De Spiritu - optative

[daivid]

I have been reading the Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu) of Abraham P. Bos and Rein Ferwerda. Even though it is a translation I ended up having a go at the Greek text.

The following is the line that leaves me a little uncertain:
(Aristotle has just stated that the innate spirit can be sustained by either a) respiration or b) concoction [aka digestion] of food)
τούτων ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον ἄν ἐκείνως δόξειεν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς · σῶμα γὰρ σώματος τρέφεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα σῶμα.

This is the translation of Bos and Rein Ferwerda
"Of these two the former manner of nutrition seems just as likely to take place by means of nutritive substance. For a body is nourished by a body and pneuma is a body."

The second half is straightforward but for the first bit the closest I can get is:
of these, the former is not less probable, it seems , than because of the sustenance

And I I don't see why Aristotle has used the optative rather than the present and why ἄν?

Is it the same distinction as in English between "it seems" and "it would seem"?

NB ἐκείνως is a substitution by Bos and Ferwerda. Even if they that is not what Aristotle wrote the Greek must make sense with that substitution or they wouldn't have made it.

[Markos]

τούτων ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον ἄν ἐκείνως δόξειεν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς · σῶμα γὰρ σώματος τρέφεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα σῶμα.

NB ἐκείνως is a substitution by Bos and Ferwerda. Even if they that is not what Aristotle wrote the Greek must make sense with that substitution or they wouldn't have made it.

Do you mean ἐκεῖνος? A substitution for what?

And I I don't see why Aristotle has used the optative rather than the present and why ἄν?

Is it the same distinction as in English between "it seems" and "it would seem"?

Yes, I think this is a case where the English and Greek track pretty well. There is a type of implied condition: ("If I (should) have all my facts right,) Mrs. Clinton would seem to be the presumptive nominee."

[daivid]

τούτων ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον ἄν ἐκείνως δόξειεν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς · σῶμα γὰρ σώματος τρέφεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα σῶμα.

NB ἐκείνως is a substitution by Bos and Ferwerda. Even if they that is not what Aristotle wrote the Greek must make sense with that substitution or they wouldn't have made it.

Do you mean ἐκεῖνος? A substitution for what?

No they definitely have ἐκείνως. It's a substitute for οὐχ οὕτως.

And I I don't see why Aristotle has used the optative rather than the present and why ἄν?

Is it the same distinction as in English between "it seems" and "it would seem"?

Yes, I think this is a case where the English and Greek track pretty well. There is a type of implied condition: ("If I (should) have all my facts right,) Mrs. Clinton would seem to be the presumptive nominee."

Thanks

[Qimmik]

The technical term for this use of the optative is "potential optative."

Smyth 1824:

The potential optative with ἄν states a future possibility, propriety, or likelihood, as an opinion of the speaker; and may be translated by may, might, can (especially with a negative), must, would, should (rarely will, shall). So in Latin velim, videas, cognoscas, credas.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... 99.04.0007

In particular, Smyth 1826:

The potential optative with ἄν is used to soften the statement of an opinion or fact, or to express irony: ἕτερόν τι τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη this is (would be) another matter D. 20.116, νοσοῖμ᾽ ἄν, εἰ νόσημα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς στυγεῖν I must be mad, if it is madness to hate one's foes A. Pr. 978. So often with ἴσως or τάχα perhaps.

a. With a negative, the potential optative may have the force of a strong assertion: ““οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμ᾽, ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύρα_ν” for I will not go away, but I will knock at the door” Ar. Ach. 236.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... 99.04.0007

Although there's a negative, the potential optative here would soften a statement of opinion.

Incidentally, δόξειεν is also a "substitution", i.e., a conjecture by scholars. The manuscripts apparently read δόξει or δόξῃ.

You can download a 19th century edition of the text by Immanuel Bekker here:

https://sites.google.com/site/librarium ... nd-science

I wonder whether what is apparently the reading of the manuscripts, οὐχ οὕτως, could be preserved by making the sentence a question. It would still be awkward, but maybe not an implausible interpretation of the sentence. Alternatively, maybe the second οὐχ could be dropped.

