Crito 49a

[jeidsath]

οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι

I don’t understand what’s going on in “ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι”. Is ἑκόντας the subject of εἶναι? Or is ἑκόντας adverbial? (LSJ: in Att. Prose (cf. Phryn.241), ἑ. εἶναι as far as depends on oneʼs will, as far as concerns one).

So, though I’m not sure, I would think that it means: We say that in no way is it required for people to do injustice willingly.

[Hylander]

ἑκόντας is the agent of the impersonal verbal adjective ἀδικητέον. Normally, the agent of an impersonal verbal adjective is dative, but here it's accusative in this indirect speech construction. Smyth 2152a.

a. Since the impersonal construction is virtually active, and hence equivalent to δεῖ with the accusative and infinitive (active or middle), the agent sometimes stands in the accusative, as if dependent on δεῖ. The copula is (perhaps) always omitted when the agent is expressed by the accusative. Thus, τὸν βουλόμενον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι σωφροσύνην διωκτέον καὶ ἀσκητέον (= δεῖ διώκειν καὶ ἀσκεῖν) it is necessary that the man who desires to be happy should pursue and practice temperance P. G. 507c.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... 99.04.0007

Smyth says that "the copula is (perhaps) always omitted . . . " but here we have a counterexample, perhaps because it's an infinitive and not a finite form of the verb. See Smyth 944 and especially 945 on omission of copula.

The plural ἑκόντας presumably agrees with the 1st plural subject of φαμὲν, as is usual in indirect speech in Greek -- the subject is typically not expressed when it's the same as the subject of the verb of speaking.

οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέον -- this is not "in no way is it required", but rather "it is required that in no way": "Do we say that in no way must we willingly commit injustice . . . ?"

This is an either/or question: οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὔ; -- "Do we say that we should commit injustice in no way or that we should commit injustice in some way but not in another?" (Not to stray too far from a literal rendering.)

[dikaiopolis]

Hylander has it right. Here's another example from Thucydides, with the neut pl instead of sing:

ἄλλοις μὲν γὰρ χρήματά ἐστι πολλὰ καὶ νῆες καὶ ἵπποι, ἡμῖν δὲ ξύμμαχοι ἀγαθοί, οὓς οὐ παραδοτέα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐστίν, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέα ἐν τάχει καὶ παντὶ σθένει. (1.86)

[Hylander]

Is the Thucydides passage precisely the same?

The point about the Crito passage is that the agent of the impersonal verbal adjective in -τεος, encoding obligation or necessity, is accusative rather than (as is more usual) dative.

In the Thucydides passage, οὓς is the patient/object of the impersonal verbal adjectives, not the agent. The agent is unexpressed, but is clearly is ἡμῖν from the preceding clause, and so unnecessary to express again. But this would be a more usual dative agent. What is characteristically Thucydidean -- and unlike anyone else -- about this is the neut. plur. verbal adjectives instead of neut. sing. See Smyth 1003a, 1052.

[dikaiopolis]

I was thinking of the next phrase, οὐδὲ δίκαις καὶ λόγοις διακριτέα μὴ λόγῳ καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους, taking αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους (implied ημας) as the acc. agent.

Yes, the neut pl -τεα is good Thucydidean style.

[Hylander]

I read this a little differently. I took αὐτοὺς in καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους to mean "them", referring back to οὓς, our allies. I think οὓς is the object of both οὐ παραδοτέα and τιμωρητέα (though not of διακριτέα, which is wholly impersonal, I think), and I take καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους as within the scope of οὓς, even if it slightly jarring with διακριτέα. (This is Thucydides, after all.)

"We should not resolve the issue by words/speeches and arbitration when even our allies [καὶ αὐτοὺς, not just ourselves] have suffered not just verbal abuse [but actual material damage]. " In other words, the thrust is that we should exact vengeance for material damage inflicted on our allies -- not just when it happens to us -- because our allies are our main source of our strength, not navies or cavalry, unlike our adversaries.

This is also a counterexample to Smyth, where the copula ἐστι isn't omitted with the verbal adjectives.

What do you think?

[jeidsath]

Thank you! Before we get too far away from the original passage, something still doesn't make sense. And perhaps this is the real root of why I'm finding this so hard.

οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέον -- this is not "in no way is it required", but rather "it is required that in no way": "Do we say that in no way must we willingly commit injustice . . . ?"

This is an either/or question: οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὔ; -- "Do we say that we should commit injustice in no way or that we should commit injustice in some way but not in another?" (Not to stray too far from a literal rendering.)

