Herodotus, 1.159

[Bart]

ἀπικομένων δὲ ἐς Βραγχίδας ἐχρηστηριάζετο ἐκ πάντων Ἀριστόδικος ἐπειρωτῶν τάδε. ‘ὦναξ, ἦλθε παρ᾽ ἡμέας ἱκέτης Πακτύης ὁ Λυδός, φεύγων θάνατον βίαιονπρὸς Περσέων: οἳ δέ μιν ἐξαιτέονται, προεῖναι Κυμαίους κελεύοντες. ’
ἡμεῖς δὲ δειμαίνοντες τὴν Περσέων δύναμιν τὸν ἱκέτην ἐς τόδε οὐτετολμήκαμεν ἐκδιδόναι, πρὶν ἂν τὸ ἀπὸ σεῦ ἡμῖν δηλωθῇ ἀτρεκέως ὁκότεραποιέωμεν.’ ὃ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπειρώτα, ὃ δ᾽ αὖτις τὸν αὐτόν σφι χρησμὸν ἔφαινε,κελεύων ἐκδιδόναι Πακτύην Πέρσῃσι
πρὸς ταῦτα ὁ Ἀριστόδικος ἐκ προνοίης ἐποίεε τάδε: περιιὼν τὸν νηὸν κύκλῳἐξαίρεε τοὺς στρουθοὺς καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἦν νενοσσευμένα ὀρνίθων γένεα ἐν τῷ νηῷ.ποιέοντος δὲ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα λέγεται φωνὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου γενέσθαι φέρουσαν μὲνπρὸς τὸν Ἀριστόδικον, λέγουσαν δὲ τάδε ‘ἀνοσιώτατε ἀνθρώπων, τί τάδε τολμᾷςποιέειν; τοὺς ἱκέτας μου ἐκ τοῦ νηοῦ κεραΐζεις;’
Ἀριστόδικον δὲ οὐκ ἀπορήσαντα πρὸς ταῦτα εἰπεῖν ‘ὦναξ, αὐτὸς μὲν οὕτω τοῖσιἱκέτῃσι βοηθέεις, Κυμαίους δὲ κελεύεις τὸν ἱκέτην ἐκδιδόναι;’ τὸν δὲ αὖτιςἀμείψασθαι τοῖσιδε ‘ναὶ κελεύω, ἵνα γε ἀσεβήσαντες θᾶσσον ἀπόλησθε, ὡς μὴ τὸλοιπὸν περὶ ἱκετέων ἐκδόσιος ἔλθητε ἐπὶ τὸ χρηστήριον.’

This is a fascinating little episode conjuring up all kind of questions. For instance, the god is angry with the Cymeans for even considering to surrender a suppliant but can or will only punish them if they actually do so. Why so? Also, though Herodotus obviously values oracles, there’s something distinctively irreverent in the way some of his protagonists interact with them: they are being bribed, influenced, put to the test (Croesus), and in this case, even tricked into revealing their true intention. Herodotus attitude seems to be ambivalent towards them, or is this just part of normal Greek religosity?
In fact, were the oracular statements reported by Herodotus actually made? I guess at least some of them must have been well known, others maybe less so.
In this case there is an interesting switch from direct discourse –the repeated statement by the oracle that’s it is okay for the Cimeans to surrender the suppliant- to indirect discourse (λέγεται ) when Apollo himself speaks from the innermost part of the temple. In using indirect discourse Herodotus seems to distance himself from this part of the story. Did he doubt this part of the story maybe, or did he just make it up?

[Hylander]

It's an entertaining anecdote, but I don't think you should subject Herodotus' views on oracles to rational scrutiny or expect strict theological consistency. The oracles are spaces where a god interacts with men in a post-heroic age. Greek gods don't always behave the way those of us in a Christian or Judaeo-Christian environment expect gods to behave.

The oracles do tend to be devious -- open to misinterpretation so that their accuracy can be confirmed whatever the actual outcome. But for Herodotus (and other Greeks), this just seems to confirm their veracity--they're always right whatever they say--and highlights the foolishness of men who interpret them wrongly to their own detriment.

I'm not sure that λέγεται necessarily indicates that Herodotus is distancing himself from the story at that point. I think λέγεται may actually give greater weight to the story, indicating that it is sanctioned and dignified by widespread acceptance.