[daivid]

The technical term for this use of the optative is "potential optative."

Smyth 1824:

The potential optative with ἄν states a future possibility, propriety, or likelihood, as an opinion of the speaker; and may be translated by may, might, can (especially with a negative), must, would, should (rarely will, shall). So in Latin velim, videas, cognoscas, credas.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... 99.04.0007

In particular, Smyth 1826:

The potential optative with ἄν is used to soften the statement of an opinion or fact, or to express irony: ἕτερόν τι τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη this is (would be) another matter D. 20.116, νοσοῖμ᾽ ἄν, εἰ νόσημα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς στυγεῖν I must be mad, if it is madness to hate one's foes A. Pr. 978. So often with ἴσως or τάχα perhaps.

a. With a negative, the potential optative may have the force of a strong assertion: ““οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπέλθοιμ᾽, ἀλλὰ κόψω τὴν θύρα_ν” for I will not go away, but I will knock at the door” Ar. Ach. 236.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... 99.04.0007

Although there's a negative, the potential optative here would soften a statement of opinion.

Thanks very much for that. It is much clearer to me now and the explanation makes it easier to be on the look out for further examples.

That Aristotle might want to soften his statement makes sense as he goes on to reject the idea that breathing can be a means of sustenance which in the quoted sentence he says is equally likely.

Incidentally, δόξειεν is also a "substitution", i.e., a conjecture by scholars. The manuscripts apparently read δόξει or δόξῃ.

You can download a 19th century edition of the text by Immanuel Bekker here:

https://sites.google.com/site/librarium ... nd-science

The text after it has been battered into shape by the experts is difficult for me, perhaps too difficult.
A text that is closer to the manuscripts sounds even harder still.

I wonder whether what is apparently the reading of the manuscripts, οὐχ οὕτως, could be preserved by making the sentence a question. It would still be awkward, but maybe not an implausible interpretation of the sentence. Alternatively, maybe the second οὐχ could be dropped.

Making it a question would fit given Aristotle later rejects it.

[Qimmik]

The text after it has been battered into shape by the experts

It's not editors who have "battered" the text--the manuscripts have garbled it, and editors have tried to make sense out of it.

[Qimmik]

The potential optative δόξειεν seems like a secure emendation, with ἴσως and ἄν; the path from οὐχ οὕτως to ἐκείνως doesn't seem as clearly plausible.

But -- thinking this through a little more -- I still find this puzzling, and I don't understand it. He seems to be saying, tentatively, using the potential optative, that nourishment might be the source of the pneuma but I'm not sure I can parse the sentence as it stands. Perhaps διὰ τῆς τροφῆς is an interpolation that was intended to make clear what is a little obscure, namely that A. is referring to nourishment rather than breathing, but it's difficult to fit διὰ τῆς τροφῆς into the sentence. However, διὰ τῆς τροφῆς seems to be what the subsequent clause with γὰρ is talking about.

[mwh]

Note: I wrote this yesterday in response to daivid but wanted to do some checking before posting. But I haven’t, sorry. So I post it as is.

Without checking the context:
τούτων ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον ἄν ἐκείνως δόξειεν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς.
Lit. “Of these (i.e. respiration and concoction) perhaps/I-dare-say in that way (i.e. in the former way, i.e. in the case of respiration) it would seem no less through nourishment.”
εκείνως is adverb, and there’s no “than” (though if there were it would be ἢ οὕτως, “than in the latter way” i.e. by concoction).

He seems (would seem!) to be suggesting that breathing no less than eating is a form of nourishment (τροφή, vb. τρέφεται pass.). Just because it’s not solid food, or not what we think of as solid food, doesn’t mean it doesn’t fulfill the same function, as τροφή.
σωματος τρεφεται is an unusual expression which I don’t understand; I’d have expected σωματι, but presumably there’s a subtle distinction of some kind.

This could be a bit off. I’d need to check the context and/or read the treatise. He’s talking about breath, apparently, not "spirit."

