jenniferolsen wrote:Since old times, when Aristotle thought time, it was connected with the idea of kinesis or movement. Then there is no movement at all at the universe!?
Aristotle's view of time is that is a sort of pathos in the soul and that it is a measure of motion.
Motion for Aristotle is most certainly real. Motion is something like the the most complete being of potency (dunamis), and potency along with being-at-work (energeia) and matter are the ruling or eidetic causes (arxai...I don't know of any appropriate translation for the term in modern languages though) of all beings excepts numbers and nous/theos (thought).
Time is real enough as a phenomenon but it seems to be somehow "subjective" to human beings. If all humans died there would be no time, but motion would continue on. Just as there is no time for the individual when he is in deep sleep, but his body and the world around him will continue in motion.
In modern philosophy I'm not sure who has developed a phenomenological view of time (as opposed to repackaging inherited concepts without actually bringing the underlying phenomenon to light) except for Heidegger (who borrows heavily from Husserl in this apparently.)
Heidegger's view is rather confusing to me but the basic idea is that Aristotle's time concept is correct as far as it goes, which is to say as far as the measurement of the motions of innerworldy things. But this common understanding of time he says is founded in temporality, which is the ability to encounter one's self). (I think you can assure yourself of this point at least by thinking of the situations where we find ourselves explicitly experiencing time "I've been waiting in this line forever", "I've got to finish this before 3 o'clock", "I can't believe I've only been on this vacation for three days", etc.)
One's self (oneself) is always persistently there but not always in directly in view. The coming upon oneself in the context of some innerworldy activity (rather than in a theoretical sense, "What's wrong with me?", "What do people think of me?") is temporality.
The reason it's important to Heidegger to establish there there is a ground for time (namely temporality) is so that he can establish the whole positive side of his existential phenomenology. According to Heidegger there is such a thing as primordial or authentic time which is grounded in authentic temporality which is coming across one's most authentic self which occurs in the moment when we experience ourselves both authentically and a a whole, which is the authentic confrontation with death. (This is obviously a lot to chew on and I may have misrepresented it but it's a great mistake to assume that it doesn't have a real meaning. At least in Being and Time Heidegger is always arguing very closely from actual phenomena of his experience, but of course he's not necessarily interpreting them correctly).
So just as, according to Heidegger, the theoretical mode of comportment is a deficient mode of being, so theoretical time, which at least according to Aristotle makes time a mere affect of the soul, is a deficient mode of thinking time. The "real" time, primordial time, is the absolutely finite horizon of being-toward-death that is Dasein. Because Dasein's authentic self is historically constituted there is no possibility of transhistorical knowledge except within the deficient mode of comportment that he especially associates with Descartes and modern science.
However there's a big Achille's heel in Heidegger's system, which is his simple assertion that the theoretical mode of comportment (philosophy originally, these days more familiar as modern science) is a deficient mode of being that arises from the breakdown of our worldy activities.
Plato implicitly argues against exactly this sort of view (which perhaps boils down to the same argument that Aristophanes made) in literally all of his dialogues, but especially in the Symposium. It would be mistaken to pin Plato down to one specific dialogue since he deliberately makes that impossible, but his corpus as a whole makes the argument that philosophy is desire, Eros, directed not to the base (the broken hammer), but to the most beautiful being of all, the agathon kat'auto, the whole, the Parmenidean hen which turns out, with great irony, to be.... the being of the philosopher himself. (I can't claim to understand this, if I did I would be divine.)
Keep in mind this is an extraordinarily bold claim for a very sensuous pagan poet like Plato, not an asexual Christianized philosophy professor like his latter day would-be followers.
So in a nutshell Heidegger's whole system stands or falls on whether Plato's Socrates should be regarded as a deficient being or a divine being. (I think the artistry of the dialogues is strong enough to convince us that Socrates at least represents a genuine human possibility rather than a pure fantasy.)