[seneca2008]

Asheri observes that "oracles have a precise function in H's narrative. They are used to explain and justify the origins of certain actions or historical, political, and military events, and in cultic or expiatory procedures....H. does not expect us to trust oracles blindly: he himself stresses their differences. " I cannot talk against oracles and say that they are not true, nor do I want to try and discredit those which speak clearly ... some are false and deceptive... some corrupted" " Asheri thinks H. steered a middle course between the extremes of his time credulity and scepticism..."

I am not sure it makes sense to ask whether any of these oracular statements were made but Asheri seems to think that he didnt make them up.

Asheri's commentary on this passage is illuminating. He sees the story of the oracle as a way of talking about the conflicting religious obligations (to a supplicant) and the political imperatives (Persian power). "H. could not expect his public .. to realise immediately that the Cymaean enquiry was irreverent and sacrilegious. H. was perfectly aware that the oracle had suggested a pro-Persian political move, but found itself compelled to contradict itself or to interpret its own response in order to justify itself before Aristodicus. As far as Aristodicus is concerned, he managed to camouflage astutely his own irreverence (and his antiPersian political stand) as religious "fundamentalism". Eventually he stands out as more likeable, more intelligent, and perhaps even more moral than the god of the Branchidae, whom probably H. disliked too. For a different view see Brown..." Unfortunately I haven't got access to Brown's article.

If you are interested in the place of Oracles in pre-modern societies I seem to remember reading some articles about the Poison Oracle among the Azande. If you have no way of making decisions which command support oracles are a useful way of getting that support. If you dont like what the oracle says ask again. I think the problem with understanding this mindset is what exactly is meant by "belief in oracles"

[Paul Derouda]

It seems to me that most people who believe in what we might call the irrational, horoscopes for instance, don't do so indiscriminately. Many people today might say that "there's something to horoscopes", and continue by adding that the ones you find in newspapers are just for fun and not to be trusted. Although fortune telling is not part of mainstream Christianity, I wouldn't call it marginal even today – François Mittérand, the former French president, regularly consulted a seer. I don't think Herodotus thought all oracles were infallible, I think he thought only the best ones (like Delphi) were always right, even if difficult to interpret sometimes. There's a passage somewhere (referred to by Bart) where someone (Croesus if I remember correctly) puts different oracles to test and finds Delphi the most reliable.

In some respects polytheism seems more logical to me than monotheism – the Greeks didn't have to ask "why is there evil in the world?", since they didn't believe in one, supremely good and supremely powerful God, but in a host of amoral, contentious deities vying with one another, with humans taking the collateral damage. Of course, it's not as simple as this – Hesiod's Zeus who rules the Universe, punishes evil and rewards good acts comes actually pretty close to the Christian God.

[Bart]

The oracles do tend to be devious -- open to misinterpretation so that their accuracy can be confirmed whatever the actual outcome. But for Herodotus (and other Greeks), this just seems to confirm their veracity--they're always right whatever they say--and highlights the foolishness of men who interpret them wrongly to their own detriment.

Indeed, oracular statements tend to be unfalsifiable. In this case the oracle is more than deceptive, it's coldbloodedly sending the Cymeans to their doom.

I'm not sure that λέγεται necessarily indicates that Herodotus is distancing himself from the story at that point. I think λέγεται may actually give greater weight to the story, indicating that it is sanctioned and dignified by widespread acceptance.

I hadn't looked at it that way, but are you sure? I have the distinct impression Herodotus uses direct discourse for first hand knowledge and indirect discourse for hearsay and information to be treated with caution. I'm too lazy now to go hunting for examples, sorry. Or is it something about λέγεται that makes you think so?

@Seneca: thanks for quoting Asheri. I have his commentary somewhere, but due to ongoing renovations to our house, I do not have access to it right now. What he says about Herodotus steering a middle course between credulity and scepticism matches with my impression of H.'s ambivalence in these matters. However his comments on the Aristodicus' case I don't find very illuminating. In fact I do not have a clear idea what he is driving at. But that's probably me being dim-witted.

I am not sure it makes sense to ask whether any of these oracular statements were made but Asheri seems to think that he didnt make them up.

