Ajax 1140 θαπτέον

[C. S. Bartholomew]

The prohibition in 1089 is another imperatival infinitive τόνδε μὴ θάπτειν. Cooper claims that imperatival infinitive is an emphatic imperative which may be supported by a restatement in form of a a verbal adjective in -TEOS. In this context we see several restatements and the refusal of burial rites for Ajax scenario is well established and still active when we encounter the verbal adjective in 1140. This sequence of development from the more explicit imperatival infinitive followed up and supported by a verbal adjective is one pattern that Cooper accounts for in his treatment.

C. Stirling Bartholomew

So, according to Cooper, the verbal adjective in -TEOS can never stand on its own,
and must be dependent on a previous form of imperative, and he provides evidence from
Sophocles' Ajax. Does he provide other works as evidence for this treatment of verbal adjectives?

Nate,

It is not really that absolute, Cooper talks about patterns. He doesn't claim that -TEOS can never stands on its own. This is similar to how descriptive linguists, people like Iver Larsen (Demnark, East Africa) do their work. They look at patterns within the corpus. Cooper doesn't claim to be a linguist but he makes some similar moves. Cooper claims that there are some fairly predicable tendencies in syntax of -TEOS verbal adjectives. He gives plenty of examples and tries to cover most of the exceptions. Thats why his book is 3500 pages about 20-25% of which are index to the citations from the corpus.

C. Stirling Bartholomew

[NateD26]

Hi, CSB.

I've found this note in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy Vol. 3, of which I only have a limited preview:

18. The gerundives express moral or prudential necessity, not psychological necessity.
See Taylor pp. 189-90; Dyson p. 33.

Can you please explain what exactly is psychological necessity?

Also, I'd love to know the full names of the authors and the books referred to in this note.

[C. S. Bartholomew]

Hi, CSB.

I've found this note in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy Vol. 3, of which I only have a limited preview:

18. The gerundives express moral or prudential necessity, not psychological necessity.
See Taylor pp. 189-90; Dyson p. 33.

Can you please explain what exactly is psychological necessity?

Also, I'd love to know the full names of the authors and the books referred to in this note.

Nate,

I'm clueless about Ancient Greek Philosophy. The distinction "moral or prudential necessity, not psychological necessity" doesn't exist in the frameworks I am familiar with.

CSB

[NateD26]

Thanks, CSB. It's also very difficult to understand to what quote he referred to and assess the role
of the gerundive in it because that page is not viewable (at least from my location).

I get mixed results when searching for definition of psychological necessity. From what I could
find, Jung wrote about it in relation to the survival of a baby, who clutch to and feel safest with the
first adult he/she encounter, usually the mother. Apparently, it's the child psychological survival
instinct that lead him/her to do so.

When a father prohibits his child from doing something, is it a prudent necessity, falling in line
with the father's moral view, or something stemming from the need to keep the child alive?
I guess that would largely depend on the content of said prohibition.

The way Smyth presents δεῖ in §933b suggests it is an ought that binds you and it wouldn't be merely
prudent to do or not do something, but an absolute necessity, thereby not differing from a
regular imperative or prohibition.

In which case,

δεῖ σε μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν
κελεύω σε μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν
ταῦτά σοι οὐ ποιητέον

don't seem to have much difference between them. Or maybe I'm oversimplifying things.

[Markos]

ἕν σοι φράσω: τόνδ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον.

I will say one thing to you. This one must not be buried.

δεῖ σε μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν
κελεύω σε μὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν
ταῦτά σοι οὐ ποιητέον

don't seem to have much difference between them. Or maybe I'm oversimplifying things.

For what it's worth, Doukas' paraphrase

http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=n ... 2;size=175

agrees with Nate that the second and third constructions are roughly equivalent:

Ajax 1140:TEXT:

ἕν σοι φράσω: τόνδ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον.

Ajax 1140 DOUKAS PARAPHRASE:

ἴσθι τὸ σύμπαν, ἀπαγορεύω σοι τοῦτον θάψαι.

Cooper claims that verbal adjectives in -TEOS do not freely alternate with the finite verb imperative.

For what it's worth, here's a case where Doukas, contra-Cooper, seems to suggest that the two constructions are roughly equivalent:

S OT 361:TEXT:

...ἀλλ᾽ αὖθις φράσον.

S OT 361 DOUKAS PARAPHRASE:

...σαφέστερόν σοι ῥητέον.

http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=n ... 0;size=175

For what it's worth, I can be on the look out to see to what extent Gaza conflates these constructions.

[mwh]

Forgive me if I don’t read the lengthy series of posts from 2012, but there is evidently a fair bit of confusion here. Let me try to clarify the various syntactical issues in question.

Ajax 1140. τόνδ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον is an independent sentence, with unremarkable grammar. The verbal adjective is used impersonally, and has τονδε as its object. Lit. “There is not to be a burying this man.” θαπτέον is neuter.

The closest equivalent would be ὅδ’ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέος, the personal use, “This man is not to be buried.” That would put more stress on “this man,” whereas the impersonal use appropriately puts more stress on the action, the not-burying. (I could bring Latin gerundives into it, but won't.)

Doukas, in paraphrasing as ἀπαγορεύω σοι τοῦτον θάψαι, changes the syntax: “I forbid you to bury this man,” addressing Teucer, Ajax' half-brother. Here the infinitive is dependent on ἀπαγορεύω in an indirect command construction, which works the same way English does.

In neither case is there an imperatival infinitive. (It would be most surprising if there were.) Nor is there "a finite verb imperative." That would be μη τουτον θαπτε (or θάψῃς), “Don’t bury this man.” That would import an addressee (Teucer), like Doukas’ paraphrase, whereas the original Greek doesn’t: it's framed in general terms, an absolute prohibition. Apart from that there is not a whole lot of difference between the imperative and the verbal adjective, except the latter has a more formal and legalistic feel and is a stronger form of expression (and less common).

In OT 361, ἀλλ᾽ αὖθις φράσον, “Now, say it again!” Doukas substitutes σαφέστερόν σοι ῥητέον, which is more exegesis than paraphrase: “You must speak more clearly” (lit. "There is to be speaking more clearly by you”), extrapolating from the Sophoclean context, Oedipus forcing Teiresias to repeat his accusation that Oedipus is himself the killer he's looking for. Doukas seems to go out of his way to distort and dullen Sophocles. The construction he uses is the same as the Ajax’s τόνδ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐχὶ θαπτέον, impersonal verbal adjective.

None of these constructions is precisely equivalent to any other of them. (I know Markos scorns precision, but I don’t, and neither does Greek. ) Cooper’s observation is not contradicted by what Doukas does.

Hope this helps.