I think this is fair, and is what I'd like this to mean in context. But from what you're saying, it seems that the idea of -τέον and necessity does not go with ἀδικη-, but with ἑκoντασἀδικη-? Is that really what's happening here?

I notice that the LSJ waves away the difficulty by glossing this particular usage: ἀδικητέον, one ought to do wrong, Pl.R.365e; φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀ. εἶναι Id.Cri.49a.

[Hylander]

I think I confused you by leaving out "willingly" in my rough translation, but it should be there, especially since it was the principal focus of your original question. It agrees with the agent of οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέον, namely, accusative ημας, which is understood from φαμὲν. Even though it has to be supplied, the agent of οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ ἀδικητέον is accusative, not dative, as per Smyth 2152a. "Do we agree that we should in no way commit injustice willingly?

But I think it may be the force of the negative οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ with the obligation inherent in the verbal adjective that is confusing you. Here it doesn't mean "we are in no way required to do wrong willingly" which doesn't make sense, but rather "we should in no way do wrong willlingly". I think you have to get this from the context -- I doubt you could formulate rules about how negatives work with modal concepts (necessity, obligation, etc.) like verbal nouns in Greek. Modals with negatives are difficult in most languages, including English.

Does this help?

To confuse matters even more, the force of the verbal adjective ἀδικητέον in the example from the Republic, which is not negatived, is different but interesting:

οἱ δὲ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσὶν οἷοι θυσίαις τε καὶ “εὐχωλαῖς ἀγανῇσιν” καὶ ἀναθήμασιν παράγεσθαι ἀναπειθόμενοι, οἷς ἢ ἀμφότερα ἢ οὐδέτερα πειστέον. εἰ δ᾽ οὖν πειστέον, ἀδικητέον καὶ θυτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀδικημάτων.

"They claim they're able to bring the gods around by persuasion through sacrifices and prayers and offerings. We must believe either both or neither of these. But if we are to believe them, then when we do wrong we should sacrifice away our wrongdoings." He doesn't mean "we must do wrong and we should sacrifice away our wrongdoings", but both verbal concepts are presented as verbal adjectives in -τέον, so that we have a rhetorically effective succession of four impersonal verbal adjectives. In English, we have to supply a subject, "we" or "one", but in Greek the impersonal neuter verbal adjectives don't need an explicit subject.

[jeidsath]

Given the next sentence, I don't have any trouble taking the Republic quote literally: "if this is to be believed, then it's necessary to commit criminal acts, and to sacrifice to the Gods out [of the proceeds] of these acts." Because, being just only saves us from punishment and doesn't actually get us anything.

(I translated impersonally above, but given the first person verb in the next sentence, it's probably personal.)

***

For the Crito quote -- which I think I now understand better thanks to your help -- I'd want to strip it down to the basic phrase, and add the modifiers back in one by one (perhaps because of an overly literal bent on my part):

φαμὲν ἀδικητέον εἶναι - we say that it is necessary [for us] to commit injustice

φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι - we say that it is necessary for us acting purposefully/willingly to commit injustice

οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι - we say that for us acting purposefully/willingly it is in no way necessary for us to commit injustice

[Hylander]

No, not “it is not necessary that we should”. “It is necessary that we should not”. In other words, we must not. And don’t forget that this is a question.

[jeidsath]

Socrates is answering this in particular:

ὡς χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπιέναι

Ie., the contention that it's morally necessary for him to commit an unjust act.

[Hylander]

Crito has given Socrates a number of reasons why he should leave Athens. In 48b-c, Socrates has dismissed these considerations. He says that the key question is whether or not, based on the principles he and Crito have agreed to in previous discussions, it would be right for him to leave Athens against the will of the Athenians. οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων τοῦτο σκεπτέον, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειρᾶσθαι ἐξιέναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων ἢ οὐ δίκαιον. 48d.

Socrates goes on to say that Crito's proposals shouldn't even be considered if it would be wrongful to do what Crito wants him to do and leave Athens, even if it means he will die by staying and doing nothing, or even if he will undergo anything else instead of doing something that is wrong. κἂν φαινώμεθα ἄδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέῃ ὑπολογίζεσθαι οὔτ᾽ εἰ ἀποθνῄσκειν δεῖ παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας, οὔτε ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. 48d.