I don't see why that question would make no sense. Asheri tries to answer it, so he at least thinks it isn't a senseless question.

[seneca2008]

There's a passage somewhere (referred to by Bart) where someone (Croesus if I remember correctly) puts different oracles to test and finds Delphi the most reliable.

Herodotus 1.46-.

I am not sure how far rationalisations of such stories can take you. Undoubtedly this story is very revealing but it cant be used to provide much information about the reliability of oracles

I dont see any kind of theism as "logical". If you are prepared to "believe" in one god you might as "believe" in many. I know that I am capable of irrational behaviour I am not sure thats the same as believing in the irrational.

[Hylander]

Polytheism seems much more plausible, more consistent with reality, to me--a bunch of gods with different agendas, all working at cross-purposes to one another, and none of them particularly interested in human welfare--than a single benign deity interested in the fate of humanity, especially one who demands absolute belief in him/herself in order to avoid eternal torment. Not that I'm a polytheist myself, mind you.

[Paul Derouda]

I dont see any kind of theism as "logical". If you are prepared to "believe" in one god you might as "believe" in many. I know that I am capable of irrational behaviour I am not sure thats the same as believing in the irrational.

Well, me neither. What I meant is that a polytheist doesn't have to address the same paradoxes as a monotheist. With "in some respects", "but not in all" was implied...

I am not sure how far rationalisations of such stories can take you. Undoubtedly this story is very revealing but it cant be used to provide much information about the reliability of oracles

Hmm, I don't think I said that. I seems to me that Herodotus is the one rationalising, not me!

[seneca2008]

seneca2008 wrote:
I am not sure it makes sense to ask whether any of these oracular statements were made but Asheri seems to think that he didnt make them up.

I don't see why that question would make no sense. Asheri tries to answer it, so he at least thinks it isn't a senseless question.

I am sorry if I wasnt clear. Asheri seems to think, on what basis I am not sure, that the oracles which H. quotes are oracles that were presented to him as oracles that were given in the past. My point is that one cant really go beyond this unless there are other written records. Just because someone believed that an oracle had been given in the past doesnt mean that it actually was. As far as I am concerned its sufficiently interesting that its in the text representing what some people thought.

I think Asheri is saying Cymaeans were sacrilegious in asking the oracle what to do as it was clear that they had had an obligation to protect Pactyes. When Aristodicus asks the oracle again he is rebuffed. He collects the sparrows and provokes Apollo to say that these sparrows are refugees (like Pactyes) and have his protection. Thus the oracle contradicts itself and doesnt like it, saying that the impious Cymaeans will be destroyed for doing what the oracle says. ‘ναὶ κελεύω, ἵνα γε ἀσεβήσαντες θᾶσσον ἀπόλησθε, ὡς μὴ τὸλοιπὸν περὶ ἱκετέων ἐκδόσιος ἔλθητε ἐπὶ τὸ χρηστήριον.’ The Cymaeans pass on Pactyes to Mytilene and it becomes their political problem.

The focus of the passage is not the mechanics of the oracle but the underlying problems faced by the Cymaeans Mytilene and Chios in dealing with the Persians. Its complicated I am quite prepared to accept I have got this wrong.

[seneca2008]

Hmm, I don't think I said that.

I am a bit confused now about who said what so I will go and have dinner.

[Timothée]

Quoting oneself is never a bad thing, Seneca!

As for polytheism, it is much more intuitive than the highly abstracted monotheism. Just walking about in the nature is enough: clearly there's a god that rains, one that shines, one that thunders, one that blows and one that makes plants grow.

Even the international treasure Stephen Fry considers this thinking sensible in its own right.

[Bart]

@seneca. Thanks for your patience in explaining Asheri. Still, the more I read his comment the more it seems to me he is basically rephrasing what Herodotus has to say in an overcomplicated way.

On the authenticity of the oracles: if Herodotus believed what he wrote down or consciously made things up is indeed an interesting question. But so is the question whether the many things he reports on (in this case the pronouncements made by oracles) actually happenend. I fail to see why asking after this would be senseless. After all, we’re not dealing with things that are a priori unknowable. Archeological evidence might come up –an inscription, a tablet with oracular prophecies etc- that would shed some light on this. Or do you mean it makes no sense until such evidence is dug up? But that would mean that, to take one example, the question ‘did Troy exist’ was without sense in the 18th century but perfectly legit in the 19th. That doesn’t seem right.