[Qimmik]

Thanks, mwh -- With your explanation, this is beginning to make sense to me. I still don't see how to get from ἐκείνως (the conjectural emendation and presumably what Aristotle or his student or someone else originally wrote, or what the editors think was written in the original text) to οὐχ οὕτως, apparently the reading of the mss. (unless there's another ms. that Bekker wasn't aware of). It's true that ἐκείνως is necessarily logically equivalent to οὐχ οὕτως, but in the context of this sentence, it seems very odd.

The Bekker edition reads hupo somatos, which would solve your problem. Daivid, could you check the text you're reading from?

Incidentally, this is at the beginning of Peri pneumatos, on p. 355 of the Bekker edition I linked to.

He’s talking about breath, apparently, not "spirit."

He's talking about pneuma, whatever that is. He has just used the term ἀναπνοή to mean "breathing" (I think), but maybe he's attempting to distinguish ἀναπνοή, the act of breathing in and out, from pneuma, something like the faculty of breathing or maybe just the essence of being alive. But I guess that's a question for someone who knows something about Aristotelian (or post-Aristotelian?) philosophy.

[mwh]

Still haven’t looked at the text (you can lead a horse to water …), but displacement of εκεινως by ουχ ουτως would be explicable if the latter was originally a gloss on the former. I can’t make sense of ουχ ουτως. Bekker was an exceptionally good reader of manuscripts and knew his Aristotle/"Aristotle" but he often didn’t signal corruption even when he must have recognized it.

pneuma can hardly be the faculty of breathing if it's σωμα. But I should read the treatise!

[daivid]

Still haven’t looked at the text (you can lead a horse to water …), but displacement of εκεινως by ουχ ουτως would be explicable if the latter was originally a gloss on the former. I can’t make sense of ουχ ουτως. Bekker was an exceptionally good reader of manuscripts and knew his Aristotle/"Aristotle" but he often didn’t signal corruption even when he must have recognized it.

That is precisely the justification that Bos and Ferwerda give for the substitution

pneuma can hardly be the faculty of breathing if it's σωμα. But I should read the treatise!

Which is the other thing that confuses me. When I read the Greek it seems to say that the breathing being a means of feeding the pneuma because "a body is nourished by a body and pneuma is a body." But I'm not sure I am connecting διὰ τῆς τροφῆς correctly the rest. It seems to be connected to ἐκείνως but is it?

(According to Bos and Ferwerda pneuma is being used in the sense of an innate vital force and not breathing and that part of their argument I follow completely).

EDIT
There were more replies than I expected - Hopefully when I read the ones I inadvertently skipped my difficulties with the Greek will disappear.

[daivid]

Bos and Ferwerda don't include the Greek text and instead provide a translation but once I started reading it became clear to me that it is really a commentary on the Greek text. Hence I looked at the Greek text in Aristotle. De spiritu. of Amneris Roselli. Interestingly she seems to have a problem with οὐχ οὕτως as she puts it in square brackets but not being able to read Italian I have no idea what she thinks should be there.

To better give the context, here are the two lines before:
ἢ ὡς τἆλλα μέρη προσγιγνομένου τινὸς; προσγίνεται δὲ τροφὴ τοῖς ἐμψχοις, ὤστε ταύτην σκεπτέον ποία τε καὶ πόθεν · δύο δὴ τρόποι δι' ὧν γίνεται, ἤ διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀναπωοῆς, ἤ διὰ τῆς κατὰ τήν τῆς τροφῆς προσφορὰν πέψεως, κατάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

I am kind of relieved that it isn't just me who has trouble working out how διὰ τῆς τροφῆς connects with the rest. It probably, though, suggests that I should stick with easier texts. I was enticed in with the promise of a translation. (Though I am finding Bos and Ferwerda's book very hard going it does seem very well argued and ideal for someone who knows Greek and Aristotle better than me).

