1322. The genitive of an explicit word may explain the meaning of a more general word.
Ἰ_λίου πόλις E 642, as urbs Romae, ““ἄελλαι παντοίων ἀνέμων” blasts formed of winds of every sort” ε 292. This construction is chiefly poetic, but in prose we find ὑὸς μέγα χρῆμα a monster (great affair, 1294) of a boar Hdt. 1.36, ““τὸ ὄρος τῆς Ἰστώνης” Mt. Istone” T. 4.46 (very rare, 1142 c). An articular infinitive in the genitive often defines the application of a substantive: ““ἀμαθία_ ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι α:` οὐκ οἶδεν” the ignorance of thinking one knows what one does not know” P. A. 29b.
You can see clearly that ἀμαθία can be inserted in front of the second ἡ for clarification.
Very well, you understood it like Burnet did the first time. But it does seem very easy to misunderstand your true understanding when you write things like “is it not” and “this reprehensible” in your translation.
On “tacked on”. Got it. That phrase was left after editing an over-complicated passage, which would have caused even more problems for you.
On relative pronoun. Got it. That was a wild guess, born of ignorance and desperation. Once you explained the attributive bit, I discarded the idea silently, hoping you’d forget I brought up.
On genitive articular infinitive. With no help whatever, I deduced that genitive articular infinitives must exist, but I kept silent on this.
Again, many thanks to mwh for a most helpful critique.