[seneca2008]

@Bart

Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

"if Herodotus believed what he wrote down or consciously made things up is indeed an interesting question"

I think you elide what Herodotus may or may not have "believed" (which we can never know even if we can overcome the difficulties of unpacking what "believe" means here) and what he wrote. Asheri says H. didnt make the oracles up thats quite different from saying H. "believed" them. As far as I am concerned all we have is a text with oracles and what Herodotus says about them. The oracles dont have any existence outside of the text (unless they appear in other texts and then we can think about how they relate). The question is how can we possibly escape from the text? (See Martindale "redeeming the text")

All we have are texts and texts which interpret those texts. There is no definitive way of deciding what the relation is between these texts (including what we think about the remains of material culture) and any "historical reality". To use a Roman example, we have the Seneca of Tacitus, Suetonius and Cassius Dio. We also have the Seneca of the prose works and tragedies (and indeed Menippean satire). The idea that it might be possible to use these to construct some kind of "historical" Seneca seems to me an impossibility. Nevertheless its open to us to say what we think these texts mean and to discuss them.

You ask particularly interesting questions about Troy. Troy has always existed in the imagination of those who wrote or read about "Troy". They all thought about it, I think, in different ways. Schliemann's activities at Hisarlik ostensibly uncovered the "Homeric Troy" but in fact unearthing another reimagined "Troy" which doesnt seem any more "real" than the "Troy of texts". Catherine Edwards has written an interesting book "Writing Rome" which deals with how the physical Rome interacts with the Rome of texts which suggests ways in which this topic can be explored.

[Bart]

Houston, we have a philosophical problem

All we have are texts and texts which interpret those texts. There is no definitive way of deciding what the relation is between these texts (including what we think about the remains of material culture) and any "historical reality".

But you do believe there is a ‘historical reality’, do you? That for instance the wars between the Greeks and the Persians took place independent of ‘the texts’?

Last example: forget Troy, take the channel Xerxes dug, according to Herodotus, through the base of mount Athos. Historians were highly sceptical about such a feat, till at the end of last century excavations found that there was such a thing as described by H., in the location he had given and dating back to he right time period. So voilà, there you have your relation bewteen text and this so called historical reality. And there are of course many similar instances.

You seem to be of pragmatist/ post modern bend that I have little affinity with. Which is fine of course, just saying that we seem to differ in our approach to, well, reality.

[seneca2008]

I am not trying to claim that there were no historical events. But as Wittgenstein said "the world is the totality of facts not things". What gives us meaning is the relationship between objects rather than the objects themselves. ( I tried to pick a text here that is not "postmodern" a term I dont much care for but lets let that go. Also I am putting to one side W.'s later disavowal of the Tractatus.)

So in your example the correspondence between an excavation and Herodotus tells us one thing but the reception of Herodotus prior to this excavation tells us something which is also important. If we just pursue a line of argument which we may think is "true" we lose the richness of other interpretations. Unpacking the reasons why previous generations were sceptical about something tells us a great deal about them (and in this case about antiquity). Whether something is "true" or "actually happened" seems a reductive approach.

Moving from cases where there are survivals of material culture ( and these are not ever free from being implicated in other ideologies) it becomes more apparent how difficult it is "to see behind the text" as I think you wish to do. This is the reason I gave the example of Seneca.

I am sure we agree on the nature of reality when it comes to crossing roads but not perhaps when reconstructing the ancient world.

[Bart]

I am sure we agree on the nature of reality when it comes to crossing roads

I do hope you adopt a more 'reductive approach' in those circumstances
Thanks for your reply.

[seneca2008]

Just so that you dont get the idea that i am as dry as dust in my approach. I am fascinated by the idea that Xerxes built a canal and I would love to see the excavation. A few weeks ago I was poking around the excavations of Roman and Etruscan temples in Fiesole. The spring flowers were beautiful and I sat in the theatre wondering what the Romans thought about the stunning view they had of the surrounding countryside.

"reductive" is such a difficult word. I wish I could use it without it seeming to belittle someone else's views. That is not my intention. As you point out reductiveness can be vital on occasion.