Though Aristotle eventually rejects the idea that air breathed in can be a form of sustenance he never rejects it in principle. The objections include that as the taken in sustenance must have a waste product it absurd for the waste product to be expelled the way it came in.
(For me there is a big elephant in the room here - Aristotle is completely wrong here. CO2 is expelled the way oxygen came in. And it doesn't follow because all animals he had encountered expel the waste product thru an anus that breathing must do the same if it is providing sustenance. And of course there are animals that Aristotle that didn't know about like flatworms that don't have anuses and so expel conventional food the way it came in. )

[Qimmik]

Daivid, is this in your text or did you make a scribal error?

ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀναπωοῆς,

[daivid]

Daivid, is this in your text or did you make a scribal error?

ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀναπωοῆς,

A typo by me, I'm afraid. Here, with two other typos corrected it is again, hopefully as Roselli intended:

ἢ ὡς τἆλλα μέρη προσγιγνομένου τινὸς; προσγίνεται δὲ τροφὴ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις, ὥστε ταύτην σκεπτέον ποία τε καὶ πόθεν · δύο δὴ τρόποι δι' ὧν γίνεται, ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἤ διὰ τῆς κατὰ τήν τῆς τροφῆς προσφορὰν πέψεως, κατάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις.

EDIT
One of the two ἤ διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς removed. Thanks Bill.

[mwh]

Thanks for typing out the immediate context daivid, but I’ve now looked at the opening in Bekker linked by Qimmik, to whom also thanks. He's proposing to investigate the nature and source of τροφή (“nourishment”), which he ties to the condition of the πνεῦμα (“breath,” but he claims it as a bodily substance). The two ways of getting τροφή are by breathing (αναπνοή, respiration) and by digesting food, and he moots (ισως δοξειεν αν) that breathing no less than digestion proceeds “through τροφή” (that’s if we accept εκεινως, which at least makes sense), on the principle that “body is fed (τρέφεται, is provided with its τροφή) by body, and pneuma is body.” The next question then is how it (the τροφή obtained by breathing) gets into the bloodstream, blood being “the final τροφή.” It's somehow sucked in arterially.

I haven’t read further, though clearly it’s interesting for peripatetic theory of how the body and its pneuma work, on which there must be a ton of literature, all unknown to me.

[daivid]

Michael, your overview puts διὰ τῆς τροφῆς in context much better than Bos and Ferwerda's translation and indeed seems closer to the Greek despite not being intended as a translation. Hence it really makes sense - thanks.
However διὰ with genitive seems, however closely I read its definition, seems to be causal and cause and effect here seem to be the other way round.

The nearest I can get without departing from the dictionary definition too much is
breathing is there because of the need for nutrition.
which would make διὰ a bit like "in order to".

Notwithstanding that - it does make sense now and I shall be on the look out for similar uses of διὰ but I would not be able to use διὰ in the way Aristotle does here myself.

[Qimmik]

διά with genitive -- "through, by means of" (among other usages). This excerpt from LSJ διά will give you some idea of a part of the semantic range of this word:

III. causal, through, by,

a. of the Agent, δι᾽ ἀλλέλων or -ου ἐπικηρυκεύεσθαι, ποιεῖσθαι, by the mouth of . ., Id.1.69,6.4, cf. 1.113; “δι᾽ ἑρμηνέως λέγειν” X.An.2.3.17, etc.; “τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ Κυρίου δ. τοῦ προφήτου” Ev.Matt.1.22; “δι᾽ ἑκόντων ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δ. βίας ποιεῖσθαι” Pl.Phlb.58b; πεσόντ᾽ ἀλλοτρίας διαὶ γυναικός by her doing, A.Ag.448 (lyr.); “ἐκ θεῶν γεγονὼς δ. βασιλέων πεφυκώς” X.Cyr.7.2.24; δι᾽ ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν τι of oneself, not by another's agency, ib.1.1.4, etc.; but also, by oneself alone, unassisted, D.15.14, cf. 22.38.