Socrates goes on to lead Crito through his argument, beginning with the principle that no one should ever under any circumstances do wrong, pointing out that Crito has agreed with this. Socrates frames this as a question: οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἑκόντας ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὔ; "Do we agree that in no way should we willingly do wrong? or might we do wrong in some way but not in another?" Plato uses the verbal adjective ἀδικητέον in the second question to mean something like "might our ethical obligations, while permitting us to do wrong in some way, prohibit us from doing wrong in another?"

He then reframes the question: ἢ οὐδαμῶς τό γε ἀδικεῖν οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε καλόν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ὡμολογήθη; Or is wrongdoing never good or noble, as we've agreed many times previously?

Crito concedes that they've agreed we should never do wrong in 49b, when he says φαμέν, in response to Socrates' φαμὲν; in 49a and again in 49b more insistently, φαμὲν ἢ οὔ; "Do we agree?" "Yes, we agree."

Then Socrates goes on to explain that doing wrong in response to a wrong is wrong, and why it would be a wrongful act to leave Athens against the will of the Athenians.

Maybe it would be helpful to read at least this portion of the Crito in an English translation to get a sense of how the dialogue develops.

[dikaiopolis]

I read this a little differently. I took αὐτοὺς in καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους to mean "them", referring back to οὓς, our allies. I think οὓς is the object of both οὐ παραδοτέα and τιμωρητέα (though not of διακριτέα, which is wholly impersonal, I think), and I take καὶ αὐτοὺς βλαπτομένους as within the scope of οὓς, even if it slightly jarring with διακριτέα. (This is Thucydides, after all.)

"We should not resolve the issue by words/speeches and arbitration when even our allies [καὶ αὐτοὺς, not just ourselves] have suffered not just verbal abuse [but actual material damage]. " In other words, the thrust is that we should exact vengeance for material damage inflicted on our allies -- not just when it happens to us -- because our allies are our main source of our strength, not navies or cavalry, unlike our adversaries.

This is also a counterexample to Smyth, where the copula ἐστι isn't omitted with the verbal adjectives.

What do you think?

I think your reading is possible, taking αὐτούς to refer to the allies. Sthenelaidas would then be answering the part of Archidamus’s speech when he says πέμπετε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοί φασιν ἀδικεῖσθαι. Taking it as referring to an implied ἡμας is also possible (and from a quick look at the commentaries, the more common reading). It would then more straightforwardly anticipate the next sentence: καὶ ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον πρέπει πολὺν χρόνον βουλεύεσθαι. I don’t have strong feelings one way or the other.

[Hylander]

Thucydides 1.86:

Just to add a little support to my interpretation, and recognizing that the alternative is entirely possible, these speeches -- Corinthian, Athenian, Archidamos and Sthenelaides, -- occur at a point where the Lacedaemonians themselves cannot yet claim that they've incurred material damage at the hands of the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians themselves are not μὴ λόγῳ βλαπτομένους,. The issue is whether they should take action and go to war to avenge their allies, as they've been asked to do.

In the next sentence, to be sure, explicitly refers to the Lacedaemonians: ὡς ἡμᾶς πρέπει βουλεύεσθαι ἀδικουμένους μηδεὶς διδασκέτω. But in the previous sentence Sthenelaides has established that the Lacedaemonians should make common cause with their allies, and doesn't repeat μὴ λόγῳ as a qualifier to βλαπτομένους. Granted, that's not a strongly compelling explanation, however.

[jeidsath]

I re-read Crito today, apparently after 4 years, and came across this section again. (It must have taken me weeks and weeks, using dictionaries, etc., back then. Now, simply reading...is nice.)

But that ἑκόντας should either have been dative or even better not there at all. If it means "ourselves" like the Thucydides example, it should really have a ἡμᾶς hanging about somewhere. As it is, the accusative subject for a -τεον is bizarre. Unmotivated, unlike the other example in Smyth, which is perfectly clear.

Cut it, and it becomes nice and impersonal, and you don't have to re-read the sentence to figure out what's going on.

οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ φαμὲν ἀδικητέον εἶναι, ἢ τινὶ μὲν ἀδικητέον τρόπῳ τινὶ δὲ οὔ;
Do we say there is no way for doing injustice to be necessary, or is doing injustice necessary in some way, not in another?

Notice also, that the concept stays impersonal for the rest of the speech. The "ἑκόντας" is striking, as it would also be exactly the sort of logical objection that someone would have added as a marginal (pettifogging) note, which could then have crept into the main text. It's too bad that we don't have more of the scholia for Plato.