b. of the Instrument or Means, δ. χειρῶν by hand (prop. by holding between the hands), “δι᾽ ὁσίων χ. θιγών” S. OC470; also δ. χερῶν λαβεῖν, δ. χειρὸς ἔχειν in the hand, Id.Ant. 916, 1258 (but τὰ τῶν ξυμμάχων δ. χειρὸς ἔχειν to keep a firm hand on, Th.2.13); “δ. στέρνων ἔχειν” S.Ant.639; “ἡ ἀκούουσα πηγὴ δι᾽ ὤτων” Id.OT1387; “δ. στόματος ἔχειν” X.Cyr.1.4.25; “δ. μνήμης ἔχειν” Luc.Cat.9; “αἱ δ. τοῦ σώματος ἡδοναί” X.Mem.1.5.6; δ. λόγων συγγίγνεσθαι to hold intercourse by word, Pl.Plt.272b; “δ. λόγου ἀπαγγέλλειν” Act.Ap.15.27; “δι᾽ ἐπιστολῶν” 2 Ep.Cor.10.9, POxy. 1070.15 (iii A. D.).

c. of Manner (where διά with its Noun freq. serves as an Adv.), “δ. μέθης ποιήσασθαι τὴν συνουσίαν” Pl.Smp.176e; παίω δι᾽ ὀργῆς through passion, in passion, S.OT807; δ. τάχους, = ταχέως, Id.Aj.822, Th.1.63 (but δ. ταχέων ib.80, al.); δ. σπουδῆς in haste, hastily, E.Ba.212; δι᾽ αἰδοῦς with reverence, respectfully, ib.441; δ. ψευδῶν ἔπη lying words, Id.Hel.309; αἱ δ. καρτερίας ἐπιμέλειαι long-continued exertions, X.Mem.2.1.20; δι᾽ ἀκριβείας, δ. πάσης ἀκρ., Pl.Ti.23d, Lg.876c; “δ. σιγῆς” Id.Grg.450c; “δ. ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις ἐγένετο” Th.6.10; “οὐ δι᾽ αἰνιγμάτων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐναργῶς γέγραπται” Aeschin.3.121; “δι᾽ αἵματος, οὐ δ. μέλανος τοὺς νόμους ὁ Δράκων ἔγραψεν” Plu.Sol.17: also with Adjs., δ. βραχέων, δ. μακρῶν τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, Isoc.14.3, Pl.Grg.449b; ἀποκρίνεσθαι δ. βραχυτάτων ibid. d; cf. infr. IV.

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/tex ... y%3Ddia%2F

[mwh]

daivid,

The text has already given us three examples of δια+gen., "through". There are two ways “through which” τροφή takes place (δι’ ὧν γίνεται), either “through respiration” or “through digestion” (δια … πέψεως). In these cases “through” means “by means of,” and this is a usage you can look out for in your reading. It's very common. διὰ τῆς τροφῆς in our sentence will exemplify just the same use, if it’s sound, but the context is problematic.

“because of” is διά+acc., a different animal. “on account of” usually captures the sense of it.

But I think you may be on to something in suggesting “breathing is there because of the need for nutrition.” That’s impossible with διὰ τῆς τροφῆς, but if διὰ τῆς τροφῆς is corrupt for διὰ τὴν τροφήν (an easy corruption), he could be saying that breathing is (or “might perhaps seem to be”—since in the event he rejects it, you say) “no less on account of τροφή (than is digestion),” i.e. that the process of respiration might be thought to function just as much as does the process of digestion as providing bodily sustenance. We can’t be at all sure of the text, but I do find διὰ τὴν τροφήν more tractable than διὰ τῆς τροφῆς. Perhaps you could propose it to Bos and Ferwerda and immortalize your name in an apparatus criticus!

[daivid]

Thanks very much for the help. The sentence is now much clearer now. I have recently been feeling that the lines between the accusative and the genitive version of διά were getting blurred. That distinction is much clearer now.

Nice of you to suggest I should claim the credit for a proposal that the accusative could have been what Aristotle actually wrote. Due to lack of experience I tend to see too many possibilities but it is interesting that in this case someone with that experience considers it worth a look.

Thank you again for both of your help.